Public financial management for PRSP implementation in Malawi: formal and informal PFM institutions in a decentralising system by Leiderer, Stefan et al.
www.ssoar.info
Public financial management for PRSP
implementation in Malawi: formal and informal PFM
institutions in a decentralising system
Leiderer, Stefan; Hodick, Benjamin; Kabey, Esther; Roll, Michael; Schnitzer,
Stefanie; Ziegenbein, Julia
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Leiderer, S., Hodick, B., Kabey, E., Roll, M., Schnitzer, S., & Ziegenbein, J. (2007). Public financial management for
PRSP implementation in Malawi: formal and informal PFM institutions in a decentralising system. (DIE Studies, 28).
Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-111233
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.


 Public Financial Management for PRSP  
Implementation in Malawi 
 
 
German Development Institute (DIE) 
 
The German Development Institute (DIE) is a multidisciplinary research, consultancy 
and training institute for Germany’s bilateral and for multilateral development coop-
eration. On the basis of independent research, it acts as consultant to public institu-
tions in Germany and abroad on current issues of cooperation between developed and 
developing countries. Through its 9-months training course, the German Development 
Institute prepares German and European university graduates for a career in the field 
of development policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stefan Leiderer has been a research fellow at the German Development Institute since 
2003. His main areas of activity are public finances in developing countries and aid 
effectiveness. 
E-mail: stefan.leiderer@die-gdi.de 
 
 
 
 Studies  
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Financial Management for PRSP Implementation  
in Malawi 
Formal and Informal PFM Institutions in a Decentralising System  
 
Stefan Leiderer 
Benjamin Hodick 
Esther Kabey 
Michael Roll 
Stefanie Schnitzer 
Julia Ziegenbein 
 
 
 
 
 
Bonn 2007 
28
 Studies / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
ISSN 1860-0468 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public financial management for PRSP implementation in Malawi : 
formal and informal PFM institutions in a decentralising system / Stefan 
Leiderer… – Bonn : Dt. Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2007. – (Studies /  
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik ; 28) 
ISBN 978-3-88985-345-5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH 
Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn 
℡ +49 (0)228 94927-0 
 +49 (0)228 94927-130 
E-Mail: die@die-gdi.de 
http://www.die-gdi.de 
 
Preface 
The present study on ‘Public Financial Management for PRSP Implementa-
tion in Malawi’ was conducted within the framework of the postgraduate 
training course at the German Development Institute (DIE) from November 
2004 to May 20005. The team consisted of five postgraduate students with 
various academic backgrounds under the direction of Stefan Leiderer from 
the DIE professional staff. The main findings were presented and discussed at 
a workshop in Lilongwe on 26 April 2005.  
The study benefited hugely from the support and contributions of various 
persons and organisations. First and foremost, we would like to emphasize 
the contribution of our cooperation partner the National Local Government 
Finance Committee (NLGFC) as well as the sector programme ‘State and 
Democracy / Public Finance Reform’ of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Tech-
nische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in the preparation and realisation of the re-
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Summary 
Recent years have seen a number of fundamental and far-reaching reorienta-
tions in the debate on international development policy and cooperation; for 
one, Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) – initially formulated as a pre-
requisite for debt relief under the HIPC initiative – have become widely ac-
cepted as comprehensive strategic frameworks for many developing coun-
tries’ efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Prepared 
through a participatory process, PRS Papers (PRSPs) are meant to describe a 
country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes to 
promote growth and reduce poverty as well as associated external financing 
needs.  
International donors in turn have committed themselves to align their support 
to developing countries’ own strategic policies and to rely increasingly on the 
recipient countries’ own administrative systems and procedures to manage 
donor contributions. Consequently, PRSPs have also become central to the 
provision of development assistance in terms of both grants and loans as they 
represent the key reference document for support from bi- and multilateral 
donor agencies through Programme-based Approaches (PBAs), including 
general and sector budget support.  
At the implementation stage, PRSPs have to be translated into medium-term 
policies and programmes, which in turn have to be implemented through 
annual budgets. Accordingly, the debate on PRSP implementation and direct 
budget support increasingly focuses on the quality of public financial man-
agement (PFM). 
Another important topical issue in the international development policy de-
bate is the continued drive for decentralisation in developing countries. By 
moving decision-making closer to the grassroots and thereby strengthening 
the political participation and representation of the poor, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of public service delivery for poverty reduction, or so it is hoped, 
can be improved. At the same time, however, decentralization renders the 
processes of budget planning, execution and control significantly more com-
plex, multiplying coordination requirements and possibly overtaxing scarce 
human and technical capacities in developing countries.  
 Stefan Leiderer et al. 
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PRSP implementation and decentralisation both involve decisions about how 
public resources are spent. Good management of public finances is thus of 
cruciaveryl importancet for the successful implementation of PRSPs and 
effective decentralisation. In this study Public Financial Management (PFM) 
is understood in its broadest sense, i.e. not as a purely technical process re-
garding the management of financial flows and public accounts but rather 
with a more comprehensive governance perspective covering:  
— the budget cycle, including strategic and budget planning, budget formu-
lation, budget execution and budget control and evaluation; 
— the legal and institutional framework; 
— human and technical capacity for the management of public finances. 
This study examines how the PRSP approach and decentralisation efforts 
interact with each other by studying constraining factors in Malawi’s Public 
Financial Management at central and local government level that impede the 
implementation of the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS). The 
main focus is thus on implications of a decentralising PFM-system for PRSP 
implementation.  
Common weaknesses of PFM systems in developing countries 
PFM systems in developing countries face numerous problems. Weak institu-
tions, capacity constraints (financial, technical, human resources) and inade-
quate budgeting techniques, together with unfavourable external factors such 
as macroeconomic instability and dependency on donor funding, prevent 
budgets from working effectively and delivering the desired outcomes. How-
ever, the observed poor practices are not necessarily rooted exclusively in 
poor formal PFM systems. In fact, many developing countries (usually under 
pressure from international donors, in particular the World Bank and the 
IMF) have introduced modern PFM legislation and institutional set-ups over 
the years. As a consequence, the formal framework for PFM in donor de-
pendent developing countries is often relatively well designed. However, in 
many cases, these formal frameworks for the management of public finances 
are not adhered to in practice, which is dominated by informal rules and pro-
cedures. 
Public Financial Management for PRSP Implementation in Malawi 
German Development Institute 3 
Wherever this is the case, the effectiveness of multi-year planning and annual 
budgeting as instruments to implement national strategic policies, such as 
poverty reduction strategies, is severely compromised, and so are the pros-
pects for effective policy making for development and poverty reduction. The 
effective implementation of PRSPs, thus, to a large extent, hinges on a good 
match between formal PFM rules and procedures and actual PFM practices 
and is closely linked to at least three key factors: (i) the political will of the 
stakeholders in the budget process, (ii) an elaborated institutional framework 
that supplies them with the right incentives and efficient control mechanisms, 
and (iii) sufficient technical, human and financial capacity that enables them 
to execute their tasks throughout the budget cycle efficiently and effectively. 
Most research so far focuses either on PRSP implementation and PFM at the 
central level or on decentralisation and local planning separately, with very 
few studies attempting to link the two issues. In contrast, this study covers 
PFM at local level and specifically examines how it is integrated into the 
national PFM system with regard to implementing national strategic priorities 
in a decentralised system. For this purpose the links (both where they exist 
and where they are missing) and the incompatibilities between PFM at local 
and central government level are examined. 
Research approach 
To study these complex relations, a case study seems the most adequate ap-
proach; Malawi was chosen as a typical showcase for a poverty-stricken 
developing country in Sub-Saharan Africa, pursuing both, the implementation 
of a national PRSP and an ambitious decentralisation agenda in parallel. In 
early 2005 Malawi also provided a somewhat special and particularly inter-
esting context for this study, due to its recent history: Gross irregularities and 
massive overspending had led a number of donors to suspend development 
assistance in 2001. In 2004, however, when new president was elected, he 
was initially given considerable credit by the international donor community 
for appearing to be strongly committed to policies aiming at fiscal stability 
and austerity. Malawi in 2005, therefore, provides a particularly interesting 
case for a study on the role of political commitment and other potential fac-
tors for the formality and quality of PFM practices in a typical poor sub-
Saharan African country.  
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A particular focus of this study is on education and health to account for the 
central role these sectors play in the MPRSP and with regard to poverty re-
duction in general. Furthermore, in Malawi and many other countries, educa-
tion and health routinely feature prominently in the PRSP and represent pilot 
sectors for decentralisation reforms or new approaches in development coop-
eration. 
The findings of this study are predominantly based on qualitative data col-
lected during a three month field trip to Malawi.  
The case of Malawi 
Most studies conducted on PFM in Malawi to date refer to the situation under 
the Muluzi administration. Their findings are rather similar: the budget itself 
is considered a “shadow budget”, the budget process is judged to be either 
extremely weak or even a mere “theatre that masks the real distribution and 
spending”. Usually, political patronage and interference from the top level are 
blamed for creating informal practices that undermine formal institutions of 
the budget process. The deliberateness of these political interferences is gen-
erally not doubted by the cited studies. However, when the Muluzi admini-
stration was replaced in 2004, the IMF and other donors, were quick to hail 
the new administration as a great hope for Malawi, following a new policy 
approach and being serious about fiscal austerity and the fight against corrup-
tion. This enthusiasm was in part driven by the new president’s decision to 
appoint a former director of the Africa department at the IMF his Minister of 
Finance. However, from the beginning many observers considered it prob-
lematic that the apparently strong commitment to better and more transparent 
political leadership depended on very few prominent figures at the top. It 
was, therefore, of particular interest to assess the impact of apparently im-
proved political commitment to sound PFM at the top in Malawi on the qual-
ity of PFM on the ground. 
Malawi is a unitary state with strong centralistic features. However, in recent 
years the state, has begun to devolve functions and responsibilities to local 
levels of government. This new approach is not least due to donors, who felt 
that a fresh impetus was needed and hence strongly argued for the need to 
develop a national a decentralisation strategy. Thus, when in 1995 a new 
constitution was adopted it entailed the requirement to establish local gov-
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ernment authorities. In 1998 the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) was 
approved, which includes establishing political decentralisation through 
democratically elected local assemblies and the devolution of central gov-
ernment functions to local government level. 
The theory and practice of public financial management in Malawi  
Since the mid-nineties, the formal legal and institutional framework for pub-
lic financial management in Malawi has undergone a series of reforms. New 
legislation regulating finance, audit and procurement was written, providing 
for relatively clear cut responsibilities and time schedules of the budget pro-
cess in Malawi. Accordingly, recent studies on Malawi’s PFM system con-
clude that the legal and institutional framework for PFM in Malawi is rela-
tively well designed and in principle provides a good starting point for a 
sound management of public finances for example. One could, therefore, 
expect that in principle the formal legal and institutional PFM framework in 
Malawi should provide for effective fiscal and expenditure planning, budget 
preparation, execution, and control in line with the priorities set in the Ma-
lawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP). 
At the same time, however, the budget process in Malawi is judged by most 
assessments as extremely weak. This is due to the fact that formal institutions 
and procedures bear little relevance for PFM practice in Malawi. In fact, 
instead of being guided by the relatively sound formal legal and institutional 
framework, the actual PFM process is characterised by three main features: 
Ad hoc mode of planning and budgeting: Malawi’s PFM is not characterised 
by routine standard bureaucratic procedures but rather by an ad hoc mode of 
action throughout the PFM process. 
Informal practices: Apart from deliberate manipulation of processes for per-
sonal gain, informal practices are often used as pragmatic solutions to cope 
with unexpected problems. 
Uncertainty: Malawi’s PFM system is characterised by systematic uncer-
tainty, in particular with regard to (i) the availability of financial resources, 
(ii) the validity of formal rules, (iii) roles and responsibilities, (iv) future 
political developments, and (v) the progress of reforms.  
These features are pervasive throughout Malawi’s PFM system and the budget 
process in particular. Most actors involved in the process contribute to this out-
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come to varying degrees and are at the same time negatively affected by it. 
Determinants of informal PFM practices in Malawi 
The observed gap between the formal framework for PFM and actual PFM 
practice in Malawi is rooted in a wide range of causes. While the fact that 
PFM processes in Malawi are predominantly shaped by informal institutions 
and procedures is widely recognised, most studies of the issue do not go into 
the details of the various underlying causes. Mostly, the reason for informal 
PFM practices is seen almost exclusively in a lack of political commitment 
by government and the bureaucracy. In contrast to this, the findings of the 
field research for this study, suggest that although an important one, lack of 
political commitment is only one reason among many for Malawi’s PFM 
system being characterised by informal practices; and, what is more impor-
tant, it seems not necessarily the most pressing problem with regard to effec-
tive MPRSP implementation. 
From the analysis of the collected qualitative data, five key areas can be iden-
tified leading to Malawi’s PFM system being characterised by persistent an 
ad hoc mode of action, informal procedures and systemic uncertainty:  
1. Capacity for PFM 
Although Malawi’s government institutions suffer from understaffing, the 
key problems with regard to capacity for PFM are:  
– Lack of adequately qualified staff in key positions for PFM;  
– Insufficient equipment and financial resources;  
– Shortcomings in organisational and human resource management.  
2. Resources for administrative PFM processes 
The substantial lack of funds in the civil service even for the most basic ad-
ministrative processes threatens the functioning of the PFM system and leads 
to poor budgetary outcomes.  
3. Donor impact on PFM 
Poorly coordinated and unaligned donor activities tend to weaken annual 
and medium term budget planning and contribute to undermining budget 
credibility.  
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4. Coordination for PFM 
Poor coordination between ministries, departments and agencies as well as 
between different levels of government undermines the whole budget pro-
cess. 
5. Commitment  
Lack of political commitment to sound PFM used to be a critical source of 
uncertainty in the PFM process in Malawi. With the new leadership, there 
were positive signs of credible commitment to accountability and effective-
ness of PFM, initially giving ground to the hope that substantial improve-
ments in Malawi’s PFM performance will soon materialise. However, it must 
be recognised that much of the old systems of inappropriate power distribu-
tion and unhelpful incentives remain. 
Against the background of these multidimensional shortcomings that cause 
Malawi’s PFM being characterised by uncertainty, ad-hoc planning and 
budgeting, and informal practices the analysis conducted for this study sug-
gests that informal practices are often a compromise between what is legally 
required and what actors can realise in the respective situation. These prac-
tices are informal in the sense that they are not legally or institutionally pro-
vided for. However, this does not automatically imply that all of these infor-
mal practices are necessarily strictly illegal or actually bad. As matter of fact, 
in many cases they represent rational second best solutions to PFM problems 
by good willing actors facing the described constraints.  
Although commitment seems absolutely essential as a precondition for re-
forming and improving PFM performance, it seems that by itself it cannot 
solve the more systemic problems that consist in a severe lack of resources 
and capacity as well as poor coordination and bad donor behaviour. Given 
these constraints, even with improved political commitment the following 
conclusions are likely to remain valid: 
— Enforcing accountability is extremely difficult in a PFM system such as 
Malawi’s. 
— The relevance of formal rules and procedures for PFM in Malawi is 
limited and is being undermined in the process.  
— The effectiveness of Malawi’s PFM system is limited and therefore the 
implementation of strategic policies (e.g. the MPRS) through this sys-
tem is unlikely. 
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Particularly in a context of political transition as in Malawi, decentralisation 
tends to further complicate the PFM system and procedures, increasing the 
likeliness that the problems identified in this study are exacerbated to a con-
siderable extend. 
Recommendations 
– Establishment of an operational link between PRSP and local 
planning and budgeting procedures: Currently, there is no opera-
tional mechanism linking local planning and budgeting procedures 
to priorities set at the national level. However, even if some stake-
holders doubt the need for such a link it needs to be understood that 
if devolution is taken forward, in particular in the sectors covered 
most prominently in the PRSP (health and education), such a link is 
indispensable if at the same time a meaningful PRSP approach is to 
be pursued. 
– Improved donor coordination: The Government of Malawi should 
take the lead in donor coordination. The responsibility of coordina-
tion, however, should not be left to the Malawian side alone. Donors 
should encourage, support and actively empower the GoM to take 
its lead in donor coordination by coordinating their activities as well 
as by harmonising their modes of aid delivery and reporting  
– Better alignment of donor support to Malawian PFM processes: 
In order to strengthen Malawian institutions and the formal PFM 
processes and to reduce uncertainty in the system, donors should 
align their procedures much more consequently to the Malawian 
PFM processes. This is especially important for the adherence to 
timeframes and deadlines throughout the budget cycle, particularly 
in the budget planning and execution phase. 
– Binding medium-term commitments to improve the predictabil-
ity of donor funding: Considering the dependency of Malawi on 
donor funding, donors should make detailed, binding and long-term 
pledges. This will increase the credibility and relevance of the 
budget as cash shortfalls in approved budget votes can be avoided. 
Apart from that it enables sound medium-term planning. 
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– Pooling technical assistance for capacity development for PFM: 
Donors play an important role in financing and organising capacity 
development. However, donor-financed capacity building measures 
are not always well communicated to and coordinated with activities 
of the Malawian government. The Department of Human Resource 
Management and Development (DHRMD) in the Office of the 
President does not have a comprehensive overview of ongoing train-
ing measures as donors tend to cooperate directly with sector minis-
tries or the local government level, in part deliberately circumvent-
ing the DHRMD. In order to improve coordination and align donor 
activities to Malawian priorities, donors should pool their technical 
assistance and support a comprehensive and prioritised catalogue of 
systematic training measures that are closely connected to PFM re-
forms and instruments. The pooled fund should be under the super-
vision of the DHRMD. Capacity building might be necessary for 
this purpose in the DHRMD for this task. 
– New modalities to deliver capacity building for local authorities: 
Especially for the local level, where the need for capacity develop-
ment is even more pressing and uncoordinated donor approaches 
have in the past undermined existing capacity, donors should con-
sider pooling resources to directly support capacity development of 
local authorities. For this purpose, establishing a mini-basket partly 
or fully financed by donors and based on an elaborated and priori-
tised catalogue of capacity building activities should be taken into 
consideration. These activities should be (i) systematically linked to 
PFM reforms, (ii) evenly distributed among districts and (iii) exe-
cuted in a timely manner. They should include measures both for the 
executive and for the legislative branch of government. However, at 
the same time the mechanism must ensure that specific and some-
times very different capacity development needs of individual dis-
tricts can be effectively addressed.  
– Strengthened support for the National Assembly to improve 
budget scrutiny and control: Malawi’s National Assembly is se-
verely underfunded. In the light of development approaches such as 
PRSPs, budget support and programme-based approaches interna-
tional donors focussed much on the executive. Currently very few 
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donors are supporting the National Assembly. In order to increase 
parliament’s relevance and its ability to contribute to a sound PFM 
by executing its oversight functions, it is recommended that more 
development assistance be directed towards the National Assembly. 
In order to minimize coordination needs, it is suggested that donor 
agencies pool their funds and leave the programme implementation 
to one lead donor. This could be done similar to the way DFID is 
currently contributing funds to the CIDA-run parliamentary pro-
gramme. 
– Provision of equipment and financial resources for administra-
tive processes: One important capacity shortcoming in Malawi’s 
PFM system is insufficient equipment and financial resources in 
government institutions, especially at local level. Donors should 
continue to assist local authorities by providing equipment. How-
ever, although maintenance of equipment is not always given prior-
ity, it has to be kept in mind that often local authorities simply do 
not have enough own resources to cover operational costs such as 
car maintenance. Therefore, it must be ensured that the responsibil-
ity to cover operational costs is clearly assigned and their coverage 
is guaranteed. As the resource envelope of  local government insti-
tutions is usually thin, donors should consider financing recurrent 
costs by providing some form of budgetary support. Donors should 
also take into account that spare parts for special equipment and 
technologies are not always available or affordable in Malawi. 
Therefore, donors should rely more on domestic procurement in or-
der to allow local authorities to acquire equipment and technologies 
that are locally available in Malawi.  
– Reduced salary gap between the public sector and private enti-
ties or donor organisations for middle-level staff: High staff 
turnover in Malawian government and oversight institutions both at 
central and local level is an important factor that hampers the PFM 
process. This is partly due to relatively low salaries for middle-level 
staff. Therefore, it is important to reduce the salary gap between the 
public sector and employees working for the private sector or donor 
organisations in order to attract and retain qualified employees in 
the public sector. The GoM should continue to implement the Civil 
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Service Pay and Employment Reform to render middle-level posi-
tions in public institutions more attractive for qualified personnel. 
– Reduced payment of allowances and their transformation into a 
fixed component of civil servants´ salaries: The payment of al-
lowances to civil servants for the attendance of workshops and 
meetings is a common way to top up salaries and was initially in-
tended to improve civil servants’ performance. However, allow-
ances render the salary system of civil servants intransparent and in 
fact create perverse incentives. Therefore, it should be considered to 
raise salaries by fixed sums and in exchange reduce allowances to 
the mere refunding of actually incurred transport and catering costs. 
Donors should support this policy and avoid creating adverse incen-
tives through the payment of high allowances themselves for work-
shop attendance. 
– Better incentives for civil servants to work in remote areas: 
GoM faces serious difficulties to attract qualified staff to districts in 
remote areas, where living and working conditions are poor. It thus 
seems necessary to create more and better incentives for civil ser-
vants to work in remote districts by compensating them for less at-
tractive living conditions.  
– Merit-based and transparent recruitment and promotion of civil 
servants: GoM should ensure that the recruitment und promotion of 
civil servants is strictly merit-based and transparent. The govern-
ment should therefore guarantee that adequately qualified people are 
recruited for vacant positions and the promotion of civil servants is 
mainly based on good performance, Donors should pay particular 
attention to these issues and follow up on government’s commit-
ments. 
– Generating multiplier effects for capacity development: Introduc-
ing new PFM tools should always be accompanied by systematic, 
long-term and timely capacity development. It has to be ensured that 
institutions´ capacity is developed instead of solely individuals´. This 
involves the establishment of mechanisms to disseminate specific 
knowledge acquired by individuals to all relevant stakeholders in or-
der to preserve the gained knowledge and capacity for the institution. 
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– Improved coordination between MoF and MEPD: Coordination 
between the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Planning and Development (MEPD), in particular with re-
gard to ensuring the consistency of the Public Sector Investment 
Programme (PSIP) and the capital budget, is not always satisfactory. 
GoM should consider establishing a mechanism guaranteeing con-
sistency of the first year of the PSIP and the capital budget. This 
seems to be a necessary precondition to increase transparency 
within the system, enforce the accountability of MoF and MEPD 
and to ensure that national investment projects are really selected 
according to national priorities as stated in the MPRSP. One neces-
sary precondition for this is that sector ministries follow formal pro-
cedures and submit their project proposals exclusively to MEPD. 
– Better involvement of local stakeholders in the recruitment of 
District Secretariat staff to strengthen accountability between 
local entities: The recruitment process for key staff is still very 
long, unpredictable and centralised, above all for the local govern-
ment level. In the medium term it may prove useful to increase the 
participation of local authorities in the selection of candidates for 
District Secretariats so that candidates feel more accountable to the 
local stakeholders. This could be achieved, for example, by chang-
ing the composition of the recruitment commission in the Ministry 
of Local Government and Rural Development (MoLGRD), giving 
more weight to local stakeholders such as the district commissioners 
and representatives of the District Executive Committee and District 
Assemblies. In the long run, the GoM could take into consideration 
whether responsibilities for the recruitment of local level staff 
should be transferred to the districts in order to reduce bureaucracy 
and increase the accountability of local civil servants to local gov-
ernment. 
– Performance-based resource allocation to local assemblies: Lo-
cal assemblies which are more committed to own revenue genera-
tion should benefit from central government transfers, based on the 
“performance matrix”, created by the NLGFC. This benchmark tool 
can be used to strengthen the awareness and creativity among local 
assemblies to become more autonomous in financial matters.  
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– Donor support for capacity to generate revenue generation at 
local level: More attention needs be paid to revenue generating 
abilities of the state and the rural districts in particular. One possible 
option to broaden the local revenue base would be to assist districts 
with the costly and time consuming activity of valuing and rating 
areas to levy property tax. 
– Better alignment of donor support to DDPs: Donors financing 
projects at district level must make sure not to undermine local 
structures and procedures. In particular, local planning procedures 
have to be taken serious and as a rule only projects emerging from 
local District Development Plans should receive substantial donor 
support.  
– Consequent support to and use of the new Local Development 
Fund: Existing financing mechanisms to fund local development 
projects should be consolidated into the proposed Local Develop-
ment Fund (LDF) with the objective to 
(i) Support planning and management of development re-
sources at the assembly and community levels; 
(ii) Provide resources which ensure that development in-
vestment respond to the priority development needs; 
(iii) Facilitate the implementation of the National Decen-
tralisation Policy; and 
(iv) Enhance the accountability of local authorities to their 
constituents.  
All donors supporting Malawi’s decentralisation policy should sup-
port the establishment and implementation of the LDF and align 
their activities and procedures accordingly. 
– Continued donor support to the NLGFC in order to ensure ef-
fective decentralisation: The NLGFC is an appropriate institution 
for supporting local government in financial management issues, 
capacity building and local development planning. The staff seems 
to be highly committed and adequately qualified. Therefore, donors 
should support the work of NLGFC in a coordinated manner with a 
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medium- to long-term perspective. The most pressing need of 
NLGFC is getting additional human resources rather than receiving 
technical training of existing staff. Now seems to be a particularly 
good time to discuss the form of support for the NLGFC. In the 
course of phasing out the Decentralisation Secretariat, some of this 
institution’s responsibilities are being taken over by NLGFC, par-
ticularly with regard to local planning. Taking a medium- to long-
term perspective in supporting NLGFC requires that regular evalua-
tions are carried out to enquire whether the structure and responsi-
bilities of NLGFC are still adequate for facilitating decentralisation 
or whether they have to be adapted. At the same time it is critical 
that donor’s support to NLGFC is evaluated regularly and, if neces-
sary, adapted to new requirements. 
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1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen a number of fundamental and far-reaching reorienta-
tions in the debate on international development policy and cooperation; 
Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) – initially formulated as a pre-requisite 
for debt relief under the HIPC initiative – have become widely accepted as 
comprehensive strategic frameworks for many developing countries’ efforts 
to reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Prepared through a 
participatory process involving civil society and development partners, these 
papers (PRSPs) are meant to describe a country's macroeconomic, structural 
and social policies and programmes to promote growth and reduce poverty as 
well as associated external financing needs (World Bank 2005). By June 
2006, fifty countries had prepared a full PRSP (World Bank 2006a).  
International donors in turn have committed themselves to align their support 
to developing countries’ own strategic policies and to rely increasingly on the 
recipient countries’ own administrative systems to manage donor contribu-
tions.1 Consequently, PRSPs have also become central to the provision of 
development assistance in terms of both grants and loans (ODI 2004, 3) as 
they represent the key reference document for support from bi- and multilat-
eral donor agencies through Programme-based Approaches (PBAs), including 
general and sector budget support.  
At the implementation stage, PRSPs have to be translated into medium-term 
policies and programmes, which in turn have to be implemented through 
annual budgets. Donors are increasingly funding these budgets. Accordingly, 
the debate on PRSP implementation and direct budget support increasingly 
focuses on the quality of public financial management (PFM), or – to stick to 
the jargon – Good Financial Governance criteria (cf. IMF / EO 2004, 4; GTZ 
2006). 
There is another important topical issue in the current debate on international 
development policy, besides the discussion on PRSPs, PBAs and PFM. It is 
the continued drive for decentralisation in developing countries. The effec-
tiveness and efficiency of public service delivery for poverty reduction, or so 
it is hoped, can be improved by moving decision-making closer to the grass-
roots and thereby also strengthening the political participation and representa-
                                                          
1  The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness from March 2005 represents the latest mile-
stone in this process. 
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tion of the poor. At the same time, however, decentralization renders the 
processes of budget planning, execution and control significantly more com-
plex, multiplying coordination requirements and possibly overtaxing scarce 
human and technical capacities in developing countries. None the less, most 
work on PFM systems and reform focuses almost exclusively on PFM at the 
central level of government, neglecting that many developing countries – 
strongly supported by international donors – are increasingly delegating po-
litical decision-making powers and financial responsibilities to sub-national 
levels of government.  
To make matters worse, most analytical work on PFM in any particular coun-
try’s circumstances focuses mainly on assessing formal institutions and pro-
cesses governing the management of public finances. And although most 
authors recognise that PFM systems in most developing countries are largely 
characterised by informal practices and procedures, the underlying mecha-
nisms leading to these informal practices are rarely examined in detail. In-
stead, neo-patrimonial structures and a lack of commitment by political lead-
ers to sound PFM and poverty reduction are readily blamed for consistent 
non-adherence to formal rules and procedures in the management of public 
finances. This study, however, argues that there are a number of important 
influencing factors that lead to persistent non-adherence to formal rules and 
regulations other than “cultural” ones. These factors leading to informal PFM 
practices are in part the result of modern but poorly adapted formal PFM 
rules as well as inadequate sequencing of reforms, and not least donor behav-
iour. 
This study examines how the PRSP approach and decentralisation efforts 
interact with each other by studying their impact on the PFM system in Ma-
lawi. It is precisely the PFM system where PRSP implementation and decen-
tralisation need to be linked and reconciled with each other. The research 
focus of this study is thus on the implications of a decentralising PFM system 
for PRSP implementation. The following section presents the main research 
question of the case study for this report in detail in the following section. It 
goes on to provide some background information on the issues being ad-
dressed. The section then briefly introduces the research approach and ends 
with an overview of the structure of this report. 
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Background and main research question  
In the late 1990s, PRSPs were introduced as a pre-requisite for debt relief 
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. The intention 
was to provide poor developing countries with tailor-made national medium-
term strategies for poverty reduction and sustainable development. Since 
then, PRSPs have evolved into key reference documents for international 
development cooperation. However, implementing PRSPs is more difficult 
than formulating them. This is the reason why Public Financial Management 
(PFM) and particularly budgeting in developing countries has become a focal 
point of the international discussion in recent years. Also in the 1990s, donors 
began to complement the much criticised project-based approach to devel-
opment cooperation with programme-based approaches (PBAs). This shift 
towards PBAs introduced new planning and coordination frameworks such as 
Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) in international development cooperation. 
This also refocused attention on somewhat older instruments such as Medium 
Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs). The modes of aid delivery were 
adapted too. Traditional project funding was to some degree replaced and 
complemented by basket funding and budget support. The quality of national 
PFM systems is an important factor for the success of these approaches. Do-
nors therefore also have an interest in PFM in developing countries.  
Decentralisation is a second topic that has gained prominence in the interna-
tional development debate and policy practice in recent years. A number of 
different objectives and hopes are usually connected with decentralisation. 
One objective is more effective poverty reduction, which is hoped to be 
achieved by moving decision-making closer to the grassroots and thereby 
strengthening the political participation and representation of the poor. Unlike 
the PRSP approach, decentralisation has already been around in the develop-
ment debate for some time. It was already on the agenda in the 1970s and 
1980s but has become increasingly important in the 1990s. A strategy of 
decentralisation covers the fields of politics, administration and finances, and 
therefore implies the fundamental redistribution of power, responsibilities 
and resources and a reorganisation of the way the state works within a par-
ticular country. 
PFM on the other hand is a relatively new issue in international development 
cooperation. The IMF and the World Bank have always taken interest in 
singular questions related to the performance of national PFM systems during 
the structural adjustment period. However, the necessity for comprehensive 
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and systematic integration of PFM work into international development co-
operation was only recently recognised with the PRSP approach and new 
modes of aid delivery increasingly gaining importance. There is no universal 
definition of the term Public Financial Management. In this study, PFM is 
used to denote the different stages of the budget process as well as the design 
of the legal and institutional framework for PFM and for the management of 
human and technical capacity that determine the effectiveness and efficiency 
of processes on each of these stages. The stages are strategic and budget plan-
ning, budget formulation, budget execution as well as budget control and 
evaluation (Leiderer 2004, 7). 
The primary research focus of this study is on the PFM system because it 
links and ideally integrates the two prominent approaches to poverty reduc-
tion, PRSP and decentralisation. The public budget is the central tool for 
operationalising and implementing policies based on national strategic plans. 
However, if a country pursues a strategy of decentralisation, it means either 
that a new level of government is created or the existing sub-national gov-
ernment levels gain power, responsibilities and resources. This fundamental 
reorganisation of the state has strong implications for the national PFM sys-
tem. It also has to be reorganised in a way that provides for effective coordi-
nation or integration of planning, budgeting and implementation processes 
across the various levels.  
To implement just one these approaches, either PRSP or decentralisation, 
already is a very complex and long-term process. Nevertheless, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, many countries are currently in the process of imple-
menting both reforms. For both reform approaches to be successful, a parallel 
reform of the PFM system is thus crucial. So far, most research has focussed 
either on PRSP and PFM or – less frequently – on decentralisation and PFM. 
This study tries to examine the existing and missing links, the contradictions, 
and the space for synergy between the implementation of PRSP and decen-
tralisation in PFM. Therefore, the main research question of this case study is 
the following:  
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What are the major challenges in Public Financial Management (PFM) at the cen-
tral and local government level for implementing the Malawi Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (MPRS), particularly in the education and health sector? 
Special attention is given to the following PFM coordination processes: 
- Between central and local government level in general (vertical 
coordination);  
- Between education and health sector ministries and their re-
spective deconcentrated units (vertical-sectoral coordination); 
- Between the various administrative units and other institutions 
at the local level (horizontal-local coordination). 
The study aims at answering this question and at identifying starting points 
for possible solutions to these challenges. 
Research approach and the case of Malawi 
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it seeks to contribute to the current 
debate on Good Financial Governance. Second, by obtaining a better under-
standing of the investigated issues, it aims at helping decision-makers in 
developing countries’ governments and donor agencies to develop a better 
understanding of the mechanisms at work undermining sound PFM in devel-
oping countries in sub-Saharan Africa. To fulfil this double purpose, a case 
study approach was deemed appropriate, which allows a detailed examination 
of a country’s PFM system, but also lends itself to careful generalisations. 
Malawi was identified to be a typical case for a poor sub-Saharan African 
country in many aspects, while special in others. It is a typical case because it 
is currently in the process of implementing a PRSP, a decentralisation strat-
egy and PFM reforms all at the same time. Therefore, it can be expected that 
lessons drawn from this case analysis are to some degree applicable to other 
developing countries that undergo similar reform processes. On the other 
hand, at the time the study was conducted Malawi provided a somewhat spe-
cial case with respect to the role of political commitment to transparent and 
pro- poor financial management. As a new government under president 
Bingu wa Mutharika had just been elected, great expectations were raised 
among donors, who believed to discern clear signs of the new administra-
tion’s genuine commitment to good governance principles. 
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The methods used in conducting this case study were mainly qualitative. The 
research team conducted more than 140 semi-structured interviews with vari-
ous stakeholders and carried out an extensive review of literature and official 
documents. This set of data was complemented with data gained from non-
participant observations and informal conversations. The interview partners 
came from various contexts, among them politicians and administrative per-
sonnel at various government levels, staff of multi or bilateral donor agen-
cies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the media, traditional authori-
ties and ordinary citizens (for a list of interview partners see Annex 2). The 
research project was closely coordinated with a Malawian partner organisa-
tion, the National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC) as well as 
with GTZ experts in Malawi and Germany.    
A particular focus of this study is on education and health to account for the 
central role these sectors play in the MPRSP and with regard to poverty re-
duction in general. Furthermore, these sectors are often pilot sectors for de-
centralisation reforms or the introduction of new development assistance 
approaches such as SWAps. The sectors of primary education, basic health 
and democratic decentralisation are also focal areas of Malawi-German de-
velopment cooperation. The results of this study are therefore particularly 
relevant for German development agencies.   
Structure of the report 
This report is divided into three parts. First, Part I introduces the three sub-
jects of this study (the PRSP approach, decentralisation in developing coun-
tries and public financial management) in detail and sets the conceptual 
framework for this study (Chapter 2). It then formulates the main research 
question and presents the research design and methodology (Chapter 3). Part 
I ends with a presentation of the case study (Chapter 4), providing the ration-
ale why Malawi was selected as case study and some relevant background 
information on the country, particularly on recent political history, decentrali-
sation, the Malawian PRSP and on the sectors education and health in Ma-
lawi. 
Part II presents the empirical findings collected during the research. Theory 
and practice of PFM in Malawi are contrasted with each other and the blatant 
discrepancy between formal rules and procedures and actual PFM practice is 
discussed (Chapter 5). Key areas where major weaknesses undermine Ma-
lawi’s formal PFM-system are identified (Chapter 6).  
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Part III draws together the empirical findings, linking weaknesses in the areas 
identified to observed PFM practices in Malawi. The findings are put into 
context with recent literature on institutional development and political tran-
sition in Africa and carefully generalises the empirical findings for Malawi 
(Chapter 7). Part III ends with recommendations for donor agencies as well 
as Malawian government bodies to address the challenges identified in this 
study (Chapter 8). 
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Part I:  Conceptual Framework and Case Selection 
2 Conceptual Framework: PRSPs, Decentralisation, 
and PFM 
International development cooperation has never been short of new concepts 
and trends. However, the 1990s were particularly rich in creating presumably 
new ones. Although decentralisation and PFM are both not genuine develop-
ment cooperation concepts, their relevance for development and poverty 
reduction were soon recognised and both were quickly taken up in the inter-
national development debate in the 1990s for a number of reasons. This chap-
ter introduces each of the three concepts that are relevant for this  study. The 
chapter starts with introducing both the PRSP approach and decentralisation 
as developmental concepts, highlighting the relevance of good PFM for the 
success of both approaches. Section 2.2 continues to look at the concept of 
sound PFM in the sense of Good Financial Governance and pays particular 
attention to common weaknesses of PFM in developing countries. 
2.1 Two prominent approaches in the current debate on 
development cooperation: PRSP and decentralisation 
2.1.1 The PRSP approach 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which were originally devel-
oped as a pre-requisite for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Coun-
tries (HIPC) initiative have become widely accepted as comprehensive stra-
tegic frameworks for efforts made by developing countries to reach the Mil-
lennium Development Goals by 2015. With the Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes (SAP) having fallen short of expectations with regard to economic 
development and poverty reduction, PRSPs are meant to describe in a com-
prehensive manner a country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies 
and programmes to promote growth and reduce poverty as well as associated 
external financing needs (World Bank 2005). However, the final responsibil-
ity for developing such a strategy should be with the respective country’s 
government in order to ensure ownership for the process. For the first time, 
this initiative explicitly linked debt relief with poverty reduction goals. The 
principles according to which the PRSPs are to be produced and implemented 
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largely incorporated the elements of the Comprehensive Development Frame-
work (CDF) proposed by the World Bank in 2001. These principles are: 
— Country driven; 
— Results-oriented; 
— Comprehensive; 
— Partnership-oriented; and 
— medium and long-term oriented (World Bank 2006b).  
The principles of country ownership and civil society participation received 
particular attention as they – at least rhetorically – put an end to the long 
criticised externally defined conditionalities. By June 2006, fifty countries 
had developed a full PRSP and an additional 13 an interim PRSP, with sub-
Saharan African countries accounting for 25 full and seven interim-PRSPs 
respectively (World Bank 2006a).  
First developed as an instrument to effectively direct resources freed up by 
debt relief to pro-poor purposes, PRSPs quickly assumed much broader im-
portance evolving into key reference documents for donor agencies’ support 
strategies for developing countries. Perhaps most prominently, the IMF re-
placed its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with a Poverty 
Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) and the World Bank introduced the Pov-
erty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) scheme. But also bi-lateral donors 
readily endorsed the PRSP approach as a vehicle to shift their support from a 
project-based approach to programme-based approaches (PBAs) and budget 
support operations. 
The PRSP thus became the ‘master plan’ for development and poverty reduc-
tion in many developing countries. However, to carry out these strategic 
plans they have to be translated into medium-term policies and programmes, 
which in turn have to be implemented through annual budgets. Successful 
PRSP implementation thus hinges on a country’s administrative and manage-
rial capacity to effectively translate strategic priorities into annual budgets 
and execute them accordingly, in other words, on the quality of the country’s 
PFM system. However, a number of assessments and evaluations of the 
PRSP approach (e.g. World Bank 2004b; IMF/IEO 2004; Booth 2003) clearly 
show that most developing countries lack the required systems and capacities 
to implement their strategy papers effectively. All studies conclude that im-
portant improvements in domestic policy processes were made in cases where 
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the PRSP approach had been integrated into domestic institutional structures. 
These improvements occurred where leadership and commitment were strong 
and good starting conditions existed. In most cases, however, achievements 
have been more tentative and incremental. An IMF evaluation even con-
cludes that the PRS approach has “acted more as a distraction from strength-
ening the domestic policy framework” (IMF / IEO 2004, 5) in countries 
where it had been externally imposed and where it was an isolated exercise.  
With regard to the implementation of PRS through the PFM system, the IMF 
evaluation team concludes: 
“Budgetary processes are weak, and the linkages between the PRSP, me-
dium-term expenditure frameworks, and the budgets are generally poor. In 
particular, public expenditure management (PEM) systems are generally 
too weak to allow the PRSP to play a central role in implementing expen-
diture priorities or modifying them on the basis of feedback on actual costs 
and outcomes. Strengthening PEM has been recognized as central to the 
success of the initiative” (IMF / IEO 2004, 4). 
These findings, together with the fact that many donors are increasingly turn-
ing towards supporting PRSP implementation through budget support opera-
tions and other forms of PBAs, lead donor agencies to shift their focus from 
thematic sector questions to institutional, administrative and procedural is-
sues. This shift is increasingly affecting the quality of financial governance, 
i.e. planning capacities, budget transparency, fiscal discipline, or accountabil-
ity, etc. Consequently, instruments promoted by the Wolrd Bank and the IMF 
in the second half of the 1990 such as Medium Term Expenditure Frame-
works (MTEFs) are becoming more and more important. 
2.1.2 Decentralisation in developing countries 
Decentralisation is one of the most prominent reform approaches in develop-
ing countries, strongly supported by donors. International development agen-
cies highly value decentralisation and attach a number of expectations to, 
such as increased efficiency in public service delivery, local consolidation of 
democratic principles and more effective poverty reduction. There have been 
several waves of decentralisation in most developing countries (Manor 1999: 
part II), including sub-Saharan Africa (Ribot 2002, 4–7; Mawhood 1993). 
With the end of the Cold War, the approach experienced a revival triggered 
by the failure of  centralised systems to deliver poverty reduction and overall 
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development (Wunsch / Olowu 1990). In addition, increasing attention was 
paid to governance and democratisation.  
Decentralisation always implies the transfer of power, responsibilities and 
resources from higher to lower government levels. Four different forms of 
decentralisation are commonly distinguished according to the degree to 
which competencies are transferred downwards: delegation, administrative 
decentralisation or deconcentration, fiscal decentralisation and political/ 
democratic decentralisation or devolution (see Box 1). 
 
Box 1: Forms of decentralisation 
• Delegation involves passing more or less clearly defined tasks to semi-
autonomous authorities at the lower level, such as parastatal agencies. How-
ever, the decision-making power remains entirely at the higher levels of gov-
ernment. 
• Administrative decentralisation or deconcentration describes the transfer 
of certain tasks to government institutions at lower levels. It often happens in 
the form of moving agents of higher levels of government into lower level 
arenas or of establishing local offices of central agencies. The crucial point is 
that although these offices may carry out activities at lower levels, they never-
theless remain accountable only to the institutions higher up in the system. If 
this kind of decentralisation is being implemented in isolation from the other 
three, it tends to constitute increased centralisation rather than decentralisation 
by enabling central authority to penetrate the periphery more effectively than 
before.  
• Fiscal decentralisation implies that higher government levels grant agencies 
at lower levels the authority to decide autonomously on the use of financial re-
sources they have access to and to raise local revenue. Central government 
transfers are often an important element of the financial resources at the dis-
posal of local governments in most developing countries due to the low eco-
nomic potential at local level.   
• Political or democratic decentralisation or devolution refers to the transfer 
of the power of decision-making, responsibilities and resources to the lower 
government levels. The bodies at the lower levels are independent from 
higher-level authorities and are usually democratically legitimated to some de-
gree. Accountability relations are mainly downwards to local constituencies. 
Source:   own compilation 
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Those arguing for decentralisation pursue various objectives. Generally, de-
centralisation is thought to positively impact in five areas. More specifically, 
decentralisation expects to 
— Increase administrative efficiency and improve local service provision;  
— Improve equity between as well as within local entities;  
— Increase political participation and strengthen democratisation; 
— Enhance the responsiveness and legitimacy of the state;  
— Support local poverty reduction.  
However, experience shows worldwide that these expectations have been 
rather optimistic. In most cases, the improvements listed above did not mate-
rialise. Among the reasons are the following: capture of decentralised gov-
ernment and administration bodies by local elites, limited commitment to 
decentralisation at the central level, as a consequence, insufficient transfer of 
power and finances, limited capacity at the local level and weak civil society 
structures at the grassroots (OECD 2004; SLSA Team 2003; Ribot 2002; 
Manor 1999; Crook and Manor 1998). It is argued that these restricting con-
ditions are particularly often found in African countries.  
Although fiscal decentralisation is of particular importance to this study’s 
focus on Public Financial Management, analysis of decentralisation as a re-
form requires a much broader approach. In accordance with a broad defini-
tion of PFM that includes the design of the legal and institutional framework, 
various aspects of decentralisation are taken into account in this study.  
2.2 The relevance of public fnancial management in 
developing countries 
The public budget determines the origin and use of public financial resources. 
Therefore, it plays a crucial role in the process of governance. Once passed 
by Parliament, the budget authorises the government to raise revenues, incur 
debts and effect expenditures to achieve defined policy objectives. The 
budget should discipline policy-making and ensure that the objectives of 
public agencies, institutions and individuals are in line with those agreed on 
in the Poverty Reduction Strategy (Foster / Fozzard 2000, 8). 
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According to standard public finance textbooks and publications by the IMF 
and the World Bank, budgets are the key instrument to achieve three impor-
tant policy goals (World Bank 1998, 27–30): 
— Aggregate fiscal discipline;  
— Allocation of resources according to strategic policy priorities; 
— Efficient and effective use of public money. 
The public budget is therefore the key instrument to translate the aggregate 
policy objectives of a population into concrete sector policies and pro-
grammes. National strategies, such as PRSPs, have to be implemented 
through the budget. Therefore, “good” PFM (or financial governance) is 
crucial for implementing a PRS. In many developing countries, poorly func-
tioning PFM systems are among the main obstacles to achieve development 
and poverty reduction objectives.  
This section of the report aims at delivering the conceptual background of 
PFM systems for this study. First, it gives a brief definition of the term Public 
Financial Management and then goes on to provide a conceptual overview of 
PFM systems and key elements of the budget cycle. Finally, it provides an 
overview of typical problems of PFM systems in developing countries.   
2.2.1 A definition of public financial management 
The international debate on public finance and budget reform offers different 
definitions of the term public financial management. Some of them adopt a 
rather narrow concept, concentrating mainly on management and control of 
public expenditure, while others incorporate a broader concept, including 
management of the whole budget cycle and even the legal and institutional 
framework as well as questions of capacity for managing public finances. In 
addition, there is no universal consensus in the literature concerning the accu-
rate distinction between the terms Public Expenditure Management (PEM) 
and Public Financial Management. Although in most discussions PFM repre-
sents a broader concept than PEM, covering the revenue side of budgets as 
well as questions of public debt, both terms are frequently used synony-
mously and interchangeably.  
In this study, PFM is understood in its broadest sense, i.e. not as a purely 
technical process regarding the management of financial flows and public 
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accounts, but rather with a more comprehensive governance perspective cov-
ering the following three areas:  
— The budget cycle, including strategic and budget planning, budget for-
mulation, budget execution and budget control and evaluation; 
— The legal and institutional framework;  
— Human and technical capacity for the management of public finances.  
Box 2 presents the second and third components, while the budget cycle is 
introduced in more detail below. 
 
Box 2: Components of PFM systems 
The legal PFM framework defines the overall setting for the actual design of the 
budget process. It should fix binding rules and regulations for budgetary practices. 
The legal PFM framework may incorporate constitutional regulations such as bind-
ing ceilings for the overall budget deficit and concrete budgetary regulations such 
as the timeframe for the different steps of the budget cycle or provisions concerning 
the management of public expenditures (Leiderer 2004, 8). The institutional PFM 
framework defines how the public budget process is organised. It determines the 
organisational setup of the governmental and administrative body determines the 
fiscal relations between the different levels of government or between the private 
and public sector etc. Adequate accountability structures are an important result 
of the legal and institutional PFM framework. The degree to which every single 
actor of the budget process feels or can be held accountable for budgetary practices 
and outcomes is a very important factor to guarantee that public resources are 
allocated in line with strategic policy priorities and spent effectively and efficiently. 
According to Schiavo-Campo / Tommasi (1999), effective accountability has two 
components: answerability (or responsibility) and consequences in the case of non-
compliance with formal rules and regulations.  
The quality and appropriateness of human and technical capacity is also a very 
important factor for effective and efficient PFM systems. Despite well-developed 
legal and institutional frameworks, human and technical capacity constraints can 
undermine the budget process at all stages. Many developing countries lack quali-
fied staff in key positions for PFM such as auditors, accountants, etc. so that rules, 
regulations and plans cannot be executed as prescribed or intended because the 
responsible personnel does not have enough knowledge to carry them out correctly. 
Well functioning information systems are another important factor for efficient 
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PFM systems. Financial management information systems (FMIS) allow decision 
makers to better control aggregate spending and deficit, to better prioritise expendi-
ture across policies, programmes and projects and to more efficiently use the budg-
eted resources. As financial management processes are transaction intensive, time 
consuming and labour intensive, automated or computerised FMIS can make work 
much easier, speed up the process and eliminate sources of error. 
Source: own compilation 
2.2.2 The budget cycle 
A typical budget cycle can be subdivided into several stages and phases, each 
of which is of particular relevance for the effective implementation of strate-
gic plans such as a PRSP. For the purpose of this study a breakdown of the 
budget cycle into four major stages was deemed seems appropriate: strategic 
and budget planning, budget formulation, budget execution, and budget con-
trol & evaluation (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The budget cycle 
 
Source: own compilation 
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It must be noted that the individual steps of the budget process tend to be 
iterative rather than unidirectional. Although the budget process is an annual 
procedure in almost all countries, the period for the whole budget cycle is 
typically three years. It comprises budget planning, budget formulation, its 
execution and the finalisation of accounts. Therefore, at any time, three or 
more budgets will be in various stages of the budget cycle (Foster / Fozzard 
2000, 12). The following part is a description of the different steps of a 
budget cycle, with particular reference to developing countries.  
Strategic and budget planning 
Before the actual budget process starts, the government (with varying degrees 
of participation by civil society and other stakeholders) has to define the main 
strategic policy priorities for the forthcoming years. In many developing 
countries, this strategic priority setting is done in the form of a Poverty Re-
duction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or similar national development plans. These 
strategic priorities then have to be translated into concrete sector policies and 
programmes, which can then be implemented through the public budget (Lei-
derer 2004, 9).  
Once the strategic policy priorities are defined, the ministry of finance col-
laborates with the central bank and possibly other agencies to establish a 
macroeconomic framework in order to forecast the overall resource envelope 
available in the forthcoming period. The macroeconomic framework com-
monly consists in a medium-term forecast in GDP growth and estimates of 
the resulting collected public revenue as well as forecasts of external finan-
cial inflows supporting the budget. Furthermore, the ministry of finance has 
to consider the scope for domestic and external financing of any budget defi-
cit. In order to asses the resource envelope available for allocation to minis-
tries and agencies in the upcoming budget negotiations, statutory spending 
(e.g. debt services, pension obligations etc.) has to be subtracted from the 
forecast revenue (Foster et al. 2002, 15–16). A reliable macroeconomic fore-
cast is a fundamental precondition to ensure macroeconomic stability and a 
realistic budget. To establish a credible and reliable overall resource envelope 
is a required precondition for the government to be able to reconcile sector 
allocations with the overall amount of public resources available; thus pre-
venting budget overruns by ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) 
while implementing the budget.  
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Based on the established macroeconomic framework, the actual budget plan-
ning begins. It is fundamental to embed the annual planning process into a 
longer term planning perspective as the implementation of strategic policy 
objectives and political programmes takes time and usually commits govern-
ment to expenditures beyond one fiscal year. Therefore, annual budget plan-
ning alone is not an adequate instrument to translate medium or long-term 
strategic goals into effective allocation decisions and spending priorities in 
accordance with medium-term sector policies and programmes. Conse-
quently, many developing countries – mostly under pressure from IMF and 
World Bank – have introduced Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks 
(MTEFs) in order to facilitate the integration of policy, planning and budget-
ing within a medium-term perspective (Holmes / Evans 2003, 5) and thus 
provide a better link between medium-term objectives and the annual budget 
(see Box 3). 
Box 3:  MTEFs in developing countries 
According to the World Bank, MTEFs aim at achieving four major objectives: 
- Improve macroeconomic balance by developing a consistent 
and realistic resource framework. 
- Improve the allocation of resources to strategic priorities be-
tween and within sectors. 
- Increase commitment to predictability of both policy and fund-
ing so that ministries can plan ahead and programmes can be 
sustained. 
- Provide line agencies with a hard budget constraint and in-
creased autonomy, thereby increasing incentives for efficient 
and effective use of funds. 
An MTEF consists of a top-down resource envelope and a bottom-up estimation of 
the current and medium-term costs of the policy programmes and activities. Typi-
cally, MTEFs cover a time horizon of three to five years, over which estimated 
aggregated costs are matched with the estimated overall amount of available re-
sources. The precise matching of costs then takes place in the context of the annual 
budget process. 
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The typical MTEF process consists of six key steps: 
1. Development of Macro-
economic/Fiscal Frame-
work 
- Macroeconomic model that 
projects revenues and expenditure 
in the medium term (multi-year) 
2. Development of Sectoral 
Programmes  
- Agreement on sector objectives, 
outputs, and activities 
- Review and development of pro-
grammes and sub-programmes 
- Programme cost estimation 
3. Development of Sectoral 
Expenditure Frameworks 
- Analysis of inter- and intra-
sectoral trade-offs 
- Consensus-building on strategic 
resource allocation 
4. Definition of Sector Re-
source Allocations 
- Setting medium-term sector 
budget ceilings (cabinet approval)
5. Preparation of Sectoral 
Budgets 
- Medium-term sectoral pro-
grammes based on budget ceil-
ings 
6. Final Political Approval - Presentation of budget estimates 
to cabinet and Parliament for ap-
proval 
Source:  World Bank (1998, 48); Le Houerou / Taliercio (2002, 3)  
Budget formulation 
As seen in Box 3, the next step in the MTEF and the final one in the upstream 
process of the budget cycle consists in the actual budget formulation. This 
step begins with the government outlining the annual budget based on me-
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dium expenditure plans and the available resource envelope. Budget formula-
tion consists in allocating available resources for different purposes and to 
different government institutions and spending agencies. Ideally, the budget 
provides information about all public revenues and expenditures, including 
external assistance and debt. The process of resource allocation is, however, 
essentially a political rather than a technical task. 
The overall resource envelope, defined by the Ministry of Finance and based 
on the macro-economic forecast and MTEF, provides the basis on which 
sector ministries should prepare their budget bids for the following year. 
Usually, the ministry of finance announces indicative ceilings for each line 
ministry or spending agency. However, these ceilings are contestable in sub-
sequent budget discussions.  
Each ministry or public agency submits a budget outline to the Ministry of 
Finance, reflecting the sector priority expenditure programmes and justifying 
the overall level of the bid. The Ministry of Finance has the task to reconcile 
the budget proposals of the different ministries and public spending agencies 
with the overall resource envelope available and the national policy priorities. 
After cabinet approval, the budget is then presented and debated in Parlia-
ment, and – once it is approved by Parliament – is published together with the 
detailed estimates, setting out expenditures by MDAs in whatever detail the 
procedures prescribe (Foster / Fozzard 2000, 16).  
Different budget classifications can be used to organise the budget, each 
having its advantages and disadvantages. Often governmental institutions use 
a mix of different budget classifications, e.g. line item classification within  
an activity-based budget. Box 4 outlines the most common types of classifi-
cations.  
Box 4: Budget classifications 
Line item classification: structures expenditures according to objects or “line items” 
(e.g. salaries, travel allowances, office material); strengths: relative simplicity, lack 
of ambiguity, easy control of expenditures, detailed; weaknesses: no indication of 
why money was spent, nor whether spending programmes were effective and effi-
cient. 
Programme or activity-based classification: structures expenditures according to 
programmes - public policy objectives along with a set of activities necessary to 
attain them. The programmes may cross departmental responsibilities. 
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Administrative classification: structures expenditures according to institutions 
(ministries, units, different administrative levels etc.) responsible for managing 
funds.  
Economic classification: structures government financial operations according to 
economic categories, especially for statistical analytical reasons, distinguishing 
between capital and current spending and revenues, subsidies, interest payments, 
transfers from the state to families and other public institutions, financing opera-
tions. 
Functional classification: structures government activities and spending according 
to their purpose (e.g. defence, education, health, transportation) 
Source: Schiavo-Campo et al. (1999); World Bank (1998) 
Budget execution 
The process of budget execution usually starts with the release of public re-
sources from the central bank to the accounts of spending agencies. The cen-
tral bank normally holds government funds within a single treasury or a gen-
eral fund. In most developing countries funds are released in monthly or 
quarterly intervals. MDAs have the task to disburse funds to provide for sala-
ries and to pay suppliers and contractors to deliver services to the public. All 
these payments follow a series of steps (Box 5) designed to insure that pro-
curement procedures are applied and that the limits set by parliamentary 
appropriations are respected (Foster / Fozzard 2000, 16–17).  
Box 5: Steps in the Disbursement and Procurement Process 
• Commitment of funds: Spending proposals are initiated by the department, 
which will use the goods or services. These proposals are subject to a pre–audit 
by the chief accounting office of the spending agency to ensure that government 
procurement procedures have been followed, the decision to commit funds has 
been taken at the appropriate level of delegated authority, and the expenditure is 
covered by the appropriation. Once approved, the spending agency signs a con-
tract or places an order for the delivery of goods and services. 
• Acquisition of goods and services: The supplier or contractor presents the 
spending agency with an invoice for the goods and services delivered. The de-
partment that initiated the order confirms that the goods or services were re-
ceived, in compliance with the terms and conditions, and requests that the ac-
counts department makes payment. 
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• Payment: The Payment is made by the accounts department of the spending 
agency pays by cheque or bank transfer. Cash payments are extremely rare and 
discouraged. However, in countries with sparse banking networks, there may be 
arrangements whereby, for example, the head teacher picks up the salary cheque 
on behalf of all staff, and makes payment in cash. 
• Accounting: The transaction is registered as complete in the accounts once the 
payment has been made, immediately following the issue of a payment order. 
Source: Foster / Fozzard (2000, 16) 
However, these steps do not guarantee that public funds are spent strictly 
according to budget allocations,2 as the orderly execution and implementation 
of the budget depends on a combination of both political and technical pro-
cesses. As the government spends scarce public resources, the government 
and its administrative bodies, therefore, need to ensure the responsible use of 
public money. Four general principles are commonly considered of impor-
tance for effective budget execution: legality, efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy of the use of public funds (INTOSAI 1998, Section 1). 
Budget control and evaluation 
The final important element in the budget cycle is control and evaluation of 
budget execution. Control takes place at different layers in the PFM system 
as shown in the pyramid in Figure 2: Levels of Control. 
Effective control is only possible with reliable data based on actions taken by 
spending agencies for which adequate systems for record keeping must be in 
place. Appropriate records must therefore be created, maintained and used in 
a way to show all transactions incurred by spending agencies reliably. These 
records are the basis for effective bookkeeping and accounting, which serves 
three purposes: it provides the database for future expenditure planning, it 
forms the basis of internal control and auditing to ensure compliance with 
laws and administrative rules, and, finally, financial reports are produced 
from the data (GTZ 2006, 24). 
                                                          
2  In the interest of flexibility this might not even be desirable.  
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Figure 2:  Levels of Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GTZ (2006) 
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and payment arrears at any point of time so that public agencies might 
lose track of the actual financial situation. 
In any democratic system, government and its administrative bodies have to 
be held accountable for their budget commitments and actions. External con-
trol over the budget process is exercised through a number of mechanisms 
and by various actors, above all national parliaments, supreme audit institu-
tions and civil society organisations.   
The role of audit institutions 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) play a key role in promoting accountabil-
ity, and transparency in the budget process and in uncovering issues such as 
the misappropriation of funds and corruption. They oversee the management 
of public funds and evaluate the credibility and quality of the reports dealing 
with the use of public funds by the government. To be able to play this role, 
SAIs need to be able to act independently from the executive in order to pro-
vide an impartial analysis of the execution of the budget by the government.  
The role of parliament 
The principal role of Parliament in the budget process is to scrutinise the 
budget in terms of priorities and effectiveness and thus exert political control 
over the budget. By approving the budget, Parliament has an important over-
sight function and can ensure that the allocation of resources is consistent 
with the national strategic objectives and political priorities of the electorate. 
Through the approval of the aggregate budget proposal, Parliament empowers 
and legitimates the government to execute its plans embedded in the budget 
(Fjelstad 2004, 19–24). It is also the role of Parliament to hold the govern-
ment accountable for the proper implementation of the approved budget. For 
this Parliament depends on a timely and meaningful report provided by the 
supreme audit institution of the country. 
The role of civil society 
Civil society can influence the budget cycle primarily through the electoral 
process. In functioning democracies, the right to vote should enable the popu-
lation to ensure that politicians really deliver the promised services and claim 
efficient and better policies. Furthermore, the organised groups of civil soci-
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ety may have an influence on the budget cycle by lobbying parliamentarians 
to increase budget allocations in their priority areas.  
An independent media also plays a crucial role in the external scrutiny of the 
budget. It is the role of the media to assess the budget process and its out-
comes and to inform the public about the government’s performance.  
2.2.3 Common weaknesses of PFM systems in developing 
countries 
PFM systems in developing countries quite often face a number of similar 
problems that prevent budgets from working effectively and delivering the 
desired outcomes. These problems are above all weak institutions, capacity 
constraints (financial, technical, human resources) and inadequate budgeting 
techniques, together with unfavourable external factors such as macroeco-
nomic instability and dependency on donor funding. Especially when coun-
tries face several of these problems simultaneously, the result is often poor 
budgetary performance. However, it needs to be emphasised that this ob-
served poor performance does not necessarily stem primarily from poor for-
mal PFM systems. On the contrary, many developing countries (usually un-
der pressure from international donors, in particular the World Bank and the 
IMF) have introduced modern PFM legislation and institutional set-ups over 
the years. Consequently, the formal framework for PFM is often well de-
signed in principle. However, in many cases, these formal frameworks are not 
adhered to in practice because informal rules and procedures tend to domi-
nate the management of public finances. 
In these cases, the effectiveness of multi-year plans and annual budgeting as 
key instruments for implementing national strategic policies, such as poverty 
reduction strategies, are severely compromised as well as the prospects for 
effective public policy for development and poverty reduction. Box 6 con-
trasts good budgeting principles with typical poor practices often observed in 
developing countries.  
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Box 6: The Theory and Practice of PFM in Developing Countries 
Good Budgeting Principles… … and Poor Budgeting Practices 
1. Comprehensiveness: the budget 
must encompass all the fiscal opera-
tions of the government 
2. Discipline: policy decisions with 
financial implications must be made 
against the background of a hard 
budget constraint and in competition 
with other demands 
3. Legitimacy: decision makers who 
can change policies during imple-
mentation must take part in and 
agree to the original policy decision 
4. Flexibility: decisions must be 
pushed to the point where all rele-
vant information is available 
5. Predictability: fiscal policy must 
take account of the need to ensure 
the timely flow of funds to spending 
units 
6. Contestability: existing policies are 
subject to constant review and 
evaluation 
7. Honesty: budgets are based on unbi-
ased projections of both revenue and 
expenditure 
8. Information: accurate and timely 
information on costs, outputs and 
outcomes is essential 
1. Unrealistic planning/ 
budgeting: both plans and 
budgets are not a statement of 
intentions, but a wish list of 
political promises 
2. Short-term budgeting: no con-
sideration of medium-term im-
plications of budgets, such as 
the recurring operating costs of 
new investments  
3. Repetitive budgeting: the 
budget is frequently remade 
during the year, in response to 
economic or political condi-
tions 
4. Cashbox budgeting: govern-
ment spends as cash becomes 
available, not according to pre-
set budget priorities 
5. Deferred budgeting: arrears 
build up as expenditures are 
pushed into subsequent years 
6. Distorted priorities: scarce 
resources are spent on ‘show-
case’ projects that produce 
meagre social returns 
7. Declining productivity: the 
size of the civil service ex-
pands in response to unem-
ployment, but ghost workers, 
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9. Transparency: information about 
budget decisions must be accessible, 
clear and communicated to the 
wider community 
10. Accountability: decision makers 
must be held responsible for the ex-
ercise of the authority provided to 
them 
underinvestment in training 
and IT, and poor working con-
ditions degrade operational ef-
ficiency 
8. Informal management: extra-
legal arrangements dictate how 
government operates in re-
cruitment, procurement, etc.  
9. Corruption: lack of enforce-
ment of formal rules breeds il-
legal behaviour, which goes 
undetected and unsanctioned 
Source: ODI (2004) 
The effective implementation of PRSPs through annual budgets highly de-
pends on a good match between formal rules and procedures and actual prac-
tices of PFM. It is thus closely linked to at least three key factors: the political 
will of the stakeholders in the budget process, an elaborated institutional 
framework that supplies them with the right incentives and efficient control 
mechanisms, sufficient technical, human and financial capacity that allows 
for executing tasks throughout the budget cycle efficiently and effectively. 
The following chapters examine in detail how these influencing factors de-
termine the relevance of the formal framework to the actual practice of PFM 
in developing countries and thus the chances of effectively implementing 
PRSPs. 
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3 Main Research Question, Research Design, and 
Methodology 
This chapter presents the main research question and gives a brief overview 
of the research design chosen for this study. It concludes with an overview of 
the structure for the remainder of this report.  
3.1 Main research question 
The research focus of this study is on the PFM system in a in many ways 
typical Sub-Saharan-African country, paying heed to the enormous relevance 
of a well functioning PFM system for implementing poverty reduction strate-
gies and for linking and integrating PRSP and decentralisation. The public 
budget is the single most important tool for operationalising and implement-
ing policies based on national strategic development plans. At the same time, 
if a country pursues a decentralisation policy, this means that new levels of 
government are created or that existing sub-national levels of government are 
assigned additional powers, responsibilities and resources. This fundamental 
reorganisation of the state has far-reaching implications for the national PFM 
system, as its functions need to be reorganised in a way that allows for the 
successful integration or at least effective coordination of planning, budgeting 
and implementation processes across the various levels.  
Most research so far focuses on either PRSP and PFM at the central level3 or 
on decentralisation and local planning separately without linking the various 
levels. Thus, this study extensively covers PFM at local level and examines 
how it is integrated into the national PFM system with regard to implement-
ing national strategic priorities. For this purpose, it examines the links (exist-
ing and missing) and the incompatibilities between PFM at local and central 
government level. In order to study these complex relations the research team 
deemed a case study design as the most adequate approach. For a number of 
reasons (detailed in Chapter 4) Malawi has been identified as a typical show-
case for a poor developing country in Sub-Saharan-Africa that pursues both 
the implementation of a national PRSP and an ambitious decentralisation 
agenda simultaneously. 
                                                          
3 For recent studies on Malawi, see Rakner et al. (2004); IMF (2004a); IMF (2004b); South 
African Institute of International Affairs (2004) and Durevall / Erlandsson (2005).  
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The main research question for this case study is therefore the following: 
What are the major constraints in Public Financial Management (PFM) at the 
central and local government level for implementing the Malawi Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (MPRS), particularly in the education and health sectors? 
Special attention is paid to the following PFM coordination processes: 
— Between central and local government level in general (vertical coordi-
nation);  
— Between education and health sector ministries and their respective 
deconcentrated units (vertical-sectoral coordination); 
— Between various administrative units and other institutions at the local 
level (horizontal-local coordination). 
The study also aims at identifying starting points for possible solutions to 
overcome these challenges.  
3.2 Research approach 
The research approach selected for this study is mainly qualitative and the 
overall research design is a country case study. The rationale behind this 
choice is that the interrelations between PRS implementation, decentralisa-
tion and PFM – even PFM as such – are very complex and might take very 
different forms in different country contexts. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that meaningful results can only be gained by studying a particular case in 
detail. Malawi was identified as an ideal showcase in many aspects, being a 
poor sub-Saharan African country. Nevertheless, the overall aim of this study 
is to identify typical challenges and to carefully draw generalisations that 
could apply to similar processes in other developing countries as well. For 
this purpose, it was deemed appropriate to attempt to gain a genuine and 
thorough understanding of all aspects and underlying mechanisms of infor-
mal practices of public financial management, in particular processes of one 
specific case rather than trying to paint a broad but shallow picture of the 
challenges for sound PFM in Malawi. In an effort to gain such a thorough 
understanding, the research was even further narrowed down by concentrat-
ing on PFM in two sectors, namely health and education. Both sectors feature 
prominently in Malawi’s PRSP and are at the same time considered pilot 
sectors for its decentralisation policy. 
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The study intends to focus not exclusively on PFM at central but also at local 
government level.  Because the situations differ significantly in urban and 
rural districts, the research team decided to concentrate on rural districts, 
given that roughly 85 percent of the population and 90 percent of Malawi’s 
poor live in these areas (Ellis et al. 2003, 1497; IFAD 2002, 9). The team 
selected two rural districts (Dedza in the central region and Rumphi in the 
north), choosing one considered a relatively good performer and one consid-
ered to face particularly many challenges regarding PFM (for a map of Ma-
lawi, see Annex 4). By resorting to this maximum difference sampling strat-
egy, the study aims at covering the broadest possible range of performance in 
order to identify critical differences as well as general features in terms of 
factors and context conditions. 4 Therefore, in addition to PFM performance, 
three other criteria have been taken into account for district selection: 
— Pilot-districts for devolution in the education sector; 
— Different donor agencies involved in decentralisation/PFM activities at 
district level; 
— Regional and political party division in Malawi. 
The analysis is predominantly based on qualitative data collected during a 
three month field trip to Malawi. The main instrument of data collection has 
been semi-structured interviews with individually adjusted interview guide-
lines. Furthermore, official documents as well as grey literature have been 
collected. Data from a number of non-participatory observations and informal 
conversations complement the data gained through interviews and docu-
ments. The analysis of these data has been qualitative and guided by the prin-
ciples of Grounded Theory. Annex I provides more details on methodology 
and research strategy. 
                                                          
4  For the initial evaluation of the districts’ PFM performance, the research team relied on 
assessments by different stakeholders in Malawi, in particular the local partner institution 
for this project, the National Local Government Finance Committee as well as donor repre-
sentatives involved in activities with local governments. 
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3.3 Structure of this report 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows:  
Chapter 4 explains why Malawi was selected a case study and provides read-
ers with some relevant background information on the country.  
Chapter 5 contrasts theory and practice of public financial management in 
Malawi and tackles the following sub-questions:  
— Do legal regulations and institutional arrangements provide a coherent 
and comprehensive framework for PFM procedures (at all government 
levels)? 
— What does current PFM practice look like and does it reflect the formal 
framework (at all government levels)? 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical results in more detail based on the following 
sub-question:  
— What are the key areas where challenges arise in the PFM process (at 
central and local levels) and what is the exact nature of those chal-
lenges?  
Key areas where challenges for PFM arise in Malawi and the mechanisms of 
these problems are then drawn together and put into relation to each other in 
Chapter 7. The impact of the problems identified on the PFM process are laid 
out and an analysis of current PFM practice is provided at a higher aggre-
gated analytical level. These findings are also put into context of recent litera-
ture on institutions and state-building in Africa. Chapter 8 identifies starting 
points and provides recommendations for possible solutions to the identified 
challenges. It does so with particular attention to the role of donors and in 
particular German development cooperation in the PFM process in Malawi.  
4 The Case of Malawi 
This chapter explains why Malawi was chosen for this case study. It provides 
the reader with some relevant background information on the country, par-
ticularly with regard to the Malawian PRSP. Furthermore, it briefs on recent 
political history, and decentralisation in Malawi. Finally, it provides informa-
tion on the local institutional set-up and the education and health sectors.  
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4.1 Why Malawi? 
Malawi was a particularly interesting choice for a case study because PRS 
implementation, decentralisation and reforms of the PFM system are all cur-
rently being carried out simultaneously in the country. It therefore reflects 
well the current dynamics in much of sub-Saharan Africa and developing 
countries elsewhere. Lessons drawn from this case analysis are thus likely to 
be relevant in other comparable situations. In addition, conducting this study 
in Malawi in early 2005 was particularly interesting due to the specific his-
tory of PFM reforms in the country. Gross irregularities and massive over-
spending under president Muluzi’s government led a number of donors to 
suspend development assistance in 2001. In 2004, however, a new president 
was elected, who was initially given considerable credit by the international 
donor community for appearing to be strongly committed to policies aiming 
at fiscal stability and austerity. Malawi, therefore, provided a particularly 
interesting case to study the role of political commitment and other potential 
factors for formality and quality of PFM practices in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Box 7: The Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
Malawi prepared its first PRSP in 2001/2002. The Malawi Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy (MPRS) was based on four strategic pillars: 
1. Sustainable Pro-Poor Economic Growth – economically empowering the poor 
by ensuring macroeconomic stability, access to credit and markets, skills de-
velopment and employment generation. 
2. Human Capital Development – ensuring the poor have the health status and 
education to lift themselves out of poverty 
3. Improving the Quality of Life for the Most Vulnerable – providing sustainable 
safety nets for those who are unable to benefit from the first two pillars. 
4. Good Governance – ensuring that public and civil society institutions and sys-
tems protect and benefit the poor. 
In addition, there were four issues cutting across these pillars: HIV/AIDS, Gender, 
Environment, Science and Technology. 
While PRSPs are considered key documents in joint efforts by governments and 
donors to achieve sustainable development in many countries, the Malawian PRSP 
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never gained too much relevance. It is mainly perceived as a background document 
that guided the general formulation of policies rather than being considered a bind-
ing policy document for different sectors of the government.  
The first MPRSP expired by the end of 2005. Preparations for a new PRSP had not 
started by the time the field research was conducted and another strategy document, 
the “Malawi Economic Growth Strategy” (MEGS) was generally considered the 
guiding policy document reflecting government priorities. By the end of 2006 a new 
PRSP had been drafted; however, the finalisation process got delayed when the 
president presented different priorities from those initially agreed upon in the par-
ticipatory formulation process to be included.  
Source: World Bank (2004a); own compilation 
Most studies conducted on PFM in Malawi thus far refer to the conditions 
under the Muluzi administration. Their findings are rather similar: the budget 
itself is considered a “shadow budget” (South African Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs 2004, 2), the budget process is judged to be either extremely 
weak (IMFb 2004) or even a mere “theatre that masks the real distribution 
and spending” (Rakner et al. 2004, iv). Political patronage and interference 
from the top level have been identified as creating informal practices that 
undermine formal institutions of the budget process. The deliberateness of 
these political interferences for individual gains under the Muluzi administra-
tion is generally not doubted by the cited studies. It was, therefore, particu-
larly interesting to attempt to assess the impact of apparently improved politi-
cal commitment at the top on the quality of PFM in Malawi. 
 
Box 8: Recent Political History of Malawi 
Malawi’s recent political history is far from unique in the African context. It is a 
country in transition. In 1994, the first democratic multiparty elections took place 
after almost 30 years of authoritarian rule under Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda. Poor eco-
nomic performance and external shocks reduced political elites’ access to resources 
and thus eroded the support bases for “bureaucratic-authoritarian” regimes (Haggard / 
Kaufman 1995, 28–30). However, the regime change was primarily induced by 
heavy donor pressure from World Bank and the IMF instead of evolving elites or 
revolutions. The aftermath of the changes in 1993/94 has been characterised by a 
typical setting and the challenge for democratic consolidation. Winner of the first 
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(1994) and second free electionsa (1999) was the conservative United Democratic 
Front (UDF)b party and its leader Bakili Muluzi was elected presidentc. In 2004, 
Muluzi did not succeed in changing the constitution to run for a third term, mainly 
thanks to the resistance of Members of National Parliament (MP) and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSO) influence. Bingu wa Mutharika, his successor and winner of 
the 2004 presidential elections, however, had enjoyed strong support from the for-
mer president and seemed to be dependent on his political influence. Nonetheless, 
the IMF and other donor organisations quickly hailed the new Mutharika govern-
ment as a great hope for Malawi, following a new policy approach, being serious 
about fiscal austerity and fighting corruption. This was in part driven by the new 
president’s decision to appoint Goodall E. Gondwe as Minister of Finance, who had 
– among other things - previously served as director of the Africa department at the 
IMF. This appointment was interpreted as a strong signal that Mutharika was indeed 
committed to sound fiscal policy and to improving Malawi´s relations with interna-
tional donors (Meinhardt 2004, 21). However, from the beginning many observers 
considered it problematic that the apparently strong commitment to better and more 
transparent political leadership depended on very few prominent figures at the top.
In 2005, controversial positions between the president and his predecessor became 
more obvious and finally led into open confrontation. Mutharika withdrew from 
UDF and formed his own Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Political conditions 
in transition countries are often shaped by rapidly changing coalitions and ‘turncoat’ 
mentalities. This appeared to be the case in this new setting of parties and politi-
cians, who had left UDF to join the new DPP. These new developments created a 
situation of political uncertainty with the result that local government elections have 
repeatedly been postponed since May 2005. Calls from voices within society and the 
political arena for a so-called Government of National Unity (GNU) became 
stronger. By the end of 2006, local government elections had still not been held, 
although there were signs that preparations were finally under way.  By this time, 
many observers no longer shared the initial enthusiasm for the new administration. 
The general impression conveyed that the new president was increasingly turning to 
an authoritarian style in his decision-making.  
Although this is not unusual in the African context, recent developments seem to 
reduce the likelihood of a democratic consolidation to happen soon. The introduction 
of a multiparty electoral system by itself does not create a liberal democracy over-
night. Although the democratic changes have increased the likeliness of legal institu-
tions and procedures to be more predictable, ad hoc decision making and informal 
procedures still exist. Thus, Malawi’s way to consolidate liberal democracy proves 
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its relevance for the PFM in so far as the absence of a dysfunctional system in favour 
of arbitrary procedures and weak institutions is a precondition for successful and 
sustainable management of finances for development. 
a Elections are held in five-year terms. The president and the legislative branch are 
elected at the same time (CIA Factbook, 2004). 
b UDF entered a coalition with AFORD (Alliance for Democracy) and the Malawi Con-
gress Party (MCP). The characteristic of national party politics became clear after the 
elections. All three parties are not characterised by strong ideological ties but frequent 
shifts of alliances. Personality matters and people vote along regional patterns: UDF 
established strong ties in the south with connections to the Chamber of Commerce. 
AFORD shows affinity to the north and various trade unions, whereas the former Banda 
party MCP could preserve its connections to the centre region of Malawi (Hussein 
2004, 109-112) 
c Muluzi is a former MCP member, who – like many other politicians in Malawi – 
changed his party affiliation after the end of the Banda era. 
4.2 Decentralisation in Malawi  
Malawi is a unitary state with strong centralistic features. However in recent 
years, it has begun to devolve functions and responsibilities to local levels of 
government. This new approach is not least due to donors, who felt that a 
fresh impetus was needed and hence strongly argued for the need to develop 
a national decentralisation strategy. Thus, when in 1995 a new constitution 
was adopted it entailed the requirement to establish local government authori-
ties. In 1998 the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) was approved, and 
incorporated into the Local Government Act. The NDP along with the Local 
Government Act provide the main framework for decentralisation in Malawi. 
This framework establishes political decentralisation through democratically 
elected local assemblies and the devolution of central government functions 
to local government level. 
The NDP is formulated and reviewed by a Cabinet Committee on Decentrali-
sation and seeks to achieve the following objectives (Decentralisation Secre-
tariat 1998, 2–3): 
— creating a democratic environment and institutions in Malawi for gov-
ernance and development; at the local level which will facilitate the par-
ticipation of the grassroots in decision-making; 
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— eliminating dual administration (field administration and local govern-
ment) at the district level with the aim of making public service more ef-
ficient, more economical and cost effective; 
— promoting accountability and good governance at the local level in order 
to help Government reduce poverty; and 
— mobilising the masses for socio-economic development at the local level 
The Local Government Act provides the implementation modalities and de-
tails of the local government structure, including key structures, procedures, 
accountabilities and remedies. It also defines the specific parameters of the 
intergovernmental fiscal system (GFA 2005, 20). 
Today Malawi is divided into three regions: the north, the centre, and the 
south. These regions, however, do not have any relevant administrative func-
tions. Thus, the relevant second administrative tier is formed by 28 rural 
districts; 8 towns; 1 municipality and 3 major cities of Malawi. Districts are 
themselves further divided into areas, wards and villages. Areas are headed 
by Traditional Authorities (TA) such as chiefs and sub-chiefs. In 1998 Ma-
lawi counted as many as 380 areas with approximately 26,000 inhabitants in 
each area, and 850 wards of 10,000 to 12,000 people each, which are the 
smallest administrative units (DANIDA 1998, 24; NSO 2005). 
4.3 The sectors: education and health in Malawi  
Although this study focuses on PFM in general, it particularly concentrates 
on PFM in the sectors health and education. There are several reasons for 
this: First, both sectors are considered highly relevant to reducing poverty in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This is also reflected in the central role both sectors are 
attributed in the MPRSP. The second reason is that the MDG-driven debate 
about new modes of aid delivery such as Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) 
or budget support are heavily biased towards these “social” sectors. Thus, 
they play a role in the closely related debate on PFM reforms. This is also the 
case in Malawi.5 Furthermore, decentralisation efforts regularly are most 
                                                          
5  GoM and a group of donors agreed to a health SWAp in 2004. A ‘mini-SWAp’ already 
exists on HIV/AIDS. At the time the field research was conducted a SWAp in the education 
sector was also being prepared.  
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pronounced in these sectors as seen in  Malawi. Finally, these sectors account 
for the largest share of the national budget. 
The following section gives a brief overview of the two sectors. 
4.3.1 The education sector in Malawi – current situation 
Around 13 % of the national budget is currently allocated to the education 
sector (fiscal year 2003/2004). The sector heavily depends on donor funding, 
much of it in support of a SWAp. About one third of the total education 
budget is donor grants (World Bank 2004b, 58). However, donors working in 
the education sector assume that 30 % to 40 % of donor funds are actually 
provided off-budget. At the time of writing Malawi is seeking to apply for the 
Education for All Fast Track Initiative. This would make an allocation of 
20 % of the national budget for education necessary. Therefore, the Ministry 
of Education (MoE) currently tries to improve coordination of the various 
donor-contributions. Donors are heavily involved in supplying teaching and 
learning materials as well as in school construction. Most school construc-
tion in Malawi is donor-financed, often including only minor community 
contributions. An arrangement between the government of Malawi (GoM), 
Germany, the UK and Canada is currently being set-up to create a thematic 
basket financing mechanism to jointly fund activities in support of primary 
education.  
About 26 % of all men and 55 % of all women in Malawi are illiterate. A 
severe problem of Malawi’s education sector consists in a lack of qualified 
teachers. In 1994, the government introduced free primary education. De-
spite a positive impact on enrolment ratios, this sudden policy shift had se-
vere consequences on the quality of primary education as not enough trained 
teachers were waiting in the wings. There are six publicly funded primary 
teacher colleges in Malawi with a combined training capacity of 2760 quali-
fied teacher graduates each year (MoE 2005b, 8). As a make-shift solution, 
the government employed 20,000 untrained teachers, planning to train them 
over the coming years. This has only happened partially so far. Consequently, 
the qualified teacher/pupil-ratio dropped drastically to around 1/118 (Hau 
2004, 29), whereas the goal is 1/60. In addition, there are currently around 
10,000 vacancies and the number is rising due to retirements and deaths 
(BMZ 2004a, 5). However, the total number of teachers – trained and un-
trained – declined (from 47,840 to 43,952) between 2000 and 2004 (MoE 
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2005b, vi). One serious problem appears to be that a surge in the number of 
private secondary schools has deprived the public primary schools of their 
most qualified teachers because they offer higher salaries. The situation is 
even worse in rural than in urban schools.  
Furthermore, the HIV/Aids pandemic poses major challenges to this sector. 
According to the MoE, four to six teachers die per day in Malawi. In addition 
to the detrimental effect this has on the quality of education, the ministry also 
faces the problem of paying the funeral costs of deceased teachers. Custom in 
Malawi requires any employer, in this case the MoE, to cater for the funeral 
costs for deceased employees. In the past, however, the education budget did 
not provide for these expenses, which can amount to considerable sums. The 
policy to place teachers all over the country contributes to high funeral costs, 
because the ministry is also expected to pay for transporting the body to the 
deceased person’s home village. This problem has been recognised and fu-
neral costs can now be budgeted for under the item “consumables” in the 
sector vote, which consequently is the second biggest expenditure item of the 
sector budget. It is expected that the devolution of the responsibility to recruit 
teachers to local administrative units will further reduce this problem by 
making it possible for teachers to teach in their home district. Besides reduc-
ing funeral costs, this may also contribute to lower HIV infection rates among 
teachers as well.  
4.3.2 The health sector in Malawi – current situation 
Poor health status is both a main reason and an important aspect of poverty in 
Malawi. Recent trends have been quite negative. Life expectancy has dropped 
from 43 years in 1996 to only 37 years in 2005, mainly due to HIV-AIDS 
pandemic (estimated adult prevalence rate in 2005, 14.2 %). Infant mortality 
is estimated to have reached 103 deaths in 1,000 births in 2005 (CIA World 
Factbook) while the maternal death rate in the same year was 1,120 deaths in 
100,000 births, almost double the rate of 1990 (Republic of Malawi 2002).  
Malawi's public health care system is structured in three tiers:  
— Three central hospitals (in Lilongwe, Blantyre and Zomba) for the de-
livery of tertiary services with a semi-autonomous status.  
— District hospitals for the delivery of primary and secondary services, 
with one hospital per district. 
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— Several health centres for the delivery of primary health services (ma-
ternal and child health, treatment of common diseases). Health centres 
are not separate cost centres but fall under the responsibility of district 
hospitals. 
As such, the Ministry of Health and Population (MoH) accounts for 64 % of 
the total number of formal health facilities (Hanson 2005, 1). Beside the pub-
lic health care providers and some private clinics, non-governmental organi-
sations play an important role in providing health care services in Malawi. 
The most important among these is the Christian Health Association of Ma-
lawi (CHAM), which provides 26 % of health care facilities (Hanson 
2005, 1).6 
The most prominent government strategy in the Malawian health sector is the 
Essential Healthcare Package (EHP), which is also incorporated in the 
MPRSP. The EHP consists of a bundle of health services that are supposedly 
available for every Malawian throughout the country. It is intended to im-
prove the quality and availability of essential healthcare inputs, to improve 
the access to essential healthcare and to strengthen the administration and 
financing of essential healthcare services (Republic of Malawi 2002, 60). 
Implementation of the EHP programme, however, is difficult, not least due to 
the poor staffing situation in the sector.  
The health sector is extremely donor dependent, with donors providing 
around 60–75 % of total expenditure over the period from 2000/01 to 
2003/04 (Hanson 2005, 8). In October 2004 the government and a group of 
donors (DFID, NORAD, World Bank) launched a Sector Wide Approach 
(SWAp) for the health sector. The financing mechanism is viewed as an im-
portant instrument for implementing the EHP. Accordingly, the EHP Pro-
gramme of Work provides an extensive list of activities that should be fi-
nanced with SWAp resources (Republic of Malawi 2004). Although at the 
time of research, the SWAp was still in its very early stages, most stake-
holders expected substantial improvements regarding the alignment of donor 
procedures to the Malawian budget cycle and donor coordination in general, 
                                                          
6   CHAM coordinates health units from different church denominations, including hospitals, 
health centres, and dispensaries. Together, these units provide roughly one third of health 
services in Malawi. CHAM receives funds from government, churches and private dona-
tions. In addition, it charges user fees for health services. 
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leading to reduced workload on all sides thanks to harmonised monitoring 
and reporting requirements.  
Most votes within the health budget (around 80–90 %) are classified as Pov-
erty Priority Expenditures (PPEs) and thus cannot be cut back during the 
budget year in case of cash fluctuations (see Section 5.1.2). As a result, fund-
ing for salaries and drugs appear to be disbursed relatively regularly and 
without substantial fluctuations during the financial year.7 This seems to 
apply less so to expenditures for administration at headquarters. Furthermore, 
operational costs are often cutback substantially during the fiscal year, be-
cause expenditure items such as fuel, electricity, water etc are not classified 
as PPEs. 
Similar to teachers in the education sector, one major problem in the health 
sector consists in the lack of qualified medical staff. Table 1 shows the popu-
lation to health personnel ratios for doctors and nurses in Malawi. Approxi-
mately 50 % of key positions, such as doctors, clinical officers and nurses 
cannot be filled; this leads to a severe shortage of medical professionals in 
public hospitals and health centres. Although the government produces a 
number of qualified professionals in nursing schools and universities, a large 
share of these graduates are absorbed by private facilities offering better 
salaries or they emigrate to Europe and other countries where salaries are 
generally much higher than public sector pay in Malawi.8 Among the reasons 
for the poor staffing situation are the cumbersome recruitment process and 
poor coordination between different departments in the MoH. For example, it 
is common for new staff to receive their first salary 3–4 months after taking 
up their job in the public health service. 
                                                          
7  However, this does not mean that drugs and supplies are readily available in all regions of 
the country, as explained below, 
8  Especially the UK is blamed for luring urgently needed nurses and doctors away from 
Malawi. As a counter-measure, the British Department for International Development 
(DFID) has recently agreed to top up the salaries in Malawi’s public health sector. This 
measure should attenuate the brain drain and contribute to attracting and retaining more 
qualified medical professionals in the public sector.  
 Stefan Leiderer et al. 
54 German Development Institute 
Another major problem is the severe shortage of drugs and materials, de-
spite of relatively regular funding. The Central Medical Stores are responsi-
ble for supplying and distributing drugs to public hospitals and health centres. 
In recent years, it has become a common phenomenon for drugs and materi-
als to disappear; therefore, some donors headed by DFID are now pushing for 
a reform of the central medical stores system.  
Another problem consists in a severe lack of basic infrastructure, especially 
in rural health centres. Health centres in remote areas often do not have elec-
tricity, running water or even a telephone available, seriously limiting the 
effectiveness of these facilities. Many health centres do not have ambulances 
at their disposal, making transport of patients extremely difficult in rural 
areas. 
Table 1: Population per Health Personnel Ratios (MoH and CHAM  
personnel) 
 2000 2002 June 2003 June 2004 Recom-
mended 
Doctors 31,746:1 70,725:1 89,962:1 106,397:1 9,000:1 
Nurses 4,871:1 4171:1 3,240:1 3,035:1 2,000:1 
Source: Hanson (2005) 
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Part II: Empirical Findings 
5 Worlds Apart: The Theory and Practice of Public 
Financial Management in Malawi  
The formal legal and institutional framework for public financial manage-
ment in Malawi has undergone a series of reforms since the first free multi-
party elections in 1994 and even prior to that. New legislation regulating 
finance, audit and procurement was written, providing for relatively clear-cut 
responsibilities and time schedules of the budget process in Malawi. Accord-
ingly, various recent studies on Malawi’s PFM system conclude that the legal 
and institutional framework for PFM in Malawi is relatively well designed. In 
principle, it provides a good starting point for a sound management of public 
finances (c.f. Rakner et al. 2004, 14–15, 18). For example, the World Bank’s 
2003 Country Financial Accountability Assessment for Malawi states: “When 
compared to most developing countries, Malawi has a good legal and institu-
tional framework for public sector financial management and accountabil-
ity.” (World Bank 2003, v). Therefore, one could expect that the formal legal 
and institutional PFM framework in Malawi should provide in principle for 
effective fiscal and expenditure planning, budget preparation, execution, and 
control in line with the priorities set in the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Paper (MPRSP). 
At the same time, however, many assessments judge the budget process in 
Malawi to be extremely weak (c.f. IMF 2004a; IMF 2004b; see Table 4 and 
Figure 6 below). The main reason for this is that formal institutions and pro-
cedures bear little relevance for PFM practice in Malawi. As a recent study 
on Malawi’s formal and informal PFM institutions commissioned by DFID 
states:  
“The budget process is a theatre that masks the real distribution and 
spending. All the actors, from civil society, government, and donors seem 
aware that many of their statements and actions have little bearing on 
[the] actual distribution of resources” (Rakner et al. 2004, iv).  
The cited studies of Malawi’s PFM tend to focus on central government. 
However, the findings of the field study conducted for this research in 2005 
confirm that their assessment is also valid for local government in Malawi. It 
found ample evidence that Malawi’s local PFM-system is characterised even 
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more by informal procedures and ad-hoc behaviour by virtually all relevant 
stakeholders in the PFM process.  
This observed gap between the formal framework for PFM and actual PFM 
practice in Malawi has a wide range of causes. In order to provide a clearer 
picture of these discrepancies and their relevance for PRSP implementation in 
Malawi, the following sections contrast the ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ of PFM9 in 
more detail before Chapter 6 goes on to examine the underlying determinants 
of informal PFM practices in Malawi. 
5.1 The formal legal and institutional framework for PFM 
in Malawi 
This section first introduces the formal and institutional framework for PFM 
in Malawi including the formal links between the MPRSP and the budget, 
before examining the determinants for these divergences more closely in 
Chapter 6. The empirical findings with regard to actual PFM practice in Ma-
lawi are presented in Section . 
5.1.1 The legal framework for PFM in Malawi 
The most important laws regulating Public Financial Management in Malawi 
are the  
— Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 2002 
— Public Finance Management Act No. 7 of 2003 
— Public Audit Act No. 6 of 2003 
— Public Procurement Act No. 8 of 2003 
These acts have replaced the Public Finance and Audit Act, which was con-
sidered inadequate for modern financial management. The new acts are 
mainly based on the recommendations given by a team of experts led by the 
                                                          
9  In this context ‘theory’ of PFM refers to the formal legal institutional framework for the 
management of public finances while ‘practice’ covers the actual reality of PFM in Malawi. 
While it is obvious that a certain gap between the formal framework and practical reality 
always exists, the degree to which a formal legal and institutional framework actually 
guides real processes may differ widely in different contexts. 
Public Financial Management for PRSP Implementation in Malawi 
German Development Institute 57 
World Bank in the course of a Country Financial Accountability Assessment 
(CFAA) undertaken between February and December 2001, following a pre-
vious breakdown of donor-government relations. 
In addition to these legal acts, financial management within government 
institutions is guided by the issuance of circulars. The purpose of these circu-
lars is to clarify and update the above-mentioned regulations. 
At the local government level, PFM is regulated mainly by the following acts, 
guidelines, and regulations:  
— Local Government Act 1998 
— National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) 1998  
— Development Planning System Handbook for District Assemblies 2001 
— Financial Reporting Guidelines for Local Authorities 2004 
5.1.2 Formal PFM at central government level 
The financial year in Malawi covers the period 1 July to 30 June. The most 
important public actors involved in the budget process at the central govern-
ment level are the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development (MEPD), respective line ministries, the National 
Parliament, and the National Audit Office (NAO). 
Malawi operates a dual budget system, i.e. the recurrent budget and the de-
velopment or capital budget are prepared separately.10 In the specific institu-
tional setup of Malawi’s PFM system this has the consequence that the re-
sponsibility for the budget planning process is distributed between two minis-
tries, namely the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development (MEPD). The MoF is responsible for medium-
term expenditure planning (i.e. the MTEF) and the formulation of the annual 
budget (consisting of the recurrent and the development budget). The MEPD 
is in charge of compiling the Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP), 
a five-year rolling plan of prioritised investment projects. The first year of the 
PSIP provides the basis for the annual development budget. The harmonisa-
                                                          
10  The term capital budget is somewhat misleading, as it can contain recurrent expenditures 
related to investment projects as well. The reverse is true for the recurrent budget, which 
can contain capital expenditure. 
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tion of the two budgets, the actual allocation of resources and the disburse-
ment of funds to MDAs is the responsibility of the MoF and the Treasury. 
Strategic and budget planning – the formal link to the MPRSP 
Budget planning in Malawi is based on a macroeconomic forecast prepared 
by a special resource committee, composed of representatives of the Reserve 
Bank of Malawi, the MoF and the MEPD, and supported by the National 
Statistics Office (NSO). The forecast consists in the projection of key macro-
economic data such as the economic growth rate, interest and inflation rates, 
level of debt, i.e. the amount of public resources available in the forthcoming 
years, including external inflows, etc. A special division in the MoF was 
established to deal with the management of external funds (Rakner et al. 
2004, 10). In theory, the annual budget process in Malawi is systematically 
integrated into the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, which was intro-
duced in 1995/96 in four pilot sectors (e.g. education and health) and has 
since been rolled out to all remaining ministries. The time frame of the MTEF 
covers the preparation of estimates for the coming budget year, i.e. the annual 
budget plus three outer years, i.e. the medium-term planning perspective 
(World Bank 1998, 42–43). At the time of writing, the MTEF only covered 
the central government level.11  
At the time the field research for this study was undertaken the Malawi Pov-
erty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP) together with the Malawi Eco-
nomic Growth Strategy (MEGS) were supposed to represent the most im-
portant references for strategic policy planning and the allocation of public 
resources.12 In theory, the MEPD is responsible for screening proposals of the 
line ministries to determine whether they meet the development priorities of 
the government and if costing is realistic (Scek 2004, 8). To compile the 
PSIP, the MEPD then ranks project proposals, based on how well they fit into 
the government’s development strategy explicitly stated in the MPRS and the 
Malawi Economic Growth Strategy (Durevall / Erlandsson 2005, 22). The 
PSIP is then submitted to the budget department in the MoF and is used to 
formulate the development budget.13 
                                                          
11  This will probably change because of recent reforms. 
12  The first MPRSP was limited to the period 2002–2005. At the time of writing a  new strat-
egy document was being devised that would better integrate the two strategies. 
13  The first year of the PSIPS rolling plan should be identical with the development budget. 
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No direct formal mechanism links the MPRSP directly to the recurrent 
budget. Recurrent expenditures are classified as being part of a programme, a 
sub-programme and as a line item, which are not related to MPRSP activities. 
However, as part of the Enhanced HIPC conditionality Protected Pro-poor 
Expenditures (PPEs) were incorporated in the Malawian budget for 13 key 
areas. PPEs are aimed at protecting vital pro-poor expenditures from 
arbitrary in-year cuts to budget expenditure caused by fiscal restraints (Foz-
zard / Chauncy 2002, 37–38). And in effect, although not directly linked to 
MPRSP activities but rather to inputs such as drugs, nursing materials, teach-
ing materials etc., PPEs appear to have led to a significant redirection of 
resource allocation towards MPRS activities (Durevall / Erlandsson 2005, 27 
et seq.). Thus, in principle there are a number of mechanisms linking the 
budget to the MPRSP, which should ensure that to a certain degree the 
MPRSP is implemented through medium-term planning and the annual 
budget. Accordingly, the World Bank concludes in its 2004 HIPC review that 
the 2002/03 budget allocated some 63.5 percent of ORT to MPRSP activities 
(see Table 2).14  
Budget formulation 
The whole budget formulation process is designed to take six months, starting 
with line ministries submitting their budget bids in December and ending 
with the approval of the budget estimates by Parliament in June. The Secre-
tary to the Treasury (Principal Secretary of the MoF) formally begins the 
process in December by submitting the Treasury Circular 1 to the line minis-
tries. The circular requests the line ministries to submit budget estimates for 
the next budget year. 
                                                          
14  ORT (Other Recurrent Transactions) represent all expenditures other than statutory and 
statehood expenditures, development budget, and personal emoluments and therefore in the 
short run represent the discretionary recurrent expenditure of government. However, one 
has to keep in mind that these numbers are for planned ORT only. As explained in the fol-
lowing section, actual budget outturns differ substantially from planned figures. In addition, 
a recent overview of Malawi’s Public Finance Management Reforms published by SIDA 
emphasises that these allocations may not be due to policy decisions as the MPRS does not 
contain any details about spending priorities in line ministries and there is no  clear connec-
tion between policy decisions and budget implementation (Durevall / Erlandsson  2005, 27 
et seq.). 
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From this point, the planning departments within the line ministries start 
preparing their budget bids, consolidating the inputs from all cost centres and 
statutory bodies, which submit their proposals (European Commission 2002, 
12, 50). They should set priorities within planned activities based on the 
MPRS and costing. In a next step, line ministries and public agencies present 
their resource bids, policy objectives and planned activities to the MoF. 
These resource bids are discussed during the hearings between the MoF and 
the different line ministries. Based on the submitted bids, the MoF needs to 
allocate the resources to the different line ministries. Resources should be 
allocated in line with the overall resource envelope available, according to 
strategic policy priorities as stated in the MPRS and costing. The MoF needs 
Table 2: The allocation of FY 2002/03 budget by MPRSP Pillar  
(ORT Only) 
 MK as  % total voted ORT 
as  % allocation 
to MPRSP activi-
ties 
Total Voted ORT 15,078.50   
Total MPRSP  
Activities  9,569.44 63.5 %  
Pillar 1  3,141.94 20.8 % 32.8 % 
Pillar 2  5,081.76 33.7 % 53.1 % 
Pillar 3   119.97    0.8 %   1.3 % 
Pillar 4  1,116.93   7.4 % 11.7 % 
Cross-Cutting     66.57   0.4 %   0.7 % 
Implementation and 
Monitoring     42.26   0.3 %  0.4 % 
Statehood Activities  1,218.94   8.1 %  
Other (Outside 
MPRSP)  4,290.12 28.5 %  
Source:   World Bank (2004a) 
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to establish binding sector ceilings so that line ministries avoid overspending 
(Rakner et al. 2004, 10). 
When all available resources are allocated to MDAs, the MoF prepares and 
submits a statement of anticipated revenues and budgetary appropriations to 
the Cabinet. This has to be done at least fourteen days before introducing the 
budgetary estimates to Parliament for approval. The submitted statement is 
then discussed in the Cabinet. When the Cabinet approves the proposed 
budget, the MoF is authorised to prepare the estimates to be presented to the 
National Assembly (PFM Act: Section 21). The final step in the budget for-
mulation process is the submittal of a statement of the budget estimates to the 
National Assembly for approval. The budget estimates have to include all 
estimated receipts, grants, other revenues and expenditures for the forthcom-
ing financial year. 
Although statutory expenditures do not have to be approved by the National 
Assembly, they are to be included in the budget estimates to deliver a com-
plete picture of the total amount of expenditures proposed by the programmes 
and activities of the government.(PFM Act: Section 21–22). The Budget and 
Finance Committee of the National Assembly scrutinises the budget for ade-
quacy and prioritisation of key expenditures. The findings are then discussed 
in the National Assembly before approval. Finally, the Appropriation Act (the 
budget bill as voted by Parliament), normally tabled for June, authorises the 
expenditure of public money. No public expenditure is to be incurred unless 
public funds have been authorised by an Appropriation Act (PFM Act: Sec-
tion 23–24). In addition to the budget estimates, the MoF has to sub mits no 
later than April 1 of each year an economic and fiscal policy statement for the 
forthcoming financial year and two outer years to Parliament. This document 
aims at specifying the economic and fiscal policy, the fiscal objectives and 
strategic priorities of the government. In addition, the MoF is required to 
publish a report by June 30 each year updating the economic and fiscal policy 
statement. (PFM Act: Section 14–17). These statements are produced to en-
able Parliament to scrutinise if the estimated budget allocations really repre-
sent the economic and fiscal policy goals, as stated in the documents of the 
government. 
Budget execution 
In 1996, the Government of Malawi introduced a cash budget system on a 
monthly basis to improve fiscal discipline and attenuate persistent overspend-
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ing due to observed weaknesses in the expenditure control system. Initially, 
the cash budget system was devised as a temporary measure, but it remains in 
place as a central tool for budget control and stabilisation. In order to improve 
planning security for spending agencies, at least partially, a credit ceiling 
allocation system was introduced. This system provides spending agencies 
with a tentative three-month allocation forecast. Each ministry and public 
agency holds various bank accounts (for personnel, administration, loans, 
donors, projects, programmes etc.) at commercial banks. The ceilings or 
spending limits for each ministry, public agency and category of expenditure 
are determined by the Accountant General and are then communicated to the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi and commercial banks holding government ac-
counts. Controlling Officers can draw cheques and payments based on the 
spending limits from their respective bank accounts and the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi only reimburses cheques within the respective ceilings to the com-
mercial banks. (European Commission 2002, 53; World Bank 2003, 7). 
At the beginning of each month all line ministries are required to submit an 
Expenditure Return Report to the MoF. This report provides information 
about all the expenditures incurred during the month. These reports are based 
on information from cost centres of line ministries and districts. The timely 
submission of the Expenditure Return Report is a prerequisite for the release 
of funds in the following month (European Commission 2002, 13, 55). 
Until recently, reporting was done manually. However, in 1996 the govern-
ment started implementing an Integrated Financial Management Information 
System (IFMIS) to computerise all records. This system should help to pro-
vide timely and accurate financial information, to improve and strengthen 
financial control, to introduce a standardised integrated financial management 
reporting system for the GoM at various operational levels and to provide the 
Accountant General with an upgraded computerised accounting system 
(World Bank 2003, v). 
Monitoring, budget control and evaluation 
The government has developed a master plan for monitoring and evaluating 
the progress of implementing the MPRSP at a strategic level. This plan con-
sists of five components: 
— Poverty Reduction Strategy Monitoring 
— Poverty, Vulnerability, and Inequality Monitoring 
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— Impact Assessment and Policy Analysis 
— Poverty Monitoring Information System  
— Communication and Advocacy Initiative; 
The lead institution for monitoring and evaluation at a strategic level is the 
M&E Division within the MEPD. 
The formal framework and institutional setup for the evaluation and control 
of the budget process in Malawi in principle provides for effective control 
and scrutiny of government’s PFM performance. Key actors are the National 
Audit Office (NAO), the National Assembly, Controlling Officers (COs), the 
Anti-Corruption Bureau, and finally Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). 
National Audit Office – According to the Public Audit Act, the National Au-
dit Office (NAO) is a fully independent audit institution headed by the Audi-
tor General who serves for a term of five or ten years maximum. The Auditor 
General audits and examines transactions, books, accounts and other financial 
records associated with programmes and projects financed with public re-
sources. Wherever it seems appropriate, the Auditor General can express an 
opinion concerning the reliability of information and the management and 
control of public money (Public Audit Act: section 4–13). The Auditor Gen-
eral summarises the results of the audits and reviews of the financial year in 
an annual report that is submitted by the 31 December to the President or the 
Speaker of the National Assembly for information purposes. Subsequently, 
the members of the National Assembly discuss the report and have the oppor-
tunity to comment on it (Public Audit Act: section 14–17). 
National Assembly – Parliament incorporates an important oversight function 
in the budget process. As described above, the MoF has to present the budget 
estimates for the forthcoming year to the National Assembly for political 
scrutiny. The MoF is only authorised to disburse funds if the budget alloca-
tions have passed through Parliament and are approved by the Appropriation 
Act (PFM Act: Section 21–26). The Public Accounts Committee of the Par-
liament scrutinises the financial statement of the government as well as the 
reports and statements of the Auditor General presented to the National As-
sembly. It has the task to examine whether there is any evidence of non-
compliance of actual expenditure patterns with the original budget allocations 
as approved by the National Assembly. In any such case, the committee can 
request line ministries and public agencies to explain or justify the use of 
public funds. Although the Committee can recommend sanctions, it is not 
 Stefan Leiderer et al. 
64 German Development Institute 
authorised to take action (Public Audit Act: Section 18–24; Rakner et al. 
2004, 16). 
Controlling Officers – Controlling Officers (COs) are public servants desig-
nated by the Secretary to the Treasury to control public expenditures for indi-
vidual budget lines. Usually, the CO is the head of a ministry or department 
within a ministry or public agency. The CO is to ensure that all expenditure is 
properly authorised and used for the specific purposes as enacted by the Na-
tional Assembly (PFM Act: Section 10). COs are formally accountable to the 
Secretary to the President in Cabinet, but in the actual budget process tend to 
be supervised and sanctioned rather by the respective minister of the line 
ministry (Rakner et al. 2004, 15). 
Anti-Corruption Bureau – The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) was estab-
lished in 1998 under the Corrupt Practices Act. The ACB is not mentioned in 
one of the main chapters of the constitution but has been created under a sub-
section. The ACB should work independently from the executive branch and 
receive annual funding from the GoM to cover its administrative costs (Rak-
ner et al. 2004, 16–17). Founded primarily as a reaction to increasing political 
pressure from international donors, the ACB can initiate its own investiga-
tions, publish the results and take legal action against government officials in 
case of alleged cases of corruption, fraud etc. 
Civil society and media – Like in most young democracies, civil society in 
Malawi is in general relatively weak. However, a number of CSO do engage 
in PFM work, and are beginning to have a significant impact on policy-
making in Malawi (James / Malunga 2006, 49). Such organisations are, for 
example, the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) or the Civil Society 
Coalition for Quality Basic Education (CSQBE)) Although the press in Ma-
lawi is not considered completely free, it is rather diverse given the size of 
the country, and it often publishes critical articles on government perform-
ance. 
5.1.3 Formal PFM at local government level 
The institutional setup of local government in Malawi has undergone a num-
ber of changes since the field research in spring 2005. Probably the most 
important change is that central government assigned an individual vote to 
each district in the national budget. The District Commissioners are now the 
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controlling officers for these budget lines. At this stage, it seems too early to 
assess the impact of these changes on PFM at local government level in Ma-
lawi. However, there are some indications that while improving budget con-
trol this new setup might undermine local accountability mechanisms. How-
ever, it can be safely assumed that the changes made to the system are only of 
minor importance with regard to the generic mechanisms that cause devia-
tions of PFM practice from formal rules and regulations. For this reason, this 
section describes mostly the setup that existed while conducting the field 
research.  
Institutions for local PFM 
While the research team conducted this study, four institutions were directly 
involved in implementing Malawi’s decentralisation policy at the central 
level, namely the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
(MoLGRD), the Decentralisation Secretariat (DS), and the National Local 
Government Finance Committee (NLGFC). These institutions provided the 
formal legal and institutional framework for local PFM. At local level, the 
district secretariats and district assemblies were the most important actors in 
local PFM processes.15 
The Cabinet Committee on Decentralisation formulated and reviewed the 
National Decentralisation Policy and oversees the implementation of the 
policy, including all plans and programmes. Committee membership is not 
restricted to particular institutions and is made up of selected ministers (GFA 
2005, 24). 
The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MoLGRD) 
acts as the supervisor of the decentralisation process and the budget process 
of local authorities. Therefore, it develops the overall policies and monitors 
the strategic planning processes of the local governments. The MoLGRD also 
recruits the directors of the district secretariats through the Local Assemblies 
Service Commission (LASCOM).  
The National Local Governance Finance Committee (NLGFC) acts as the 
institutional link between central and local government level. At the time of 
the research, transferring funds from central government transfer mechanisms 
                                                          
15  This only applies to rural districts. Structures and the names of the institutions are some-
what different in cities and towns but are not subject to/not a part of this study. 
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(in particular the General Resource Fund – GRF and the District Develop-
ment Fund – DDF) to the local assemblies was one of NLGFC’s main re-
sponsibilities.. In addition, it also examined and supervised accounts of local 
government authorities.16 Apart from that, the NLGFC’s role is to advise and 
provide training to local authorities on PFM issues, in particular planning and 
budgeting processes. After budget preparation at local level, it consolidates 
local assemblies’ budgets and submits them to the National Assembly 
through the MoLGRD. The local authorities report regularly to the NLGFC 
on budget execution at local level. This served as a budget control mecha-
nism because the NLGFC could hold back funds when the respective local 
authority did not submit the required reports on time. 
The members of the NLGFC are (GFA 2005, 27): 
— Nominee  representing local government authorities 
— Principal Secretary for Local Government 
— Member of Society of Accountants in Malawi 
— Chairman of the Civil Service Commission or a representative; 
— Nominee representing the Electoral Commission; 
— Principal Secretary for Finance or his or her senior representative; 
Unlike the NLGFC, the Decentralisation Secretariat was always meant to 
be a transitional institution and has – after numerous delays – been finally 
phased out, passing its responsibilities on to MoLGRD and NLGFC.17 Mainly 
funded by donors, the DS was mainly responsible for the implementation of 
the National Decentralisation Programme (NDP). In this capacity, the DS had 
originally been created to provide technical support to the MoLGRD. In addi-
tion, the DS was responsible for the consolidation of local authorities’ strate-
                                                          
16  This arrangement changed in 2005 when the GoM  made the District Commissioners (for 
rural districts) and Chief Executives (for cities and towns) controlling officers directly ac-
countable to the National Assembly and the National Audit Office. Transfers via the GRF 
and the DDF are now transferred directly from the Treasury to the accounts of the assem-
blies.  
17  This change took place after the research was completed for this study in early 2005. 
Public Financial Management for PRSP Implementation in Malawi 
German Development Institute 67 
gic development plans, the District Development Plans – DDPs, and for sub-
mitting them to the MoLGRD.18  
In rural districts, the District Secretariat and the District Assembly are the 
most important actors in the PFM system. The District Secretariats form the 
administrative bodies of the districts. They manage the district’s budget plan-
ning and execution process, i.e. they formulate the DDP, and are responsible 
for the formulation of annual budgets as well as budget implementation and 
control. The District Assembly (DA) is the legislative body at rural local 
level, among other things responsible for approving DDPs and annual budg-
ets. 
The DA is composed of elected councillors; each ward within a district sends 
one councillor to the Assembly. The chair (mayor in cities) is elected among 
the councillors and heads the Assembly. Furthermore, there are three addi-
tional groups of members groups without voting power. These members are 
the TAs (Traditional Authorities) who are the chiefs and sub-chiefs of areas; 
members of National Parliament (MP) from constituencies that are within the 
geographical limits of the district; and finally five additional individuals who 
are appointed by the elected members of the DA and who represent various 
interest groups form civil society (Hussein 2004, 116–118).  
The administrative body of the DA is the District Secretariat, which is com-
posed of a District Commissioner (DC), a Director of Finance (DoF); a Di-
rector of Planning and Development (DPD); a Director of Works (DoW); and 
a Director of Administration (DoA). All these positions are hired directly by 
the MoLGRD. Together with the District Health Officer (DHO) and the Dis-
trict Education Manager (DEM), who are the heads of their respective line 
ministry’s deconcentrated units in the district, they form the District Execu-
tive Committee (DEC). The DEC is thus the administrations’ highest com-
mittee responsible for preparation of decision making by the Assembly, espe-
cially with regard to strategic development planning and PFM related issues.  
Figure 3 illustrates the institutional set-up as established by the NDP and the 
Local Government Act. 
 
                                                          
18  Every district develops a District Development Plan (DDP), from which Annual Investment 
Plans are derived. 
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Figure 3:  Institutional setup established by the National Decentralisation 
 Policy 
 
Source:   GFA (2005) 
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Local planning process 
In 2002, Malawi’s districts were for the first time eligible to take measures 
for a locally initiated ‘medium-term planning’, called District Development 
Planning System (DDPS)19. This system contains steps such as preparing a 
Socio-Economic Profile (SEP); developing Village Action Plans (VAP)20; 
and finally, prioritising development needs of each district in a  District De-
velopment Plan (DDP) (Republic of Malawi 2001, 43; MoLGRD 2004). 
Figure 4 illustrates the local planning process. 
As a starting point the Village Development Committees (VDC) usually 
identify community-based projects and estimates the required internal and 
external resources mainly in cooperation with members of the District Execu-
tive Committee (DEC) and local extension workers. Nevertheless, commu-
nity members, NGOs, and grassroots organisations may also propose projects 
to the VDC. The Area Development Committee (ADC) then compiles a list 
of suggested projects for prioritisation and finally submits the list to the 
DEC.21  
The DEC should approve projects that are feasible and judged worthwhile, by 
comparing the goals and objectives and evaluating whether the project im-
plementation will assure an efficient use of resources. The DEC also evalu-
ates on how the chosen projects will be best realised in order to achieve the 
objectives and outputs (Republic of Malawi 2001, 36–38). The DDP de-
scribes the objectives and strategies of the district thus providing a compre- 
                                                          
19  According to the Development Planning System Handbook for District Assemblies, the 
DDPS is based on four principles namely (i) bottom-up approach, (ii) participation, (iii) 
district-focus, and (iv) people-centred (Republic of Malawi 2001, 5, 33). The handbook 
also makes clear that the whole DDPS process should be based on the MPRSP and the Vi-
sion 2020 (MPRSP-Annex 1 2002, 34; Republic of Malawi 2001, 32, 41).  
20  Developing a VAP involves a highly participatory process. To prioritise village needs 
independently, group patterns, such as elderly, women, or the youth within a village are 
separated to prioritise and finally bring all their findings together for discussion.  
21  Important prerequisites for this participatory process to function well were established only 
recently. Before 2003, VDCs did not exist in most districts and the process at village level 
was either not working or dominated by arbitrary actors, which contributed to a state of in-
formal procedures and flawed accountability. This has changed in most Malawian districts. 
Similarly, so far ADCs were chaired by Traditional Authorities (TA) instead of elected 
members. Some districts, however, have undergone adjustments in this respect after coun-
cillors pushed for reforms to have VDC members elected by the village population and 
ADC members and their chairs elected by the area’s VDCs. 
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hensive policy direction and guidance for development. The analysis in the 
DDP serves as a basis for selecting programmes and projects that the district 
would like to implement. The DEC is responsible for compiling the DDP, 
while the DA is responsible for its approval. (Republic of Malawi 2001,  
4–23). The Development Committee (DC) thus reviews the drafted plan and 
finally sends it to the full assembly for approval. 
Funding for local development 
To fund approved projects, the districts– in principle – have access to three 
different sources of revenue, namely central government grants, locally gen-
erated revenue, and ceded revenue collected by central government (see Sec-
tion 6.2.2.1). 
There are five major transfer mechanisms to provide financing for local gov-
ernments, namely the General Resource Fund (GRF), District Development 
Fund (DDF), Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF), EU Micro-projects 
Programme (MPP), and EU Public Works Programme.  
The GRF is a formula-based unconditional block grant accessible to all local 
governments in Malawi. Although the main purpose is to provide funding for 
recurrent expenditure of local governments, 25 percent of GRF grants are 
earmarked for capital investment. In the case of rural districts, these 25 per-
cent are supposedly transferred directly to district’s DDF account. However, 
far more important for funding local development expenditure are the District 
Development Fund (DDF) and the Malawi Social Action Fund, which make 
up about 90 % of the capital budget of rural districts (GFA 2005, 51 et seq.). 
MASAF was established in 1995. The World Bank funded MASAF with a 
$122 million credit for the first two phases from 1995 to 2003. As most social 
action funds, MASAF administrative units manage nearly all processes re-
lated to identifying and financing community projects in a parallel structure 
to those of local government planning authorities.  
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Box 9: The Local Development Fund 
A new financing mechanism for local development was proposed in a recent study 
(GFA 2005) commissioned by the MoLGRD and supported by UNCDF and KfW. 
The purpose of this new mechanism would be to establish a nation-wide sustain-
able, standardised and transparent financing mechanism in the form of a country-
wide basket financing mechanism that would consolidate existing financing 
mechanisms into a common system for financing capital investment at the decen-
tralised level. 
The specific objectives of the LDF are to: 
• Support planning and management of development resources at the assembly 
and community level; 
• Provide resources which ensure that development investments respond to the 
priority development needs; 
• Facilitate the implementation of the National Decentralisation Policy; and 
• Enhance the accountability of local authorities to their constituents. 
The proposed LDF would be managed by a special management unit within the 
NLGFC and offer four different financing windows (Community Fund, Local 
Assembly Fund, Urban Fund, and Performance/Capacity Building Fund) in order 
to accommodate different needs and objectives of donors and recipients. Funds 
channelled through the LDF could thus be earmarked for specific sectors, themes 
or windows. 
By the time of writing the approach had been endorsed by the Government of 
Malawi and all important stakeholders, including MASAF, had signalled their 
support to the LDF. 
Source: GFA (2005) 
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The DDF is a (mostly donor funded) municipal development fund accessible 
only to rural districts.22 Its allocation is partly formula-based, with 30 percent 
equally distributed between districts and 70 percent allocated according to 
population and poverty indicators (GTZ 2004, 1; Boex et al. 2001, 18). 
The DDF is managed by the NLGFC and serves to channel funds to finance 
small-scale projects and activities emerging from the District Development 
Plan. In order to access project funding from the DDF certain minimum con-
ditions apply (GFA 2005, 57): 
— A Director of Development and Planning, two Accounts Clerks and a 
Works Supervisor must be in place 
— Quarterly progress reports and monthly financial statements must  
be produced by the DA and sent to the Decentralisation Secre-
tariat/Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
— An annual investment plan must be approved by the Assembly by the 
end of January each year 
— three quarters of the projects approved from the previous planning pe-
riod must be successfully completed. 
It is the NLGFC’s responsibility to ensure that resources provided through 
the DDF are properly managed (Simwaka 2003, 5). 
Therefore, in theory, the institutional setup of Malawi’s PFM system, as 
outlined in Figure 5, is relatively well designed Responsibilities are to a large 
extent clearly defined and distributed between actors. However, as seen in the 
next section, this formal framework bears little relevance for actual PFM 
practice in Malawi. 
 
                                                          
22  At the time the research was undertaken UNDP/UNCDF, the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), NORAD, DANIDA, CIDA and DFID among others (including non-governmental 
organisations) were channelling significant funds through the DDF to support Malawi’s de-
velopment. (Gama et al. 2003, 30; GTZ 2004, 1; GFA 2005, 56). Currently, with strong 
support from German Development Cooperation, a Local Development Fund (LDF) is be-
ing drawn up, which will integrate the different funding mechanisms into one single financ-
ing mechanism for local governments in Malawi, open to towns and districts as well. The 
LDF will be managed by a special unit within NLGFC. 
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Table 3: Abbreviations used in Figure 5 
ACB Anti Corruption Bureau 
Acc Gen Accountant General 
ADCs Area Development Committees 
BFC Budget and Finance Committee 
DS Decentralisation Secretariat 
GoM Government of Malawi 
MEJN Malawi Economic Justice Network 
MoE Ministry of Education 
MoF Ministry of Finance 
MoH Ministry of Health 
MoLG Ministry of Local Government 
MoPD Ministry of Economic Planning and Development 
NAO National Audit Office 
NLGFC National Local Government Finance Committee 
NSO National Statistics Office 
Tas Traditional Authorities 
VDCs Village Development Committees 
Note: Figure 5 gives an overview of the major actors and the interrelations between them as 
far as they are of importance for this study. It does not claim to cover Malawi’s PFM 
system comprehensively. The size of the boxes nor their position in the figure reflect the 
political importance or hierarchy of the respective actors. Arrows mark the interrelations 
between them, whether in terms of finances, policy directives or accountability. 
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5.2 PFM in practice: ad hoc planning and budgeting, 
informal practices and uncertainty 
As the preceding section illustrates, the formal framework for the different 
PFM processes at central and local government level in Malawi is relatively 
well defined and, thus, should in principle enable the Government of Malawi 
to implement strategic policies through the national and local budgets. In 
practice, however, it routinely encounters considerable difficulties with trans-
lating MPRSP priorities into the budget and implementing it accordingly. 
One reason is that activities listed in the MPRSP and the respective costing 
exercises have not been clearly linked to budget programmes, sub-pro-
grammes and items (Durevall / Erlandsson 2005, 29). Furthermore, in prac-
tice it is not entirely clear how spending needs are reconciled with the top-
down resource constraints provided by the MTEF. 
Table 4: Approved and actual recurrent and development expenditure  
as a share of GDP 
 Recurrent Budget Development Budget 
Fiscal Year Approved Actual Approved Actual 
1994/95 27.0 34.0 6.8 7.6 
1995/96 21.6 24.3 7.0 6.5 
1996/97 19.1 18.4 4.9 4.8 
1997/98 20.4 22.6 5.1 5.1 
1998/99 15.6 18.4 9.4 8.6 
1999/2000 15.9 17.8 9.3 10.5 
2000/01 19.8 22.6 10.6 10.1 
2001/02 19.4 24.6 6.9 7.3 
2002/03 23.2 32.0 8.2 7.7 
2003/04 20.4 33.0 8.1 10.3 
Source:   Durevall / Erlandsson (2005, 9) 
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As a consequence, hard budget ceilings are neither clear nor consistently 
rolled out and enforced (CABRI 2004, 40), and as Table 4 shows, budget 
outcomes differ substantially from planned allocations, both for recurrent and 
development expenditures. Although there have been notable improvements 
in overall variance on expenditure, in particular with regard to overspending 
on individual budget votes, important compositional shifts and thus signifi-
cant re- prioritisation in the course of budget execution occur. exist (see Fig-
ure 6). This phenomenon is particularly marked for the fiscal year 2001/02, 
when overall variance on expenditure was only slightly above 10 percent, but 
compositional shifts were extremely important with more than three quarters 
of budget votes receiving either 10 percent more or 10 percent less than origi-
nally budgeted for. 
According to the IMF, the observed poor outcome of the budget process is 
rooted in the fact that formal institutions and procedures bear little relevance 
for PFM practice in Malawi as the directives of the budget are not being ob-
served by the senior leadership, and public expenditure management regula-
tions that bind the administration are not fully enforced (IMF 2004a, 7). Or, 
to repeat the image invoked by as a recent study commissioned by DFID on 
Figure 6: Variability of budget outturn with respect to original budget 
 
Source: IMF (2004a; 2004b) 
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formal and informal PFM institutions in Malawi: “The budget process is a 
theatre that masks the real distribution and spending. All the actors, from civil 
society, government, and donors seem aware that many of their statements 
and actions have little bearing on [the] actual distribution of resources” (Rak-
ner et al. 2004, iv ).  
Box 10 taken from Rakner et al. (2004, 15 et seq.) gives a vivid illustration of 
this phenomenon with regard to the MTEF process in Malawi. Similar dis-
crepancies can be observed for the budget implementation and oversight 
processes in Malawi.  
Evidence shows that in many cases the formal PFM processes at local level 
are distorted. There are three main reasons for this.  
First, councillors regularly do not partake in important local PFM processes 
even if they are formally required to do so. Financial constraints often make it 
impossible for the DAs service committees and the full assembly to meet on a 
regular basis to decide and approve submissions of the DEC. Lack of fi-
nances, but also poor infrastructure, in particular transportation, telecommu-
nication, and postal services make communication between councillors and 
the District Secretariat difficult. 
The second reason is the lack of skills and experience of elected councillors. 
Many elected members have not developed a routine with regard to formal 
procedures of decision-making and agenda setting for scheduled meetings. 
Therefore, decision-making procedures such as the approval of DDPs or the 
local budget often do not follow formal procedures and regulations. Not be-
ing familiar with routine formalities disables decision-making, leads to frus-
tration and weakens commitment. This scenario does not only apply to DA 
members, but also to those members engaged in planning processes at lower 
levels (e.g. ADCs or VDCs). 
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Third, these dysfunctional and barely institutionalised procedures create more 
responsibilities for the DEC. The DEC has to play a more vital role in all 
PFM processes and decision-making than provided for by the formal frame-
work. Due to the shortcomings explained above, the DEC has to act on its 
own in many cases to reach decisions. Informal procedures might not involve 
the full assembly and the budget and other submissions might get approved 
without the presence of all necessary members. In some cases the finance or 
planning committees make the decisions or even just the chair of committees 
without scrutiny of all elected members. These informal procedures are often 
justified by involved stakeholders as necessary ‘procedural shortcuts’ that are 
left as the only possible alternative for decision making. However, this fre-
quently leads to frustrations at the grass root level not only because develop-
ment projects are not implemented according to community priorities, but 
also because there is lack of transparency and thus lack of understanding how 
decisions were made. Although planning is meant to be based on grass-root 
decision making, it has turned out to be difficult, time consuming and expen-
sive to create room for public consultations about planning and development 
prioritisation. Hence, many people are less willing to participate in future 
activities. Although from the empirical evidence it cannot be deduced that 
DECs regularly abuse their position of power and their additional responsibil-
ity, the situation increases the chances for bureaucrats to capture decision-
making procedures.23  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23  Although public administration primarily is an instrument to execute and structure policies, 
in reality it tends to gain political influence in decision-making procedures of its own and 
acts as an independent interest group following own objectives (Illy 2002, 148). This sys-
tem of bureaucracy proves to be important in Malawi’s local setting.  
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Box 11: Counterproductive competition among local stakeholders 
The PFM cycle process at district level and beyond seems to be based on a sound 
regulatory framework. The principles of broad participatory and bottom-up planning 
and implementation are very well integrated into the formal procedures. However, 
it is striking that organisational structures especially at community level are some-
times not clear. Counterproductive competition among local stakeholders is com-
mon.  
This becomes obvious in the relations between chiefs (TA), councillors, and Mem-
bers of the National Parliament (MPs). In Malawi’s rural society Traditional Au-
thorities tend to receive more respect than elected local councillors. The same ap-
plies to MPs who are perceived to represent a higher authority than local assembly 
members. It is common practise in Malawi that TAs with good local connections are 
used by national politics to gain additional political support at the grass roots level. 
TAs who are successful in acting as local agents for development are more likely to 
link up with their communities in their areas and districts. This strengthens their 
trustworthiness for the people and on the other hand makes them more interesting 
for national politics to broaden their support. In sum, the better TAs prove their 
connections, the better they can also benefit from national politics and thus have an 
incentive to broaden their clientelistic relations. Nevertheless, this means that TAs 
have to interfere in local procedures, which in theory are reserved for elected offi-
cials such as councillors. This observation has important implications for the way in 
which the devolution process is undertaken to empower the citizenry so that it can 
hold public officials and institutions to account for their performance in the delivery 
of public goods and services  
Source:    MoLGRD (2005); own compilation 
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6 Determinants of Informal PFM practices in Malawi  
Various recent studies on PFM in Malawi recognise that it is mainly informal 
institutions and procedures that predominantly shape PFM processes in Ma-
lawi. However, most studies do not discuss the underlying mechanisms caus-
ing the observed discrepancy between formal and informal PFM institutions 
in Malawi in detail. One of the most recent studies commissioned by SIDA, 
for example, comes to the conclusion that although capacity constraints in 
implementing PFM reforms must be recognised, in the past the main limiting 
factor for sound PFM in Malawi appears to have been a lack of commitment 
from political leaders (Durevall / Erlandsson 2005, 35). The findings of this 
study, however, suggest that although lack of political commitment is impor-
tant, it is only one reason among many why the PFM system is characterised 
by informal practices; and that it is not necessarily the most pressing problem 
for MPRSP implementation in Malawi. 
After summarising existing studies on Malawi’s PFM system and looking at 
the findings of this research, the following statements apply:  
— The effectiveness of the PFM system is limited; therefore, implementing 
strategic policies (e.g. PRPS) through this system is unlikely. 
— Enforcing accountability is extremely difficult in Malawi’s PFM system. 
— The relevance of formal rules and procedures for PFM in Malawi is 
limited and is constantly being undermined by a lack of resources, ca-
pacity and a general mode of uncertainty.  
Actual PFM practices and the budget process in particular depart substan-
tially from formal rules and procedures. Instead of being guided by the for-
mal legal and institutional framework, the actual PFM process is character-
ised by three main features: 
— Ad hoc mode of planning and budgeting: Malawi’s PFM is not charac-
terised by routine standard bureaucratic procedures but rather by an ad 
hoc mode of action throughout the PFM process.24 
— Informal practices: Apart from deliberate manipulation of processes for 
personal gain, informal practices are often used as pragmatic solutions 
to cope with unexpected problems. 
                                                          
24  This is to a somewhat lesser extent the case for strategic planning at central level, e.g. the 
MPRSP formulation process. 
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— Uncertainty: Malawi’s PFM system is characterised by systematic un-
certainty, in particular with regard to the availability of financial re-
sources, and with regard to the validity of formal rules. Uncertainty in 
terms of financial resources stems from the fact that various actors in 
Malawi’s PFM system at no time know how much money they will have 
at their disposal for implementing policies during the next financial year 
(amount). Even after their budgets have been approved, cutbacks occur 
frequently. Even worse, most actors do not even know when they will be 
told how much money they will actually receive as the official schedule 
is not adhered to (ceilings and time of disbursement). Uncertainty in 
terms of formal rules not only means that formal rules and procedures 
might not be well known by many stakeholders in the first place but that 
their practical relevance is further undermined by the constant non-
adherence to them.  
These features seem to be pervasive throughout Malawi’s PFM system and 
the budget process in particular. Most actors involved in the process contrib-
ute to this outcome to varying degrees and are at the same time are negatively 
affected by these practices. In order to understand the determinants of PFM 
outcomes in Malawi, therefore, the underlying causes for these features of 
Malawi’s PFM system need to be explored in detail. 
After analysing the collected qualitative data, five key areas can be identified 
leading to Malawi’s PFM system being characterised by persistent ad hoc 
mode of action, informal procedures and systemic uncertainty. The following 
sections discuss these main areas in more detail. They can be summarised as 
follows:  
1. Capacity for PFM 
Although government institutions suffer from understaffing, the key 
problems with regard to capacity for PFM in Malawi are:  
- Lack of adequately qualified staff in key positions for PFM  
- Insufficient equipment and financial resources  
- Shortcomings in organisational and human resource manage-
ment.  
Public Financial Management for PRSP Implementation in Malawi 
German Development Institute 87 
2. Resources for administrative PFM processes 
The substantial lack of funds in the civil service, even for the most 
basic administrative processes, threatens the functioning of the PFM 
system and leads to poor budgetary outcomes.  
3. Donor impact on PFM 
Poorly coordinated and unaligned donor activities tend to weaken 
annual and medium-term budget planning and contribute to under-
mining budget credibility.  
4. Coordination for PFM 
Poor coordination between ministries, departments and agencies as 
well as between different levels of government undermines the 
whole budget process. 
 a) Horizontal coordination at central government level (MoF-
MEPD) 
Although responsibilities between MoF and MEPD are clearly as-
signed to one of the two ministries in most cases, coordination prob-
lems arise, as MoF sometimes seems to push through its own priori-
ties. 
 b) Vertical coordination in general  
Coordination between central and local government level is charac-
terised by a highly hierarchical system, which results in poor verti-
cal information flows, in particular from the bottom to the top. With 
regard to information flows, unclear distribution of responsibilities 
and the introduction of new PFM tools as well as local authorities’ 
dependency on transfers from central government, this leads to de-
lays and uncertainty in the budget process. Finally, this results in in-
formal practices at local government level. 
 c) Vertical-sectoral coordination (MoE, MoH) 
As devolution in the sectors has not gone very far yet, communica-
tion and coordination between central and deconcentrated units of 
sector ministries do not appear to pose major problems yet. How-
ever, the envisaged devolution of sector responsibilities to local 
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governments will cause difficulties. This is especially the case with 
the observed weaknesses in communication and coordination be-
tween different actors and levels in Malawi’s PFM system. 
 d) Horizontal coordination at local government level 
First, PFM at local government level has not yet evolved into a fully 
functional subsystem of the Malawian PFM system due to a poor in-
stitutionalised local governance system, in which local stakeholders 
and PFM procedures are characterised by a high degree of uncer-
tainty. In the course of decentralisation, newly established institu-
tions collide with existing ones, leading to an unclear distribution of 
responsibilities.  
Second, uncertainty of local institutions and procedures is exacer-
bated by uncoordinated financing mechanisms of government and 
external donors. Especially the Malawi Social Action Fund 
(MASAF) does not adhere to the formal local government structures 
and thus perpetuates chances for sound, transparent, and accountable 
local institutions, effective for sound PFM (see Section 6.2.2). 
5. Commitment  
Lack of political commitment to sound PFM was in the past a critical source 
of uncertainty in the PFM process in Malawi. With the new leadership, there 
are positive signs of credible commitment to accountability and effectiveness 
of PFM, giving ground to the hope that substantial improvements in Malawi’s 
PFM performance will soon materialise. However, one must recognise that 
much of the old systems of inappropriate power distribution and unhelpful 
incentives remain. 
The following sections form the main analytical part of this study. These 
sections explore the underlying mechanisms by which weaknesses in the five 
identified areas lead to the observed diversion between formal rules and pro-
cedures and actual PFM practice. 
Weaknesses identified in these areas contribute to the ubiquitous feature 
identified to be key for actual PFM practice in Malawi: ad hoc mode of plan-
ning and budgeting, informal practices and uncertainty in various dimensions.  
The analysis does not claim to be comprehensive in any way, but rather fo-
cuses on the most important challenges in each of the key areas identified 
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instead. The various dimensions of each weakness are highlighted and the 
causes and consequences discussed. Where appropriate, it is specified 
whether the problems discussed are relevant only at central or local govern-
ment level. If not specified, they are prominent to a stronger or lesser extent 
at both levels. Furthermore, the analysis is linked back to the different stages 
of the budget cycle throughout the chapter. The interrelations between the 
challenges identified in these key areas are discussed and linked back to the 
overall findings in Chapter 7. 
6.1 Capacity 
Lack of adequate human and technical capacity was identified as one of the 
major shortcomings undermining sound PFM in Malawi. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) defines capacity as the “ability of people, 
institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and 
achieve objectives” (UNDP 2002, 2). This definition is quite broad; it thus 
seems useful to elaborate a bit more on how the term ‘capacity’ is used in this 
study. The analysis especially concentrates on four key elements of capacity 
concerning PFM: the staffing situation in public institutions, the qualification 
of staff, the management of human resources, and the availability and condi-
tion of necessary equipment and installations. 
Although Malawi’s government institutions are severely understaffed, the 
major problems with regard to capacity for PFM appear to be:  
— Lack of adequately qualified staff in key positions for PFM 
— Shortcomings in organisational and human resource management 
— Insufficient equipment and financial resources 
Many government and oversight institutions are severely understaffed both at 
central and local government level in Malawi. It is not uncommon for minis-
tries, oversight institutions (in particular the National Audit Office), and local 
administrations to have 30–50 % of all established positions vacant.  
Box 12 illustrates how serious the staffing situation can be at the local level. 
However, in some cases it often remains unclear how staffing requirements 
are determined. Strong evidence indicates that all vacancies of an institution 
do not necessarily reflect the number of employees necessarily needed to 
carry out the respective tasks.  
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Box 12: Staffing situation in the District Education Office in Rumphi 
district 
The District Education Manager’s (DEM) office in Rumphi is a good example of 
existing dimensions of staffing problems. The structure of the office is split into 
three pillars: human resource management, financial management and the actual 
teaching staff, e.g. primary education advisors, head teachers, teachers etc. Each of 
the pillars has six hierarchy levels. In the three pillars positions at the upper four 
levels are all vacant. The financial management pillar gives the following picture 
regarding the chain of command: 
DEM → Principal Accountant (vacant) → Accountant (vacant) → Senior Assistant 
Accountant (vacant) → Assistant Accountant (vacant) → Senior Accounts Assis-
tant (filled) → Accounts Assistant (filled).  
Although the accounts assistants might be adequately qualified, it is obvious that 
they probably have difficulties to cope with the workload. This has severe conse-
quences for the efficiency and effectiveness of PFM in the education sector at the 
district level. In Dedza district, the situation is even worse; the office is only staffed 
with an acting DEM, a human resource officer, an accountant and a typist. 
Source:   MoE (2005a); own compilation 
Consequently, evidence collected during the field study suggests the real 
problem is not the overall level of staffing but the lack of qualified staff in 
key PFM positions combined with insufficient financial resources and short-
comings in organisational and human resource management. Thus, these 
shortcomings are described in more detail in the following section with a 
special focus on the latter, while Section 6.2 elaborates on the causes and 
consequences of the lack of adequate resources for PFM. 
6.1.1 Lack of adequately qualified staff in key positions 
There is a lack of adequately qualified staff throughout all government levels, 
in particular in key middle-level positions for PFM, e.g. accountants and 
auditors at central level or directors of finance or planning at local govern-
ment level. Thus, it is common to find key positions filled only with “acting 
directors” and the like. Consequently, staff routinely perform key PFM func-
tions without qualified technical skills and training in important formal PFM 
procedures Not only does this lead to work overload and poor performance, 
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but more importantly this situation causes uncertainty among other actors 
with regard to the distribution of responsibilities and the validity of formal 
rules and procedures. These capacity shortcomings have negative effects on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of PFM on all stages of the budget process 
and the use of public finances. While the capacity constraints may partly 
result from an insufficient supply of qualified candidates on the Malawian 
labour market, they are also due to a lack of financial resources and adequate 
equipment as well as shortcomings in organisation and human resource man-
agement, which are described in the following sections. 
6.1.2 Shortcomings in organisational and human resource 
management 
High staff turnover 
High staff turnover is a very common phenomenon in nearly all government 
bodies in Malawi, both at central and local government level. Apart from 
qualified staff being lured away by private sector companies or donors, there 
is frequent reshuffling of staff between key positions in the public administra-
tion. Evidence suggests that this is not merely a phenomenon owed to the 
consolidation of a newly elected administration but a general feature of the 
public sector in Malawi. This, of course, has severe consequences for these 
civil servants’ functioning in the PFM system for different reasons: 
First, high staff turnover in government bodies leads to a lack of institutional 
memory. It is rare to find the employees working at the same government 
institution or even in the same department for several years, especially at 
central government level. Therefore, the majority of the staff is poorly in-
formed about past reforms or decisions. A high turnover also leads to a lack 
of routine in working procedures. The research team found one common 
symptom during the interviews; many civil servants explained that they were 
new in their jobs and excused themselves for not being able to provide all 
details about their responsibilities since they were not quite sure about the 
regulations defining these. As a result, work efficiency is not optimal until the 
newcomers familiarise themselves with their work. Another important conse-
quence of high staff turnover factor is the frequent loss of training efforts and 
effects. High staff turnover thus causes targeted capacity development meas-
ures for public sector employees to be largely ineffective, as individuals be-
ing trained e.g. in the use of specific PFM tools may soon be in a completely 
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different position performing entirely different functions. Knowledge about 
formal rules and regulations is thus frequently lost and has to be permanently 
learned anew. This significantly limits the effectiveness of efforts to build 
capacity in the public sector. 
Another important issue for sustaining and building up capacity are monetary 
incentives to retain qualified staff in the public sector. While the upper cadres 
in Malawi receive comparatively high salaries, many government institutions 
find it difficult to attract or retain qualified middle-level employees. These 
civil servants often leave their jobs to work for private companies and, more 
importantly, for donor organisations. There is a huge discrepancy between 
public salaries and those paid in the private sector or by donor organisations. 
This difference is only partly reduced by the widespread use of paying civil 
servants allowances for attending workshops and seminars. In addition, these 
payments create adverse incentives of their own.25 
A recent study (Valentine 2003) commissioned by the Department for Human 
Resource Management and Development in the Office of the President and 
Cabinet concludes:26 
— Real salaries in the public sector in 2001/02 were half of those paid to 
civil servants in 1980. 
— The differences in salaries between job grades are too small to offer 
sufficient reward for experience, skills, responsibility and performance. 
— Salaries and working conditions are inadequate to attract and retain staff 
with managerial, professional and technical skills. 
— Promotions are awarded for the length of service, not merit. There are 
no awards/sanctions in the incentives regime for good/bad performance. 
                                                          
25  For more detailed information about the incentive structures in the public sector and the 
importance of allowances in Malawi see Durevall / Erlandsson (2005, 13–14). 
26  The report (Valentine 2003) was prepared as an input into the design of a medium term pay 
policy reform and gives a comprehensive overview about the situation in the Malawian 
civil service and makes recommendations on how to overcome some of the problems. 
Based on these findings, the GoM is currently undertaking a broad Civil Service Pay and 
Employment Reform to improve transparency and incentive structures for civil servants 
and to increase transparency within the system. A key element of this reform consists in a 
substantial raise of salaries for the entire civil service. However, whether sufficient re-
sources are going to cover this reform is being debated (Scek 2004, 7). It was too early to 
draw conclusions about the possible impact of the reform process for this study. 
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— The compensation package is not transparent due to various forms of 
allowances and benefits. 
The incentives for civil servants to work in rural districts are especially low. 
Many are reluctant to take on government posts in rural areas because living 
and working conditions are less attractive than in urban areas. Several key 
positions are being transferred to districts or are newly created as ongoing 
measure in the decentralisation process. This makes it even more important to 
improve the incentive structure for qualified civil servants to work in these 
areas. 
Insufficient delegation of tasks and responsibilities 
Civil servants in senior positions tend to be reluctant to delegate tasks and 
responsibilities to lower staff levels. They perceive lower level staff as not 
having sufficient abilities to follow procedures and instructions and carry out 
the delegated tasks to their satisfaction. This occurs at central and local as 
well as between government levels and potentially leads to work overload for 
senior staff. But it also implies that lower level staff have few opportunities to 
gain additional work experience and improve their skills through learning by 
doing. Contributing to this phenomenon are also the many vacant government 
positions in middle level management. 
A similar mechanism applies to the ongoing devolution process in Malawi. 
Many stakeholders in central government institutions are reluctant to devolve 
functions to local government levels because they have concerns regarding 
the capacity of staff in district secretariats and assemblies. 
Lack of effective capacity development and professional skills 
Conversations with different stakeholders at both central and local govern-
ment level revealed a significant lack of effective capacity development and 
professional skills throughout the public sector. This is in part because re-
cruitment in the public sector in Malawi does not always seem to select can-
didates strictly based on their merit. As a number of interview partners 
stressed, on-the-job training cannot substitute basic education in the princi-
ples of accounting, for example. In addition, once employed, civil servants 
are frequently inadequately trained and prepared for their tasks, especially 
when new policies and PFM tools are introduced. A prominent example was 
the introduction of Activity Based Budgeting (ABB) at local level. Local staff 
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interviewed had received training, but felt insufficiently prepared to actually 
produce and submit ABB budgets on time. The quality of capacity develop-
ment measures is furthermore compromised by the fact that many capacity-
building measures are primarily aimed at training individuals instead of 
building sustainable capacity of public institutions. In addition, training con-
tent is sometimes poorly adapted to practical working situations most civil 
servants face. 
The same applies to elected councillors, who frequently have low levels of 
academic attainments and cannot provide policy direction. Training pro-
grammes for elected assembly members on PFM issues are thus often inade-
quate (GFA 2005, 33). 
The described shortcomings in professional training and capacity develop-
ment for key PFM processes and tools complicate the implementation of 
reforms, new policies, and innovative PFM tools.  
Long and unpredictable recruitment process 
Not only is the recruitment process of senior staff both in central and local 
government institutions in Malawi not strictly based on merit criteria, but it is 
also often long and unpredictable. Although there are plans to decentralise 
some of the recruitment procedures,27 the recruitment system is still very 
centralised and bureaucratic. Central government entities hire key executive 
staff for local government. Different service commissions are in charge of 
recruiting candidates for vacancies. Lower level staff are employed directly at 
the local entities, for example, district secretariats. 
Many interview partners, especially at district level, claim that they do not 
know when key positions are going to be filled. The mechanisms and pro-
gress of ongoing recruitment processes do not seem to be well communicated 
and transparent to local staff and assembly members. The lack of communi-
cation combined with the limited supply of qualified candidates for key ad-
ministrative functions on the labour market, leads to uncertainty regarding 
human resource planning. It also makes the distribution of tasks and respon-
                                                          
27  It remains to be seen whether this still holds true in view of recent institutional changes, in 
particular with regard to the role of district commissioners having been made controlling 
officers. 
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sibilities among civil servants difficult and existing staff have to assume 
additional responsibilities and workload.  
Disturbance of regular working procedures and additional workload 
through donor-related activities and workshops 
Donor-related activities and workshops (see Chapter 6.3. and 6.2.) regularly 
disturb working procedures at central and local government level. There are 
many different donors in Malawi and their activities are not always well har-
monised and aligned to Malawian procedures. In addition, hey frequently 
absorb public employees for meetings, workshops or administrative work. 
Different application, implementation and monitoring procedures and re-
quirements for donor funds and projects cause additional workload for civil 
servants. This leads to time constraints for PFM related activities.  
6.2 Resources for PFM processes 
In a poverty-stricken country like Malawi, resource constraints are an omni-
present problem. The following section deals with different dimensions of 
resource constraints in the administrative bodies of Malawian government 
institutions and analyses their impact on PFM. 
As described in Section 5.1.2, Malawi operates a dual budgeting system with 
the national budget divided into a development budget and a recurrent 
budget. The civil service has to be financed out of the recurrent budget. 
While the development budget is about 80 % donor-financed, the recurrent 
budget incorporates much smaller proportions of donor funding and relies 
more heavily on national revenue. This implies serious problems at the level 
of financial management, as Malawi’s revenue base is extremely thin (sig-
nificantly below 20 % of GDP). The economy relies heavily on agriculture, 
which accounts for 35 % of GDP and constitutes over 90 % of its exports. 
Export earning rely are dominated by one single commodity, tobacco, which 
accounts for 65 % of total exports. This makes Malawi’s export earnings and 
public revenue highly vulnerable to external shocks (IDD and Associates 
2005, 8). Together with extremely unpredictable donor funding as illustrated 
in Figure 7, this makes intra-year monetary planning extremely difficult (see 
Section 6.3.1).  
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These factors, together with the cash budgeting system, lead to a situation 
where in a given month the government can only spend what it collected in 
the previous month. The resource envelope is small and ridden by cash flow 
fluctuations. This leads to cutbacks of approved budget votes and implement-
ing agencies usually do not receive the money that was allocated to them for 
the financial year. However, not only is the overall resource envelope charac-
terised by a high degree of volatility and thus uncertainty. In addition, more 
specifically, resources available to public sector institutions to perform their 
PFM functions are often all but unpredictable. This is particularly true for 
Malawi’s oversight institutions, in particular the National Audit Office and 
Parliament, but also for administrative bodies at the local level as seen in the 
following sections. 
Figure 7: Total Revenue and Actual ODA Inflows (in percent of GDP) 
 
Source:   IMF (2004b) 
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6.2.1 Funding as a prerequisite for capacity 
As illustrated in the previous sections, Malawi faces severe capacity con-
straints in its government institutions. One of the most important reasons for 
this is the lack of resources. There are three main ways this affects the capac-
ity of key PFM institutions:  
— Inadequate staffing of key PFM positions 
— Inadequate incentives and brain drain due to low salaries in the civil 
service, and 
— Lack of adequate equipment to perform key PFM functions. 
Lack of adequate equipment and financial resources, in particular, impedes 
effective PFM at central and even more at local government level. Ample 
evidence exists that officials regularly do not have transport, fuel, computers 
and office stationary to carry out even simple tasks. It is a common that no 
funding is provided to cover maintenance costs, even if there is enough 
equipment such as cars or computers (mostly provided by donors). The re-
search team saw many broken and useless computers or copy machines that 
would be needed for instance to produce and distribute financial reports. 
Consequently, accounting and other important tasks are done manually, 
which creates many errors and makes meaningful financial control a very 
difficult undertaking. According to a number of interview partners, frequent 
power-cuts make it difficult to use computers for key PFM tasks, in particular 
in rural areas. Of course, these problems severely undermine efforts such as 
those currently made by the World Bank to improve financial control through 
a computerised Integrated Financial Management Information System 
(IFMIS). Accordingly, the IFMIS was not operational at the time of this field 
study (see Durevall / Erlandsson 2005, 22–26). 
The lack of resources to perform key PFM tasks is omnipresent at central 
level. In  particular Malawi’s oversight institutions, such as the National 
Audit Office and Parliament, are severely underfunded (see Box 13). This 
affects the external control of administrative bodies at the local level as well.  
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Box 13: Financial Resources for budget scrutiny and control – Parliament 
and the NAO  
Parliament plays a crucial role in scrutinising and controlling the budget and 
thereby assuring sound financial management and transparent budgetary procedures. 
The approval by Parliament legitimises government spending. However, capacities 
of legislature to use its control function are very limited. And Parliament seems to be 
critically underfunded, lacking – among other things – technical support to scrutinise 
the executive’s budget proposals and the NAO reports.  
The National Assembly faces resource constraints in several areas; for example, the 
MPs are not assigned offices. MPs are forced to work from their homes or private 
offices. They use private equipment such as computers and stationary. The MPs lack 
training on parliamentary issues in general and budgetary procedures in particular. 
Training is only provided if it is donor-funded. UNDP, CIDA as well as other do-
nors provide some training.  
The GoM funds up to three parliamentary sessions per year. The parliamentary 
committees, however, are not funded by the GoM except for the Public Accounts 
Committee, which is provided for in the constitution. Thus, key parliamentary com-
mittees such as the budget and finance committee rely heavily on (erratic) donor 
financing for their meetings and, consequently, are chronically under-funded. This, 
of course, severely undermines oversight function of parliament and has in the past 
led to unrealistic budgets and unsanctioned deviations from approved budgets. For 
the time being CIDA (with funding from DFID) is the only donor agency working 
on budgetary matters with the National Assembly. They fund committee meetings 
(by renting a conference centre and paying allowances and accommodation), budget 
literacy workshops and fact finding missions, and produced a handbook for MPs on 
the budget process. Without donor funding the National Assembly would not be able 
to carry out their functions of scrutinising, approving and controlling the budget.  
Budget oversight is also undermined by the lack of funds in the National Audit 
Office (NAO). Although the NAO is formally independent from the MoF, it re-
ceives its funding from treasury and not directly from Parliament. In the past, this 
funding was subject to considerable in-year cutbacks. Consequently, the NAO can-
not execute its oversight function properly. In recent years, the NAO never presented 
its report on the financial statements on time. This undermines transparency and 
accountability in the budget process. 
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Staffing is a serious problem for the NAO. Out of 300 posts in the three NAO of-
fices 150 were filled at the time of the field research. Most of the employees were 
only partly qualified, some had only received secondary education. According to the 
Auditor General, the NAO would need 60–70 qualified accountants with diploma, 
but presently has only 15 employed. It seems to be difficult for the NAO to attract 
qualified staff as the few existent accountants are also sought by the private sector, 
which can pay much more competitive salaries than the NAO. Therefore, the NAO 
has difficulties retaining freshly trained accountants.  
There is some evidence that in particular the NAO’s regional offices cannot perform 
their duties because of under-funding of operational costs and these in-year cut-
backs. The Auditor General (AG) for the northern region, for example, plans to audit 
75 % of the MDAs and District Administrations in the region annually. However, by 
March 2005, the AG’s northern region office had audited only one district. In fact, 
most districts’ accounts have not been audited for at least 4–5 years, on district 
visited by the research team had not been audited for seven years. This, conse-
quently, leaves most responsibility for control to the DAs internal auditor at district 
level; and the MoLGRD, NLGFC, and the DS as central state institutions (Govern-
ment of Malawi / UNDP / UNCDF 2000, 48). This situation has been exacerbated 
by failure of the Assemblies to produce the final accounts for audit due to the nature 
of their accounting systems coupled with staffing problems. 
Still, the Auditor General for the northern region puts the relation of capacity and 
resource constraints as follows: “Staff is not the only factor, it is finance. With the 
staff we have, we could do the 75 %, if we do not take weekends and holidays off. 
But we would need finances and another vehicle”. 
Funding for the NAO seems to have increased substantially in the first half of 2005; 
however, in order to develop and implement meaningful and well-prioritised audit 
programmes, what the NAO seems to need most in order to adequately perform its 
functions is a combination of more predictable funding and the capacity to attract 
and retain qualified staff.  
6.2.2 Lack of resources for PFM at district level 
At local level, the lack of resources to perform key PFM functions is even 
more evident, because especially rural districts are financially highly depend-
ent on transfers from the centre, their own resource base being negligible. 
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Consequently, informal procedures in planning and budgeting are common at 
local government level.  
Local development planning is formally required to be done through a par-
ticipatory bottom-up process, involving Participatory Rural Appraisals 
(PRAs) in villages throughout the districts. Based on these appraisals Village 
Action Plans are to be developed and incorporated into a District Develop-
ment Plan (see Section 5.1.3). However, due to time and resource constraints 
most of the districts do not adhere to these formal procedures. Instead, in 
many districts planning is done on an ad-hoc basis by members of the district 
administration or even by external consultants with technical and financial 
support of the Decentralisation Secretariat. 
The same is true for budget formulation at district level. Regular funding is 
not available to prepare and convene district assembly meetings to discuss 
and approve the local budge. For example, the councillors in Rumphi district 
reported that they did not receive the budget draft before the full assembly’s 
budget session simply because the District Secretariat does not have the re-
sources to copy and send the drafts. Even invitations to assembly meetings 
are not always communicated, as the District Secretariat may not send them 
by official mail. To avoid costs, invitation letters are entrusted at random to 
passengers on vehicles travelling to the home villages of the respective coun-
cillors instead. 
DAs are supposed to have at least six service committees, as specified in the 
Local Government Act. These committees are supposed to meet quarterly. 
However, due to funding constraints they meet less frequently (see Table 5). 
In order to meet the formal deadlines for submitting the budget to the Na-
tional Local Government Finance Committee, districts have repeatedly turned 
to ad-hoc solutions. For example, they discuss and approve the budget only in 
the budget and finance committee instead of the full assembly, as is formally 
required. Obviously, this undermines the legitimacy and credibility of local 
budgets. 
In a similar fashion, local governments’ internal auditors are not adequately 
equipped with resources like computers and motor vehicles due to the lack of 
resources. In addition, they have no formalised audit procedures manual to 
guide them. Consequently, audit reports are largely below acceptable stan-
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dards (GFA 2005, 44). Even worse, external auditors do not regularly scruti-
nise local accounts because of scarce resources (see Box 13). 
A particular challenge at district level is the frequent lack of funding for sala-
ries of local staff. Because lower level staff are employed directly by the DA 
their salaries have to be paid, at least partially, out of local revenues. Local 
revenues, however, are extremely scarce as the following section illustrates.  
6.2.2.1 Sources of local finance for recurrent expenditures 
According to Section 44 of the Local Government Act, District Assemblies 
(DAs) in principal have access to three different sources of revenue for recur-
rent expenditures, namely central government grants through the General 
Resource Fund (GRF) and sector funds, ceded revenue collected by central 
government within districts, and locally generated revenue.  
The General Resource Fund 
The GRF is an unconditional block grant. Three-quarters can be used for 
recurrent expenditures, whereas one quarter must flow into the assembly’s 
DDF account for development purposes.28 The NLGFC distributes the GRF 
to the 40 DAs in accordance with a formula approved by National Parliament 
and based on factors such as population; poverty indicators and equalisation. 
                                                          
28  The most important funds for development expenditure at local level, including the DDF, 
are described in Section 5.1.3. 
Table 5: Service committee meetings in Dedza and Rumphi DA 
 Suggested fre-
quency of meet-
ings 
Frequency of 
meetings in 
Dedza  
Frequency of 
meetings in 
Rumphi 
Education Com-
mittee 
quarterly “Around twice a 
year” 
“Not even once a 
year” 
Budget and 
Finance Com-
mittee 
monthly “Around five to 
six times a year”  
“Three to four 
times a year” 
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In addition, as a key element the distribution is supposed to “encourage Local 
Assemblies to raise more own revenues” (Decentralisation Secretariat 
2005, 1). However, this performance-based element of the formula is not yet 
being applied.  
According to the National Decentralisation Programme I and II, five percent 
of the total (net) national government revenue (NNR)29 should be allocated to 
districts through the GRF. However, as can be seen in Table 6, actual alloca-
tions have been much lower in the past and – possibly even worse – are 
highly unpredictable for District Assemblies. This leaves local governments 
severely under-funded with regard to recurrent expenditure for administrative 
activities and service delivery. Local governments thus often cannot allocate 
the required 25 % of GRF transfers to development activities because they 
need these funds to cover administrative and other recurrent costs (GFA 
2005, 50). The cases of Dedza and Rumphi help to illustrate the relative im-
portance of GRF allocations for rural districts. GRF allocations account for 
roughly 29 percent (Dedza) and 16 percent (Rumphi) of the assemblies’ re-
spective total income. Given this heavy dependency on GRF transfers and the 
fact that they are used mainly to pay salaries, there is an argument that the 
distribution of GRF funds between districts according to poverty indicators 
may be inappropriate (GFA 2005, 53). 
 
                                                          
29  Excluding grants. 
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Ceded revenue 
Ceded revenues are non-tax revenues collected by various government agen-
cies on behalf of the central government that should partly be transferred 
back to local authorities. The non-tax revenues to be ceded to the local gov-
ernments include toll fees; gambling and casino fees; fuel levy/fee (road 
maintenance levy); motor vehicle registration fees; and industrial registration 
fees (GFA 2005, 50). However, ceded revenues are currently not redistrib-
uted to Local Assemblies (Decentralisation Secretariat 1998, 12; Decentrali-
sation Secretariat 2005,5) as the institutional mechanisms, the legislative 
procedures, budgeting processes and the revenue distribution mechanisms are 
yet to be established (GFA 2005, 51). Therefore, for the time being, ceded 
revenues do not play any relevant role for local revenue mobilisation. 
Local revenue generation 
Locally generated revenues mainly consist of ground rents, fees and service 
charges, user fees, business and occupational licences, income from commer-
cial undertakings, property rates, and interest on monies invested by local 
government (Decentralisation Secretariat 1998, 11; Decentralisation Secre-
tariat 2005, 1). According to Section 49 of the 1998 Local Government Act, 
DAs may also borrow money for some commercial activities but need the 
approval of the NLGFC (Republic of Malawi 2001,  51). 
Local revenue generation is generally low because the available sources of 
revenue have low yield, are difficult to collect and are not sufficient to make 
a meaningful contribution to administrative costs of local government, let 
alone for investment for development (GFA 2005, 50 et seq.).30 In particular, 
while legally entitled to collect property taxes, rural districts in Malawi are 
currently not able to do so as there is no database of rateable properties in 
rural assemblies, and no system or capacity for valuing these rateable proper-
ties exists.31 Other fees, such as market fees, are frequently not collected for 
                                                          
30  Annex 3 gives a more detailed overview of sources of local revenue generation available to 
rural districts. 
31  This problem is somewhat less serious for urban assemblies as property rates and business 
licences are easier to collect in towns and cities than in rural districts (see Box 14). The key 
precondition to be able to raise property tax, of course, is the ability to value property / rate 
areas within a jurisdiction. The time consuming and expensive task of rating properties re-
quires capacity in terms of manpower and knowledge. 
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the simple reason that staff supervising the collection of market fees lack 
means of transport to access market places. 
Box 14: Revenue Generation in Urban Districts 
With regard to revenue generation, cities and municipalities are in a clearly better 
position than towns and rural districts. There are two main reasons for this: 
First, Malawi’s three cities, its municipality, and even its towns, benefit from better 
infrastructure and conditions than rural districts, facilitating most kinds of economic 
activities.. Consequently, companies and market places, such as Malawi’s largest 
market, located in Zomba municipality, are more often found in urban areas than in 
villages of rural districts. This also brings more diverse and wealthier segments of 
population to the cities, increasing the potential for tax revenues. Thus, cities benefit 
from a much broader tax basis than rural districts. 
Second, most property in cities is rated and registered, enabling the administration 
to collect significant amounts of revenue from property taxes. In Lilongwe City, 
property rates alone make up 85 percent of its total income, including other tax 
income and GRF transfers from central government. Even in small towns such as 
Dedza Town, and Mangochi Town, property rates account for 58 percent and 34 
percent of total income respectively. 
Therefore, urban districts are far less dependent on external sources of money. For 
example, in the case of Lilongwe City payments from GRF account for only 0.8 
percent of the city’s total income. No direct conclusion can be drawn as to whether 
cities manage their development planning and public finances better than rural 
districts. Nevertheless, the city assemblies are much more independent in PFM 
issues than their rural counterparts. In consequence, planning procedures are less 
likely to be undermined by parallel planning procedures of external funding mecha-
nisms. In addition, delays in central government resource allocations and transfers 
do not harm planning and budget execution to the same extent they affect rural 
districts. This contributes to to more certainty and own responsibility of PFM pro-
cedures. 
Note: Urban districts refers to Malawi’s three major cities (Lilongwe; Blantyre; 
Mzuzu); one municipality (Zomba); and eight towns (Balaka; Dedza; 
Karonga; Kasungu; Liwonde; Luchenza; Mangochi; Salima). 
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6.3 Donor impact on PFM 
Malawi is even more dependent on foreign aid to finance its balance of pay-
ments and public expenditures than most other African countries (IDD and 
Associates 2005, 18). Up to 80 % of the capital budget and around 23 % of 
Malawi’s GDP are donor-financed (Whitworth 2005, 1). Consequently, do-
nors interfere in many ways and at various levels in Malawi’s PFM.  
Three areas appear to be most problematic to Malawian stakeholders: lack of 
predictability of donor funds; different, complicated and poorly harmonised 
donor procedures; and insufficient donor support for the adoption of PFM 
reforms.  
6.3.1 Lack of predictability of donor funding 
The high dependency on external aid creates special problems for Malawi’s 
government in terms of in-year monetary management and it is an important 
factor behind the observed fiscal volatility and budget deviations.  
To make matters worse, as Figure 7 on page 96 illustrates aid flows to Ma-
lawi are highly volatile and ODA commitments have been systematically 
higher than actual ODA inflows. According to a recent evaluation of general 
budget support32 for Malawi, the share of external resources has fluctuated 
between 33 and 57 percent of total inflows since the mid-nineties (IDD and 
Associates 2005, 6). Consequently, ODA flows are highly unpredictable for 
the Government of Malawi and commitments contain little information on 
actual future inflows (IMF 2004b, 43; see Figure 8). 
 
 
 
                                                          
32  Malawi was not receiving general budget support (GBS) when this research was conducted 
in 2005. Only the UK and the EU had GBS programmes. However, while DFID had 
pledged £ 68m for the 2005/2006 budget, the EU had stopped disbursing when Malawi had 
gone off-track. Other donors organised in the CABS (Common Approach to Budget Sup-
port)-Group, were considering providing budget support but had not taken a final decision 
(Whitworth 2005). 
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Figure 8: Commitments and Actual Inflows (in Mio U.S. dollars) 
 
Source:   IMF (2004b) 
In addition to this, not only are the amounts disbursed subject to a high de-
gree of uncertainty, also the time of disbursement is often unclear to Mala-
wian officials in advance. Sound resource and budget planning as well as in-
year cash management are further complicated in Malawi because planning 
cycles of donors are not coordinated with the Malawian budget cycle and 
planned disbursements are often delayed.33 In the words of a government 
official: “There’s no point in planning for three years if you can’t even plan 
for six months. If suddenly 50 % of the money doesn’t come, there’s really no 
point.” 
Weak capacities to meet overly demanding or poorly communicated donor 
requirements and conditionalities also lead to delayed or withheld disburse-
                                                          
33  Many donors announce their commitments only after the budget is approved. This has, for 
example, led to the practice that the Ministry of Health asks its deconcentrated units to pre-
pare two budgets, one with and one without donor support. This serves to reflect different 
scenarios in the planning process – one optimistic, one pessimistic – regarding donor sup-
port during the fiscal year.  
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ments.34 Consequently, when external funding is delayed or does not materi-
alise at all, the government may be required to turn to ad-hoc solutions such 
as domestic borrowing, or cutbacks of planned expenditures and deviation of 
funds intended for different purposes, undermining macro-economic stability 
and budget credibility (IDD and Associates 2005, 18).  
Poor communication by donors and among government agencies also under-
mines effective resource planning and prioritisation in other ways. A large 
share of donor support is provided as tied aid in the form of technical assis-
tance to ministries, departments and agencies. This aid does not appear in the 
national budget and donors do not regularly provide detailed information on 
the costs of such projects. In addition, they tend to negotiate directly with the 
MDAs supported, often bypassing central ministries. The supported entities 
have strong incentives not to communicate all support received directly from 
donors to central government agencies, in particular the MoF, as this could 
diminish allocations they receive from the national budget.35 Communication 
failures occur in the reverse direction as well, with the consequence that 
spending agencies are not informed about funding and donor support avail-
able to them. Thus, the MoF cannot establish a comprehensive picture of the 
resources available to each sector and, therefore, cannot ensure that the 
budget allocations are in line with the strategic priorities of the MPRSP and 
other strategy documents.36 
                                                          
34  This applies to central and local level. However, while at central level a typical obstacle to 
the disbursement of donor funds consists in the government not meeting demanding report-
ing requirements, the problems at local level are frequently much more basic. Frequently, 
local communities simply fail to meet even simple requirements to contribute own re-
sources to donor financed development projects such as sand or bricks for the construction 
of schools or roads. 
35  Formally, all donor activities should be reported to the Department for Aid and Debt Man-
agement within the Ministry of Finance. However, all attempts to establish a comprehen-
sive aid database have failed so far (Whitworth 2005, 7). 
36  This poses serious problems with regard to the availability of funding as well. To access 
funding via the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI), at least 20 % percent of a 
country’s public spending has to go to education. In Malawi, the sector’s share of the na-
tional budget is only about 12,8 % (2004/2005). One reason is the substantial share re-
ceived by the sector off-budget. In order to be eligible for funding from the FTI, it is thus 
crucial for Malawi to get this extra-budgetary expenditure on-budget The fact that a donor 
agency had to take on the responsibility to compile the required data and prepare the appli-
cation for FTI funding is a good indicator for the lack of capacity and possible perverse in-
centives in the Ministry of Health. 
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6.3.2 Differing, complicated and poorly harmonised donor 
procedures 
Donors exacerbate PFM capacity constraints through poorly harmonized 
procedures and control requirements, thereby generating confusion and addi-
tional workload for the domestic administration. With virtually all major 
donors operating in Malawi, it seems to be difficult for Malawian stake-
holders to know, understand and follow all the different procedures and 
mechanisms required by different donor agencies. Especially stakeholders at 
local level find it particularly difficult to understand and meet the require-
ments of the various funding mechanisms available to them.  
Donors also actively contribute to PFM in Malawi being characterised by 
systemic uncertainty through uncoordinated and unsustainable capacity build-
ing efforts. This problem is especially relevant at the local level. A number of 
donors have distributed the 28 rural districts between them and provide ca-
pacity building support almost exclusively to their “own” districts. By doing 
this they tend to undermine rather than promote the introduction of new PFM 
tools at the local level. One example is the introduction of an integrated fi-
nancial management information system (IFMIS). Not all districts receive the 
required training and technical equipment in time. Thus, possible synergies 
and economies of scale and scope of capacity building measures are not real-
ised. 
6.3.3 Insufficient donor support for the adoption of PFM 
reforms 
In the past, donors have repeatedly contributed to discrepancies between 
formal and informal PFM procedures. They introduced PFM tools such as 
sector investment programmes, SWAps or the MTEF but failed to ensure 
genuine ownership for these tools and to provide sufficient support to make 
them fully operational, as an integral element of the overall PFM system. The 
MTEF exercise for instance is therefore perceived by Malawian officials as a 
purely donor-driven “add-on” introduced via a partial intervention, supported 
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only with insufficient resources and missing concerted efforts (CABRI 2004, 
39).37 
The MTEF was introduced as a pilot in four ministries (Education, Health, 
Agriculture, and Public Works) in financial year 1995/1996. Like in other 
African countries, the exercise was initiated by donors to improve medium-
term budget planning. Nevertheless, the MTEF was never operational as a 
rolling medium term planning tool in Malawi. If used at all, figures were 
rather adapted to the new estimates each year and the focus was only on the 
first year while the two outer years were neglected. Donors failed to create 
genuine government ownership for the instrument, but also failed to support 
its effective use, e.g. by changing from yearly pledges for financial aid to 
predictable medium-term commitments. Thus, the government does not ap-
pear to be genuinely committed to the MTEF, instead, it uses only a semi-
functional version to satisfy donor requirements.38  
6.4 Coordination 
6.4.1 Horizontal coordination at central level (MoF, MEPD, 
sectors) 
A remarkable feature of the institutional setup in Malawi is the distribution of 
key PFM responsibilities between two ministries, namely the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development 
(MEPD). The MEPD is mainly responsible for the elaboration of strategic 
policies and plans, for example, the PRSP and short-term und medium-term 
development strategies, such as the Public Sector Investment Programme 
(PSIP). The MoF is mainly responsible for the allocation of resources, both 
for the recurrent and for the capital budget. Other joint responsibilities in-
clude macroeconomic forecasting and the monitoring and evaluation of 
projects. Therefore, strong coordination links are necessary between MoF 
and MEPD.  
                                                          
37  Durevall / Erlandsson (2005, 17–21) provide a detailed historical account of the MTEF in 
Malawi. 
38  There is, for example, no clear link between the MTEF and the Public Sector Investment 
Programme (PSIP). 
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In principle, the responsibilities of MoF and MEPD are therefore clearly 
defined. However, coordination problems arise as MoF sometimes tends to 
impose its own priorities. The following section presents the coordination 
mechanism between MoF, MEPD and the sectors, by using PSIP as an exam-
ple to illustrate where coordination problems arise.. 
The Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) was introduced in the 
early 1980s as a 5-year rolling plan. Its main aim was to enable the MEPD to 
better exercise policy formulation, planning and prioritisation between differ-
ent development objectives and activities. When the MoF and the MEPD 
were merged into the new Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MoFEP) in 1997, the PSIP was abolished because it was assumed that it 
would be replaced by the MTEF (Durevall / Erlandsson 2005, 21). However, 
planning functions to necessary to implement the programme were never 
fully developed in the new ministry. Sector ministries started to sign contracts 
directly with donors without informing the MoFEP. Consequently, many 
projects were not included in the capital budget and the MoFEP knew little 
about ongoing investment projects in line ministries. As a result, development 
planning became difficult and intransparent and resources were not allocated 
in line with strategic priorities. 
Once the MoFEP was split up again for political reasons in 2003/2004, the 
PSIP was re-introduced to improve development planning. Today, the aim of 
the PSIP is to present a comprehensive list of all public projects in a five-year 
rolling plan. Line ministries are required to submit a prioritised list of project 
proposals to the MEPD for the next years. It is the responsibility of MEPD to 
select projects, prioritise them according to the resources available and to 
ensure that they are in line with national priorities as stated in the MPRSP. 
The PSIP is then sent to MoF to translate the ranked project list into the 
budget. The capital budget of the respective financial year should be identical 
with the first year of the PSIP. 
Cabinet guidelines state that only projects recorded in the PSIP should re-
ceive funding in order to ensure a clear link between the capital and the recur-
rent budget. In reality, however, the PSIP does not always provide the most 
important reference point for the allocation and prioritisation of the capital 
budget. Interview partners revealed that presidential orders or other political 
interferences from the top have in the past led to the implementation of proj- 
ects that were not originally included in the PSIP. In the development budget 
for the fiscal year 2004/05, for instance, some PSIP projects were missing, 
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while other projects were included although not stated in the PSIP. One rea-
son for this besides political interference from the top might be communica-
tion difficulties between the MoF and the MEPD. More important, however, 
seem to be institutional rivalries between the two institutions as well as per-
sonal ones between higher cadres. 
Consequently, the capital budget is not identical to the first year of the PSIP 
as the formal framework would require. In the past, therefore, individual 
projects could not be considered in the resource allocation phase. A reliable 
macroeconomic forecast and exact revenue projections are needed to guaran-
tee that PSIP can be translated into the capital budget without modifications. 
Furthermore, the formal communication chain established when the MoFEP 
was split into the MEPD and the MoF is still not always followed by all sec-
tor ministries. During the preparation phase of the budget 2004/05 some line 
ministries still submitted their project proposals to MoF instead of sending 
them to the MEPD. However, stakeholders underlined that during the prepa-
ration phase for the budget year 2005/06 the coordination of information 
flows had improved and most duplication was eliminated. 
6.4.2 Vertical-sectoral coordination in the education and 
health sector 
Most sector ministries in Malawi are composed of headquarters in Lilongwe 
and several deconcentrated units or representatives at district level. This also 
applies to the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health, which were 
analysed more closely for this study. Both ministries have extensions in every 
Malawian district. Although in the course of ongoing devolution the situation 
concerning the distribution of competencies and the cooperation between 
headquarters and deconcentrated units of sector ministries is constantly 
changing, communication and coordination do not seem to be major prob-
lems for now. 
In the 1990s, different ministries in Malawi began to follow a decentralisation 
policy. Both the health and education sectors were deconcentrated. As de-
scribed in Section 4.3.2., the health sector now has a two-tier structure, which 
is composed of the. ministry headquarters at central level, and District Health 
Officers (DHOs) at district level. DHOs are the administrative and medical 
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heads of the district hospitals and several health centres. Coordination be-
tween these levels do not seem to be a major problem. 
The education sector is organised in a different way. It is designed as a three-
level-system with Education Division Managers at the intermediate level 
between headquarters and District Education Managers (DEMs). There are 
reportedly occasional problems with the construction, registration and staff-
ing of schools. The districts, together with the communities concerned, are 
responsible for school construction, after approval by the MoE.39 However, 
communication and coordination failures have in the past repeatedly led to a 
situation where newly constructed schools would not be registered by the 
MoE and thus not be staffed with teachers. However, these appear to be only 
isolated cases, as in general, relations in the sector are highly hierarchical and 
responsibilities rather clearly defined. The deconcentrated units are mere 
implementers, whereas headquarters are responsible for policies, guidelines, 
recruitment of most of the staff and disciplinary measures. Headquarters issue 
ceilings for the districts in the budget planning and formulation phase. The 
districts prepare their budget estimates and submit them back to headquarters 
where they are consolidated into the sector budget.40  
It remains to be seen, whether coordination problems gain importance in the 
course of further devolution of sector responsibilities in the future. 
6.4.3 Vertical coordination 
Coordination between central and local government level is characterised by 
a highly hierarchical system. This is especially evident in the way informa-
tion flows and how new PFM tools are introduced as well as in the depend-
ency on transfers from the central level. This system leads to delays and un-
certainty in the budget process and finally to informal practices at local gov-
ernment level. 
This section analyses what in this study is described by the term vertical 
coordination, i.e. coordination between the central and local level of govern-
                                                          
39  School construction is usually financed by donors. The DAs are responsible for applica-
tions. 
40  In the education sector, the district budgets are first consolidated into division budgets, 
which are then consolidated into the sector budget.  
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ment. The section outlines the efficiency of coordination of governmental 
institutions such as the Decentralisation Secretariat (DS), the Ministry of 
Local Government and Rural Development (MoLGRD) and the National 
Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC). Finally, it discusses the 
necessity of an operational link between strategic plans of central and local 
governments. 
Vertical coordination in general 
Vertical coordination of PFM between central and local government level is 
relatively well established and legally institutionalised in Malawi. Central-
local coordination can be characterised as a system of hierarchy and depend-
ency. It is not a system of coordination between central and local level of 
government in the sense of cooperation between equals, mutual agreement 
and information. Sometimes coordination between the two levels of govern-
ment does not work well. These deficits then have severe consequences for 
the functioning of the PFM system of the local authorities.  
Local governments depend heavily on central governmental transfers such as 
the General Resource Fund (GRF) to finance their administrations. According 
to the Financial Reporting Guidelines for Local Authorities transfers are 
withheld when the local authorities do not submit financial reports to the 
NLGFC on time. On the other hand, central government sometimes withholds 
the transfers due to lack of financial resources or political reasons. Therefore, 
the link between performance and financial transfers is not always clear to 
local authorities. Sometimes they do not receive funds, although they fulfilled 
all formal requirements. Consequently, the sanctioning mechanism of with-
holding funds does not work as an effective incentive mechanism. If transfers 
are cut back or delayed, the dependency of the local PFM system on central 
government funds becomes visible: District secretariats are responsible for 
training committees at sub-district levels in planning processes required for 
preparing the DDPs. However, frequently such training cannot take place 
because the central government does not transfer the required resources. In 
other cases, the DA stepped in and deviated funds from other sources for TAs 
to receive the needed training.  
Local authorities depend on receiving important information from central 
level on time. When central government informs local authorities about ceil-
ings later than the PFM Act requires, the districts still need to submit their 
budgets on time in order to avoid sanctioning mechanisms to apply. How-
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ever, the time to formulate their budgets is then  shorter than actually pro-
vided for by law and they may not be able to adhere to all formal procedures. 
Instead they resort to informal rather than formal procedures as a pragmatic 
solution. A common solution is for example that the budget committee de-
cides on the budget instead of the full Assembly. Another result might be that 
the local authority is forced to formulate a tentative budget without knowing 
the actual ceilings for the coming financial year. This normally has the con-
sequence that the districts have to adjust their budget, once they receive the 
actual ceilings. Thus, receiving ceilings too late generates more work and 
harder time constraints for the districts. It also costs more money for addi-
tional meetings and adds to uncertainty about resources available during the 
budget year. 
Furthermore, the central government has repeatedly introduced new PFM 
tools at local level such as activity-based budgeting for district assemblies 
without providing the necessary support for their implementation or ensuring 
the predictability of funding required to make activity-based budgeting a 
useful PFM instrument.  
Coordination of the institutional links between central and local 
 government level, MoLGRD, DS and NLGFC  
Coordination between the DS on the one hand and the MoLGRD and the 
NLGFC on the other hand was determined by the different roles each institu-
tion plays and the decision to phase-out the DS. Originally, planning and 
budgeting of DA was to be coordinated by different institutions. The DS was 
assisting the DAs in the planning process (to be taken over by the MoLGRD) 
while the NLGFC was responsible for the coordination of budgeting and the 
allocation of financial resources to local governments (GFA 2005, 41).  
Officially, the DS was planned to stop its operation by the end of the year 
2005. This actually happened. However, when this research was conducted in 
early 2005, many interview partners were not quite sure whether it would 
take place. Either, they did not know about the official decision, or they were 
not sure, whether it was a definitive one because the discussion about termi-
nating the DS had been going on for quite some time and the deadline had 
often been postponed.  
The tasks of the DS were to be transferred from the DS to the MoLGRD and 
NLGFC. This transfer influenced the effectiveness of coordination efforts. It 
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was a widespread phenomenon in the NLGFC and MoLGRD that there was 
no clear understanding about what tasks had already been transferred to the 
MoLGRD or the NLGFC. Interviews revealed that people were wondering 
why there were planners in both the DS and in the MoLGRD. In addition, it 
was evident that both institutions did not have the necessary capacity to take 
over the transferred tasks. This was especially true for the NLGFC. This 
problem possibly became less relevant as staff was transferred from the DS to 
the NLGFC. Nevertheless, the lack of clarity about the actual process and 
timeframe for the DS termination lead to considerable uncertainty about roles 
and tasks of actors in PFM. 
Conflicts between the DS and the MoLGRD have had a negative impact on 
the coordination between the institutions and the implementation of the de-
centralisation policy. From the MoLGRD’s perspective, the strong role do-
nors played in the DS tended to undermine the ministries leading role in 
overseeing the implementation of the NDP. In fact, the effectiveness of coor-
dination between the MoLGRD and the DS appears to have been negatively 
influenced by the fact that the DS received such strong donor support. Donors 
tended to use information they got from the DS in negotiations with the 
MoLGRD. They were thus undermining the formal institutional system, 
weakening the MoLGRD’s steering position. As a result, the DS in various 
instances refused to accept guidance from the ministry. 
As mentioned before, in 2005 there were important changes in the local insti-
tutional set-up. Probably the most important change was that transfers to each 
district were made individual votes in the national budget. The District 
Commissioners act as controlling officers for these budget lines. Since these 
changes took place after the field research was conducted for this study, the 
effects of this on accountability relations at the local assembly level could not 
be systematically examined. However, the general feeling seems to be that 
these changes may impact negatively on accountability relations between 
DCs and local assemblies as DCs are now required to submit monthly expen-
diture returns directly to the MoF, and cash controls to the Accountant Gen-
eral.  
Coordination between NLGFC and local authorities 
The analysis shows that coordination and cooperation between the NLGFC 
and local authorities are working rather well. Nevertheless, the research team 
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gained the impression that some elements regarding the role of the NLGFC as 
well as elements regarding advice and transfer of funds are seen critically. 
In some district secretariats, the attitude seems to dominate that the NLGFC 
as an institutional link between central and local government level is not 
necessary, but that the local authorities should cooperate directly with central 
government (i.e. MOLGRD). This feeling stems from the fear that the 
NLGFC might not always pass on complaints from the districts to central 
level, e.g. regarding insufficient funding. Interviews also revealed that there 
was lack of understanding why the treasury did not transfer funds directly to 
the districts. This shows that the role of the NLGFC is sometimes not quite 
clear and is sometimes regarded with suspicion by local authorities. Plans and 
budgets are approved by the assembly but are to be reviewed by the NLGFC. 
However, it is questionable how well the NLGFC can fill this function if it is 
not involved in the planning process itself.  
In general, however, it the NLGFC’s support and advice is judged positively. 
However, there is still room for improvement. For example, the NLGFC only 
visits local authorities twice a year due to lack of time and lack of funds. In 
addition, the NLGFC frequently withholds transferring funds. Often, this is 
due irregularities or unmet reporting requirements at local level. It can also 
result from scarce resources at central level. These deficiencies combined 
with poor communication lead to an unclear picture for the district assemblies 
of the link between performance and funding (GFA 2005, 47). Consequently, 
the DAs often do not know or understand why the NLGFC holds back fund-
ing. This in turn increases the level of uncertainty under which they operate. 
Operational link between central and local strategic planning for  
development 
No operational link exists between strategic plans of the local and central 
government levels (i.e. between District Development Plans and the MPRSP 
or the Vision 2020). In particular, there is no coherent poverty monitoring 
system at local government level and monitoring and evaluation activities at 
central and local government level are not coordinated. In addition, weak 
capacity for monitoring and evaluation at local level makes the coordination 
of poverty related data collection and consolidation difficult. This is further 
complicated by the multiplicity of data collection points below the Assembly 
level, which tend to be different for each sector ministry (GFA 2005, 46 et 
seq.). A more consistent monitoring and evaluation system is urgently needed 
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to consolidate local and central monitoring efforts. At the planning stage, 
national and local processes are also poorly coordinated as there is no opera-
tional mechanism linking DDPs to national strategies and plans, in particular 
the MPRSP and the PSIP. Such a link, which needs to be both bottom up as 
well as top down at the same time, is indispensable if decentralisation is taken 
further ahead. However, a certain trade-off does exist between further devolu-
tion of government functions and concerted efforts by donors and central 
government to implement national development strategies such as the 
MPRSP.  
6.4.4 Horizontal coordination at local government level 
This section analyses local institutions and stakeholders and their involve-
ment in the PFM process. It pays special attention to procedures of financing 
mechanisms how they are coordinated with local institutions.  
Although the Government of Malawi and the donor community welcome 
decentralisation as an important reform, severe difficulties in Malawi’s public 
administration make local governance more vulnerable to informal proce-
dures and render its institutions less credible.  
In-depth analysis of the qualitative data collected of local stakeholders in-
volved in the PFM process suggests  the following:41 
First, sound PFM at the local government level has not yet developed due to a 
poorly institutionalised local governance system, in which local stakeholders 
and PFM procedures are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty. In the 
course of decentralisation, new organised institutions collide with existing 
ones. This leads to undefined fields of responsibility and sometimes arbitrary 
and informal procedures.  
Second, uncertainty of local institutions and procedures is boosted by unco-
ordinated financing mechanisms of government and foreign donor funds. 
                                                          
41  Stakeholders involved in the analysis are: The District Assembly (DA) and its elected 
councillors, including committees; the DAs administrative body, the District Secretariat and 
its senior and minor staff; the Traditional Authorities (TAs) that have to be distinguished 
into Paramount Chiefs, Senior Chiefs, Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs, Group Village Headman, and 
Village Headman; local NGOs; donor agencies; and other influential stakeholders such as 
business people.    
Public Financial Management for PRSP Implementation in Malawi  
German Development Institute 119 
Especially the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) does not adhere to the 
formal local government structures and thus undermines transparency, ac-
countability and sound PFM at local government level. This is illustrated in 
the following section.  
Coordination with vertical funds – the case of MASAF 
The Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) was established by the govern-
ment of Malawi in 1995. The World Bank funded the first two phases from 
1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2003 with a credit of US$ 122 million. Be-
cause  MASAF was introduced three years ahead of the Local Government 
Act and the National Decentralisation Policy the World Bank’s initial ap-
proach was to support the community level directly, circumventing the cen-
tral state. 
Thus, like most social action funds, MASAF management units administer 
most processes related to identifying and financing community projects in a 
parallel structure to planning authorities of local governments.42 In the case of 
Malawi this practice has in the past resulted in undermining local planning 
and budgeting processes and accountability mechanisms.  In its latest phase 
MASAF III has realigned its institutional setup in order to provide a back-
stopping system for local Assemblies as they take over functions previously 
managed by MASAF itself. However, inadequacies in accounting for funds 
are frequent: financial queries remain unanswered, justification of funds takes 
a long time, and irregularities in the procurement processes occur (GFA 
2005, 66 et seq.). All this leads to delays in the disbursement of subsequent 
project funding. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42  For example, MASAF has not used the DDPs and their Annual Investment Plans (AIP) as a 
basis to select activities and allocate resources to identified priorities. Instead, MASAF staff 
from MASAF zone offices and MASAF Justification Officers in the districts undertake a 
separate planning and identification process together with DEC members, in particular the 
District Planning Director, replicating planning activities. 
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The following are major procedural weaknesses in the vertical coordination 
with local institutional and planning structures: 
Formal local planning procedures have had little or no relevance for MASAF. 
Furthermore, MASAF failed to provide for effective cooperation with local 
institutions and it widely ignores local government structures; In addition, 
perverse incentive structures led to a proliferation of instrumental commu-
nity-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Finally, MASAF has failed to initiate any serious cooperation or 
harmonisation with other local funds such as the DDF.   
The evidence from the rural districts shows that the MASAF framework 
widely ignores local planning procedures. As demanded in the MPRSP, local 
                                                          
43  The APL is a combination of a credit and a grant.  
Box 15: MASAF III 
In 2003, MASAF III has started with substantial changes compared to the previous 
phases, running until 2015. Again, it is divided into three phases. The World Bank 
approved a so-called Adaptable Lending Programme (APL) line amounting to US$ 
240 million.43 This financial stimulus is intended as a contribution to reaching the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, the new approach is also a 
response to the MPRSP and the decentralisation reform to strengthen the new 
structures of local government, improve accountability and empower communities 
as the fund itself states: “The underlying and ultimate goal of MASAF III is to 
institutionalise community empowerment and accountability within the framework 
of the community driven approach.” (MASAF 2003, 4). MASAF III consists of 
four different components: 1. Community Development Programme (CDP), for-
merly known as Community Managed Projects (CMP) and Local Authority Man-
aged Project (LAMP); 2. Social Support Programme (SSP), which corresponds to 
the third pillar of the MPRSP; 3. Community Savings and Investment Promotion 
Programme (COMSIP); and 4. Transparency and Accountability Programme 
(TAP).  
Each component is equipped with a certain amount of money, decided by the 
MASAF board (MASAF 2003, 2–16). The amount of every component is allo-
cated to the various districts according to a certain key of distribution similar to the 
GRF. 
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assemblies and their administrative bodies have managed to start their own 
costly and time-consuming planning procedures. The District Development 
Plans (DDP) are, in principle, formulated in a bottom-up and participatory 
planning process, supported by the main administrative staff of the district 
assemblies. Although MASAF III has acknowledged that eligible projects 
“[…] will be within the approved Local Authority Development Framework 
built on Village Action Plans (VAP) reflecting priority community needs” 
(MASAF 2003, 6), it has widely carried out its own planning procedures and 
project identification. Especially for its Community Development Programme 
(CDP), MASAF has not used the DDPs and their Annual Investment Plans 
(AIP) as a source to select activities and allocate resources to the identified 
and prioritised fields. Instead, the staff from its respective zone offices44 and 
their justification officers in the district work together with the staff from 
District Secretariat: This forces DEC members, in particular the district plan-
ning directors (DPD) to duplicate planning processes. Although district staff 
complain about this additional workload, allowances from MASAF are an 
incentive to suppress their protest and to follow MASAF procedures.  
In addition to MASAF’s own planning procedures, the fund has so far not 
achieved its goal to strengthen local government structures. Some examples 
illustrate this failure: i) for its own planning procedures, the fund does not 
necessarily cooperate the legal representatives of the community at sub-
district level, i.e. with the Village Development Committees (VDC) and the 
Area Development Committees (ADC). This is in stark contrast to the impor-
tant role these committees play in the planning procedures for the Village, 
Area and District Development Plans. ii) the same can be said about the 
fund’s cooperation with the elected members of the DA- the councillors. 
MASAF does not provide a comprehensive pattern of cooperation. This be-
comes obvious in the case of the Community Savings and Investment Promo-
tion Programme (COMSIP). Because MASAF was under pressure to launch 
COMSIP after a series of delays, it relied primarily on traditional authorities 
(TAs) for the distribution of application forms. This is comprehensible given 
that TAs are widely recognised as influential dignitaries in the districts. How-
ever, this happened without the knowledge of the DAs and their representa-
                                                          
44  For its third phase, MASAF III has changed its organisational structure. Several district 
offices were replaced by only three regional zone offices in Lilongwe (center); Blantyre 
(south); and Mzuzu (north), the largest regional cities.  
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tives and was thus contrary to the declared objective of MASAF to strengthen 
accountability and transparency of local institutions.  
The Social Support Programme (SSP) aims at providing technical assistance 
to NGOs and CBOs to work directly with vulnerable groups at the grass roots 
level. To apply for projects, the communities need to identify a civil society 
organisation in order to receive support. This has provided an incentive to 
establish many new organisations to access funding from the SSP. However, 
letterbox organisations abused the funds and local authorities could not pro-
vide accurate information about correctly operating CBOs. The result has 
been confusion and frustration among local communities.  
Finally, MASAF follows a somewhat different approach from other funding 
mechanisms that leave local authorities entirely responsible for the resources. 
One reason is that the MASAF was established before the approval of the 
NDP; therefore, before local governments were actually established in Ma-
lawi. However, another reason might be that the MASAF has been conceived 
as a country-wide development effort within the same logic as the PRSP and 
the MDG debate, i.e. as a processes at a national scale and not as a tool for 
local intervention. 
However, with the establishment of a new Local Development Fund most of 
the observed coordination failures should cease to exist since the fund is 
aimed at consolidating existing financing mechanisms into a common sys-
tem.45 
6.5 Commitment 
Lack of political commitment to sound PFM used to be a critical source of 
uncertainty in the PFM process in Malawi. At the time of this research, there 
was a commonly shared feeling among donors and observers in Malawi that 
the new leadership, showed positive signs of a much stronger commitment to 
accountability and effective PFM, giving hope that substantial improvements 
in Malawi’s PFM performance would soon materialise. For example, the IMF 
reported about the staff monitored programme (SMP): “The overall perform-
ance under the SMP reflects a high degree of commitment by the government 
                                                          
45  For a detailed presentation of the proposed mechanism, see GFA (2005). 
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to adhere to its budget. This is a noteworthy turnaround from experience in 
previous years” (IMF 2005). 
Shortly after the new government was elected, a number of measures were 
taken as symbolic steps to indicate commitment to budgetary discipline and 
sound debt management. One such step was moving government offices from 
Blantyre to Lilongwe. In addition, to limit travelling expenditures, approval 
procedures for travels made by ministers and PSs were transferred from line 
ministries to the Office of the President.  
In an attempt to improve cash planning in line ministries, the treasury gave 
back the responsibility of utility costs to line ministries, from which it had 
originally been taken away to avoid accumulation of arrears. This measure 
includes sanctioning mechanism, withholding cash transfers in case of new 
arrears. 
The new government also introduced a sanctioning mechanism in order to 
achieve better budget control at local level. The new Financial Reporting 
Guidelines for Local Authorities state that funds for local authorities may be 
withheld in case financial reports are not submitted to the NLGFC on time. 
Finally, funding was increased for the National Audit Office (NAO) and Anti 
Corruption Bureau (ACB). The initial anti-corruption drive saw a number of 
senior officials, including some former ministers, arrested. Yet, the most 
prominent case was the one of Minister of Education Yusuf Mwawa, who in 
May 2005 was dismissed and later convicted for using government funds for 
a private wedding celebration. 
However, most elements of the old system of inappropriate power distribu-
tion and perverse incentives remain in place. In addition, during the field 
research most observers agreed that the current political commitment de-
pended heavily on very few people at the top, above all the new President and 
the Minister of Finance. This created a certain degree of uncertainty about the 
sustainability of the apparent commitment to sound PFM of the new admini-
stration. Even a genuinely well-intentioned President, within such a system, 
may lack support and may be threatened by a coalition of those who previ-
ously profited from the old system (IDD and Associates 2005, 28).  
The role weak political commitment might still play in creating a parallel 
PFM system of informal rules and procedures in Malawi should thus not be 
underestimated. Nonetheless, the evidence collected and observations made 
during the field study suggest that at this time, the absence of political will to 
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manage government finances efficiently and transparently is not the most 
important cause of poor PFM performance in Malawi. Instead, commitment 
to sound PFM for poverty reduction appears to be a necessary but by no 
means sufficient condition to ensure PRSP implementation through a PFM 
system as in Malawi. 
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Part III: Analysis and Recommendations 
7 Public Financial Management under Uncertainty: 
The Case of Malawi  
This section draws together the empirical findings in each of the key areas 
described in the preceding section and presents some more general results 
regarding actual PFM practice in Malawi. The main finding shows that actual 
PFM practices and, in particular, the budget process differ significantly from 
formal rules and procedures. Instead of being guided by this generally well 
designed framework, the actual PFM process is characterised by three main 
features. These are:  
— Ad hoc mode of planning and budgeting: Malawi’s PFM is not charac-
terised by routinised and standard bureaucratic procedures but rather by 
an ad hoc mode of action throughout the system. 
— Informal practices: Apart from deliberate manipulation of processes for 
personal gain, informal practices are often used as pragmatic solutions 
to cope with unexpected problems and shortcomings. 
— Uncertainty: Uncertainty has many dimensions in Malawi’s PFM sys-
tem. The two most important ones are uncertainty with regard to finan-
cial resources and formal rules. Uncertainty in terms of financial re-
sources denotes the fact that various actors in Malawi’s PFM system do 
not know the amount of money they will have at their disposal for im-
plementing policies during the next financial year. Even after their 
budgets have been approved, cutbacks occur frequently. Furthermore, 
various actors do not know when they will be told how much money 
they will receive as the official schedule is not being adhered to (ceilings 
and time of disbursement). Uncertainty in terms of formal rules thus re-
fers to a twofold problem: For one, it describes the problem that stake-
holders do not know formal rules and procedures, or are uncertain which 
rules apply in a particular situation. In addition, the term refers to the 
fact that given the constant non-adherence to formal rules, most actors 
cannot be sure that others adhere to the rules and thus do not know 
whether they themselves will be able to follow formal procedures in ful-
filling their functions. 
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These features are pervasive throughout Malawi’s PFM system and the 
budget process in particular. The following section discusses them in more 
detail and shows how they relate to each other.  
All actors involved in the PFM process contribute to these outcomes to vary-
ing degrees and are at the same time its victims. How each of the key areas 
and factors analysed in the last chapter contributes to this outcome is ana-
lysed in Section 7.2. 
The results of this study are then looked at in the context of recent literature 
on PFM in general and institutional development and public administration in 
sub-Saharan Africa in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 concludes the study by looking 
at the consequences of uncertainty for PFM in Malawi. 
7.1 Central features of Malawi’s PFM: uncertainty, ad hoc 
planning and budgeting and informal practices 
Uncertainty, an ad hoc mode of planning and budgeting as well as the use of 
informal practices are common features of PFM in Malawi. The three phe-
nomena are closely linked to each other as shown in this chapter. To make 
the argument clear, the three analytical concepts are briefly introduced in the 
next sections. 
7.1.1 The overriding feature: systemic uncertainty 
A very prominent and pervasive finding of this empirical research on PFM in 
Malawi is a high level of uncertainty, which impacts negatively on PFM at all 
levels of government. ‘Uncertainty’ is the analytical term chosen by the re-
search team to sum up all evidence and comments collected on this phe-
nomenon. Thus, the term refers to a systemic kind of uncertainty, which. 
cannot be ascribed to the lack of information or knowledge of individual 
actors only. Systemic uncertainty is created because the rules, procedures and 
institutions of a governance system (here: the PFM system of Malawi in its 
particular context) are not entirely reliable and, therefore, do not provide 
long-term predictability. At the same time, the actors involved do not receive 
relevant information timely and systematically. However, these features are 
preconditions for the establishment of routine standard bureaucratic proce-
dures in an effective and efficient law-based public administration. 
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According to this analysis, uncertainty has five major dimensions as far as 
PFM in Malawi is concerned: a) formal rules, b) financial resources, c) roles 
and responsibilities, d) future political developments and e) the progress of 
reforms. Together, they form what could be termed an uncertainty pentagon 
as illustrated in Figure 9. The remainder of this section briefly outlines these 
five dimensions. 
Figure 9: The uncertainty pentagon of Malawi’s PFM system 
 
Source:  own illustration 
Uncertainty with regard to formal rules 
Uncertainty about formal rules has two aspects. The first stems from deficient 
information about and/or understanding of formal rules and relates to the 
content of rules. The second, and probably the more important one with re-
gard to the observed weaknesses of PFM in Malawi is consists in uncertainty 
about the relevance and reliability of formal rules. This concerns the question 
for each actor in the PFM system, whether – given the constraints regarding 
information and financial resources – he or she can fulfil his/her functions 
according to formal rules and regulations without negative consequences 
(personally or with respect to the effectiveness of their work) and expect 
others in the system do so as well. In other words, the critical question is 
whether the existing formal rules actually serve as a mechanism for “uncer-
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tainty absorption”.46 As the collected evidence suggests, this is routinely not 
the case with regard to rules and procedures for PFM in Malawi.    
Uncertainty with regard to financial resources 
This is a common problem for almost all actors involved in PFM in Malawi 
at the various levels. It is also prominent at all stages of the budget cycle. In 
the strategic planning phase, for example, MEPD and MoF frequently do not 
know how much funding they will receive from donors in the medium term. 
This often is also the case in the annual budget formulation phase. Sector 
ministries at central level are sometimes required to formulate budgets with-
out having received their respective ceilings before. This leads to cutbacks 
when the amount of money that the sector ministries finally receive is below 
the budget proposal. If sector ministries should receive more funds than ex-
pected, additional activities have to be included in an ad hoc mode. There-
fore, sector ministries as well as other government bodies plan, formulate and 
execute budgets under a high degree of uncertainty. Even in the budget exe-
cution stage, it is often not clear, e.g. for local government levels, when and 
how much money will be disbursed by donors and central government. The 
two most important components of uncertainty with regard to financial re-
sources are the amount of money and the time of disbursement.  
Uncertainty with regard to roles and responsibilities 
Another common feature seen is that actors are not well informed about 
which institutions or actors are formally responsible for specific tasks and 
how labour should actually be divided. This is understandable in a context 
where many large reforms are being implemented at the same time, e.g. de-
centralisation and PFM reform. Uncertainty with regard to responsibilities 
and roles often result from either insufficient or unsystematic dissemination 
of information on new regulations or from the fact that the new division of 
responsibilities is not considered practical by actors or is not in their interest. 
                                                          
46  Uncertainty absorption as defined by Luhmann (2002, 41–44, 238–240) and based on 
March / Simon (1958) takes place, for example, if the following happens: an organisation 
processes information, considers risks, alterations and alternative solutions, assumes the re-
sponsibility for all mistakes made in this process and in the end draws conclusions and 
comes up with a decision. Uncertainty absorption has been successful if only the final deci-
sion but not the various elements of the process of arriving at this decision serve as starting 
point for further decisions and processes (adapted and translated from Luhmann 2002, 238). 
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A telling example is the role of the TAs at local level. Donor agencies and 
government frequently rely on TAs for mobilisation and information dis-
semination purposes; however, this sometimes blurs their role in the adminis-
trative system when compared to local councillors and MPs.  
Uncertainty with regard to reform processes  
The various actors involved in the PFM process often lack information about 
the various reform processes, even if their institutions are key stakeholders in 
reform. The information they do not know is for one the content and reform 
details and secondly the very reform process itself – will there be a reform at 
all or not? The whole process of decentralisation is a good example for this 
feature. 
Uncertainty with regard to the political future 
As political programmes and their implementation depend on a number of 
factors, among them the personal commitment of the president and other key 
political figures, as well as on donor support, many actors in the PFM process 
in Malawi are aware that the political situation could change from one mo-
ment to another. Such a change could alter the context of work for all actors 
involved and could completely change the relevance and binding force of 
formal rules and procedures. Even if the initial phase of the new president 
Bingu wa Mutharika’s government was assessed quite positively by most 
interview partners, they were all very well aware that this could change any 
time. 
7.1.2 Ad hoc mode of planning and budgeting  
Various actors involved in the PFM process in Malawi act according to an ad 
hoc mode of action, particularly in the planning and budgeting process. Plan-
ning as well as budgeting are closely interlinked processes. That means that 
actors routinely depend on each other fulfilling their respective tasks as a 
precondition for the next actor to be able to fulfil his or her task. If there are 
delays or any other kind of procedural disturbance in this chain of action, it 
has an impact on all following steps. Disturbances, particularly frequent de-
lays in Malawi’s PFM process occur so that formal procedures are frequently 
not be adhered to. However, as time pressure and deadlines cannot simply be 
adapted or new ones are set which are very tight, many actors find themselves 
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in a permanent ad hoc mode of planning and budgeting instead of a routine 
and standardised mode of action. Box 16 provides illustrations.  
7.1.3 Informal practices as pragmatic solutions 
The incidence of informal practices in terms of deliberate political influence 
on administrative decision-making appears to have decreased under the new 
government according to the perception of most interview partners. However, 
it was a very dominant mode under the Muluzi government and still occurs in 
certain cases today.  
The second type of informal practices that were identified in the analysis are 
more prominent. They occur when formal rules and procedures cannot be 
followed because of delays in the process. For example, actors that are further 
down in the chain of action often have no choice but to pragmatically adapt to 
the situation they find themselves in. These informal practices are often a 
compromise between what is legally required and what actors can do in the 
respective situation. They are informal practices in the sense that they are not 
formally defined by the legal and institutional framework. That does not 
mean that all of them are necessarily illegal or “bad” per se. They are not 
even inefficient in all cases, although many are. Box 16 illustrates some ex-
amples of how informal practices are created.  
How the three features uncertainty, ad hoc mode and informal practices are 
linked to each other in Malawi’s PFM system and how uncertainty is created 
in the first place is discussed in the following section. Selected illustrations 
are also given.  
7.2 How uncertainty is created in Malawi’s PFM 
Malawi’s formal institutional and legal framework for PFM is seen as sound 
and adequate. Nevertheless, PFM and the budget process in particular are 
considered to be weak. But why is there such a discrepancy between the for-
mal PFM framework and actual practice? This section draws together the 
findings and concludes the argumentation.  
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7.2.1 How formal PFM rules are undermined 
To be effective, the formal institutional and legal framework for PFM needs 
to be adhered to in actual PFM practice. Particularly in the context of a very 
poor country with few professionals, a high degree of donor dependency and 
a long history of political authoritarianism it is obvious that this is a very 
challenging task. During the field, research five key areas were identified that 
are critical for implementing this framework.47 The major problems in each of 
these key areas were identified and respective reasons for as well as effects of 
these problems analysed. Problems in each of these five key areas contribute 
to the PFM process in Malawi being characterised by uncertainty, an ad hoc 
mode of planning and budgeting and the use of informal practices through 
two different channels: 
— The direct link where certain problems become explicit triggers48 for an 
increased ad hoc mode of planning and/or budgeting and thereby in-
crease overall uncertainty. 
— A more indirect way that does promote but in itself does not cause ad 
hoc behaviour, informal practices and uncertainty; 
One example for a typical trigger event would be the delay of disbursement 
of funds or detailed announcements by donors. This delay will be transmitted 
throughout the entire budgeting process from each stage to the next one. 
Reliable budget ceilings will be issued too late and the resulting time pressure 
will make it impossible to adhere to formal rules and procedures (e.g. there is 
no time to get the budget approved by the full district assembly at the local 
level), leading to ad hoc planning and/or budgeting at the various levels. This 
again increases uncertainty with regard to the relevance of formal rules and 
procedures, even more so when informal practices that are not in line with 
formal regulations are not sanctioned accordingly. If ad hoc planning and 
budgeting or informal practices are already taking place, the weaknesses in 
these areas tend to reinforce those negative features further, increasing the 
overall level of uncertainty in the system. Figure 10 illustrates this self-
                                                          
47  The authors do not claim to cover all relevant key areas for PFM in Malawi. However, 
there are reasons to believe that these are probably the most important ones.  
48  A “trigger event“ is directly linked to an ad hoc mode of action although it might not 
always be easy to clearly identify the single most important event as several factor do often 
work together, leading to a situation where ad hoc planning and/or budgeting is practiced.   
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reinforcing cycle. It also illustrates how decentralisation may reinforce  
the described process by adding complexity to the entire PFM system and 
exacerbating weaknesses in the five key areas. 
Over the long-run, there is even the danger that formal rules and procedures 
are no longer being taken serious as relevant guidelines of PFM if they are 
regularly not being adhered to. Informal practices that serve as pragmatic 
“emergency” solutions might become institutionalised as the standard mode 
of action. Once this has occurred, it may prove extremely difficult to change 
the established routines. The illustrations in Box 16 show the role systemic 
uncertainty plays in Malawi’s PFM system and suggest that such a process is 
indeed observable in Malawi.  
However, high levels of uncertainty might also have other negative effects on 
the effectiveness of the PFM system: it could reduce the commitment of ac-
tors at all government levels to these formal rules and procedures. It can also 
undermine the legitimacy of newly established institutions, particularly at 
local government level, such as the DA. Furthermore, these practices can 
undermine capacity development of local councillors as well as effective 
coordination between central and local level institutions. Throughout the 
PFM process uncertainty is an outcome as well as a cause of an ad hoc mode 
of planning and budgeting and the use of informal practices. 
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Box 16: Illustrations for PFM under uncertainty 
This box presents several examples of how formal rules have been undermined and 
uncertainty created in Malawi’s PFM system. It is a selection of cases based on the 
field research conducted in Malawi and is intended to illustrate the more abstract 
considerations above. 
Delays of ceilings for budgeting 
This is one of the most prominent examples for how uncertainty (with regard to 
financial resources) is created in Malawi. The formal schedule for budgeting in 
Malawi gives clear deadlines for when ceilings have to be communicated and budg-
ets handed in and approved. However, this schedule is frequently not being adhered 
to. A frequent “trigger event” is that donors are late with communicating their com-
mitments for the following financial year to the government. Therefore, the MoF is 
late with announcing the ceilings. In order not to delay the entire budgeting process 
too much, the ministry asks all other government bodies to submit the budget as 
quickly as possible. This high time pressure induces an ad hoc mode of budgeting. It 
frustrates those who have already prepared a budget and now have to reduce or redo 
it again. Comments like the following made by staff of government bodies that 
suffer from these delays were frequent:  
“Sometimes you wonder why you make budgets! If in the end, you only 
get a fraction of what you planned and budgeted. You can’t plan.” (Gov-
ernment body at central government level)  
“If we start budget planning we should have an idea of how much money 
we have. But it is unclear how much donors put in. Normally this informa-
tion does not come. Some do give it - there we can plan. The government 
knows numbers too late. So, they also send the ceilings very late. Too late, 
let me tell you - that frustrates us and the operational. … The budget plan-
ning process is frustrating and unrealistic.” (Ministry of Health) 
“No, we normally get the ceilings late. If you do not get the ceilings on 
time, it is difficult to know the limitations of the budget. We do a budget 
without knowing the exact figures and then, finally, we have to cut them 
back.” (Government officer at local government level) 
“In Uganda they get ceilings nine months in advance. In Malawi, we get 
them only when the budgeting is finished. We blindly do our budgets.” 
(District Health Officer)  
“Budgeting is useless.” (District Health Officer)  
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Actors use a number of strategies  to deal with this problem. Some of them are for-
mal while others are informal but all are pragmatic solutions to this uncertainty in 
budgeting due to the delays. The first example is a formal and very official solution. 
The introduction of activity-based budgeting (ABB) even at local government level 
is one of the most recent reforms in PFM in Malawi. A government official at cen-
tral level stated that ABB is a good instrument for dealing with delays of ceilings or 
uncertainty in the budget process as it makes it much easier to cut back certain ac-
tivities according to the prioritisation when the actual ceilings are finally given. This 
is much more complicated with line-item-based budgeting. Another more informal 
solution is that ministries advise their respective budgeting units to take the previous 
budget as reference for budgeting: “We give the districts a rule of thumb: 10  % 
more than the last year, the treasury supports that idea. The problem is it makes the 
planning a bit theoretical and not flexible.” (Ministry of Health). 
In the health sector an informal solution has become institutionalised: while antici-
pating that ceilings might come too late and that the proposed health budgets coming 
from the districts might have to be cut back, the Ministry of Health advises the 
DHOs to prepare two budgets, budget A and budget B: one of them is the ‘normal’ 
budget while the other one is a worst case scenario. Both are then submitted to the 
ministry and based on the ceilings it is then decided which one will be used – over 
the last years the worst-case plan has been used more often. 
Another strategy to deal with the delays of ceilings and high time pressure at local 
government level is to skip certain legally required steps in the budget process. 
Normally, after the District Secretariat has prepared the budget, the full District 
Assembly has to approve it. If the ceilings come too late and the NLGFC (which has 
also received the ceilings late) requests districts to submit budgets within a few days, 
this step is often skipped. To call for a full assembly meeting in a rural district would 
require much more time and is very expensive for the District Secretariat. As a 
pragmatic compromise, the District Budget and Finance Committee are called to 
approve the budget. The full assembly is then informed about that in the next meet-
ing. There is the danger that this informal solution becomes institutionalised and that 
formal regulations that require the full assembly to approve the budget are routinely 
neglected. In some districts, the full assembly had been circumvented for two years 
in a row when the field research was conducted. 
All these procedures create significant uncertainty in the budgeting process. How-
ever, most government officials at all levels know that this delay is a chain reaction 
and do not blame the authority above them. A local government official puts it as 
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follows: “We got the ceilings only on Friday. But they [the authority immediately 
above them] got  it late from MoF. And they got it late from the donors. Now we 
have two days to give them the budget. They just pass on the ball.” 
Local government elections and the dissolution of District Assemblies 
Local government elections are provided for in the constitution of Malawi. How-
ever, at least officially due to budget reasons, GoM did not budget for the local 
elections that would have been due in May 2005.  The “trigger event” therefore is 
the lack of money provided for local elections in the budget 2004/2005. Following 
the constitution, the minister therefore announced on April 14, 2005 that the local 
assemblies stand dissolved by law effectively by March 20. Instead of elected coun-
cillors, the district commissioners and local chief executives with the support of the 
traditional authorities should run the district until the next elections, now planned for 
2006. Soon after that message, the city assembly of Lilongwe appealed against this 
decision at the High Court, arguing that local councillors have been elected for five 
years in November 2000. On April 22, High Court ordered that the ministry should 
not start acting as if assemblies were dissolved until a judicial review on the matter 
was carried out. The official reason given subsequently for not holding the elections 
was that any available money was needed to buy maize in order to compensate the 
effects of the extremely poor 2005 harvest, stifling any serious protest.  
It is easy to imagine how much uncertainty this affair must have caused at local 
level, particularly under conditions of weak capacity and coordination. Again, an ad 
hoc mode of action characterises this affair. Nobody, particularly not at local level, 
has really thought about this problem before. Uncertainty about the exact date of 
new local elections has been more or less accepted. Therefore, the order to dissolve 
the assemblies came very surprisingly and local councillors perceived it as an ad hoc 
decision.  
The fact that district councillors, chief executives and traditional authorities should 
take over the responsibilities of elected councillors can be considered as an informal 
practice, although it has been officially announced. This practice is likely to dra-
matically increase uncertainty for local stakeholders and the local population about 
hierarchy and responsibility of the different actors at local level and therefore have a 
negative impact on the decentralisation process in Malawi. 
Temporarily government seemed to intend to postpone local elections until 2009. 
However, by the end of 2006, preparations for local elections seemed finally to be 
under way, with seven billion Kwacha set aside for the purpose.  
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The introduction of PFM reforms 
Although this illustration refers to the introduction of PFM reforms at local govern-
ment level, the same phenomenon is also common at central government level. As a 
pilot project in terms of sector devolution, the responsibility for the payroll of teach-
ers should be devolved to the districts. This time the “trigger event” was less an 
event, but it was the fact that coordination and communication between central and 
local government level was completely lacking. The training measures for preparing 
the devolution of the payroll was very much ad hoc from the perspective of the 
district education managers who were going to be responsible for managing the 
teacher’s payroll. Although informal practices have not yet arisen from this process, 
it has created a lot of uncertainty. This is not a very positive context for such an 
important reform. The acting DEM of Dedza district, one of the three pilot districts 
in Malawi, clearly illustrates that:  
“[On the devolution of the payroll for teachers] we got the first informa-
tion in November last year. This year there was a week when we have 
been told what exactly this means and we have been trained on how to 
use the computers for that. Three districts will start, seven have been 
trained. I don’t know whether we fall into the first three or the last four. 
We have been told that we will be informed, there will be more training. 
We are still waiting to see. … The problem is: other people are planning, 
the implementers are somewhere else. We’re only told: come here. We 
will tell you when to continue. So, we are waiting, we have not yet been 
told.” 
7.2.2 Why formal PFM rules are undermined  
As has been discussed in the last chapter, the causes for current PFM practice 
in Malawi being characterised by uncertainty, ad hoc mode of planning and 
budgeting and informal practices have their roots in five key areas. In order to 
understand the mechanisms at work, it is, however, necessary to take a closer 
look at the inner workings of this phenomenon. This analysis cannot be com-
prehensive due to the manifold interrelations between the various shortcom-
ings in the five areas identified above and between the features of uncer-
tainty, ad hoc behaviour and informal practices, Therefore, only the most 
relevant relations impacting on PFM performance are presented.   
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Capacity 
The ways in which the capacity problems outlined above contribute to ad hoc 
behaviour, informal procedures and uncertainty are manifold. For example, a 
shortage of qualified staff, particularly in key positions for PFM, leads to a 
situation in which existing staff tend to suffer from work overload. This 
strongly increases the likeliness of the long-term planning and the preparation 
of key tasks being neglected and that an emergency or ad hoc mode of action 
becomes the rule rather than the exception. This might also increase the like-
liness that ‘shortcuts’ are used instead of formal procedures.   
Insufficient equipment and financial resources also lead to a situation where 
staff cannot perform their routine duties but have to work in an ad hoc man-
ner when they receive the required resources or equipment.  
High staff turnover also increases uncertainty and informal practices because 
institutional memory is not established and administrative routines are not 
being developed. Professional knowledge, specific training efforts and fa-
miliarity with local stakeholders for coordination purposes are also lost and 
take a lot of time and resources to be re-established.  
Long and unpredictable recruitment processes also contribute to ad hoc plan-
ning and budgeting by acting staff and increase uncertainty as strategic and 
long-term decisions are simply not made if senior positions are not filled.  
Resources for PFM 
If funds are insufficient to pay adequate salaries qualified PFM staff cannot 
be attracted to and retained in rural districts. This will most likely exacerbate 
the negative effects at local government level of procedural disturbances 
originating from higher levels. More importantly, if no funding for meetings 
of service committees (at both central and local government level) and the 
full DA is available, formally required consultation procedures with these 
bodies cannot be followed. Inevitably, this leads to informal procedures. If 
the resources are missing on a regular basis, uncertainty is created about the 
relevance of formal procedures undermining the entire PFM process, includ-
ing its democratic control and legitimacy.  
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Donor impact on PFM 
One of the most critical factors contributing to the high degree of uncertainty 
in Malawi’s PFM is the lack of predictability of donor funds, which includes  
actual amounts, time of disbursement and possible reductions. If donor com-
mitments are not well coordinated with the Malawian budget process, this 
might cause delays or additional financial resources after the budget has been 
approved. If no supplementary budget is set up, both cases lead to increased 
ad hoc planning and budgeting.  
The MoF tends to send out the budget ceilings to sector ministries and local 
government bodies late if donors are also late in confirming their contribu-
tions to the GoM.  This delay then propagates throughout the budget process 
and leads to sometimes hectic ad hoc planning and budgeting activities at 
both levels of government. Again, this increases the likeliness of using in-
formal practices instead of the formal procedures and in the end increases 
uncertainty throughout the system.  
If donors do not adequately support the introduction of new PFM instru-
ments, such as the MTEF, it will only increase the use of ad hoc mode of 
planning and budgeting and other informal practices. Reforms are then only 
introduced superficially instead of embedding them systematically and in a 
sustainable manner in the entire PFM system.  
Coordination 
Missing or insufficient coordination between the numerous actors involved in 
PFM increases uncertainty substantially, in particular so when informal and 
intransparent communication channels are used instead of formal coordina-
tion mechanisms. Although this might sometimes be more efficient, it usually 
does not strengthen but often undermines the formal institutional and legal 
infrastructure. Information is thus not distributed systematically and evenly to 
all relevant actors in the system but rather selectively according to personal 
relations. This adds to uncertainty for all actors involved.  
Commitment 
Lack of political commitment to sound PFM is another critical source for 
uncertainty in PFM processes in developing countries. This applies to uncer-
tainty about the validity of formal rules as well as to the question as to 
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whether observed commitment is indeed genuine and can be sustained. How-
ever, currently it seems that the political commitment of top government 
officials as well as personal commitment of civil servants at technical levels 
do not provide the most important source of uncertainty triggering the ob-
served ad hoc mode of planning and budgeting and use of informal practices 
in Malawi’s PFM. This argument is elaborated in more detail in the following 
section. 
7.2.3 The budget as a theatre, continued – How important is 
political commitment? 
As previously quoted in Chapter 5, a recent study on Malawi’s formal and 
informal PFM institutions commissioned by DFID finds that “the budget 
process [in Malawi] is a theatre that masks the real distribution and spending” 
(Rakner et al. 2004, iv). Another recent study on Malawi’s PFM comes to the 
conclusion that although capacity constraints in implementing PFM reforms 
must be recognised, the main limiting factor for sound PFM in Malawi in  
the past appears to have been a lack of commitment of political leaders 
(Durevall / Erlandsson 2005, 35). This point of view, however, would imply 
that by substantially improving  political commitment of senior government 
officials, the quality of PFM could be improved significantly. In Malawi, 
such a change appears to have taken place with the election of the new gov-
ernment in May 2004. So far, most donors agree that there is evidence that 
the new leadership is committed to fiscal discipline and tackling corruption 
(Durevall / Erlandsson 2005, 37).  
Consequently, one could expect substantial improvements of PFM and the 
adherence to formal rules and procedures in Malawi. However, as the evi-
dence collected for this study suggests, even with good formal institutions 
and regulations in place, political commitment alone will not suffice to ensure 
adherence to PFM rules and procedures in a country like Malawi. This is 
because there are various limiting factors inherent to the public sector in a 
typical African developing country like Malawi that undermine adherence to 
formal rules and regulations, lack of commitment by political leaders being 
only one of them. Some authors suggest that disorder and uncertainty in fact 
serve as political instruments for African elites to maintain their power base 
(c.f. Chabal / Daloz 1999), and are as such intended consequences of actions 
undertaken by political leaders lacking commitment to development and 
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poverty reduction. However, evidence suggests that there are other important 
factors as well, leading to the rather unintended establishment of informal and 
parallel PFM systems. This means that even though political commitment 
may have improved significantly in Malawi, the PFM system’s main features 
of uncertainty, ad hoc behaviour and informal practices will continue to exist. 
They must be considered as systemic problems themselves, rather than in-
tended consequences of the elite’s lack of political commitment to develop-
ment only. The reflex to blame neo-patrimonial and clientelistic structures 
alone wherever good formal institutions and regulations are not adhered to, 
must therefore be challenged to a certain degree. 
Although commitment is an essential precondition for reforming PFM; it 
cannot solve systemic problems that consists of a severe lack of resources and 
capacity as well as poor coordination and donor behaviour. In brief: although 
the budget may no longer be a mere theatre in Malawi, the old stage still 
exists.   
7.3 Uncertainty in PFM and institutional development in 
Africa 
How unique is the case of Malawi with a PFM system that is characterised by 
the central features of uncertainty, ad hoc behaviour and informal practices? 
Many of the conditions that were identified as leading to these problems can 
also be found in other developing countries. It is likely that similar phenom-
ena can also be discovered there. Therefore, Malawi is certainly not unique in 
the developing world and some generalisations regarding other countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa seem justified.  
But what if these central features of PFM in Malawi are compared to PFM in 
consolidated Western democracies with a strong public administration? Sur-
prisingly, similar features are found in these countries as the following quote 
shows:  
“Instruments of public financial management that have been established 
for emergency interventions become institutionalised as instruments for 
the maintenance of the budget cycle. … [Informal] bilateral negotiations 
between finance- and sector administration divisions are no longer the ex-
ception but are an important instrument of budgeting itself.” (Peters 2000, 
135; own translation.) 
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These findings do not refer to a developing country but to PFM in the Ger-
man capital, Berlin, in the late 1990s. An informal ‘second budget cycle’ had 
been established and was almost completely separated from the official 
budget cycle in response to the severe financial constraints the municipal 
administration was facing.  
In organisational sociology literature, it is a well-established phenomenon 
that administrative systems in modern democracies tend to increase their 
autonomy and discretionary space for informal practices when the political 
and administrative system suffers from work overload (Luhmann 1987, 142–
151). Therefore, the question is legitimate in how far PFM in Malawi really 
differs from other, well-consolidated and in general sufficiently well func-
tioning PFM systems in developed countries. This study would argue that 
what makes the case of Malawi special is not the mere existence of uncer-
tainty, an ad hoc mode of planning and budgeting and informal practices in 
general but rather the quality of these problems as well their occurrence in a 
typical sub-Saharan African institutional context. Therefore, the major differ-
ences to PFM in developed countries apart from the lack of qualified staff are 
the following:  
— The extent of uncertainty: In addition to relying on a narrow and highly 
vulnerable tax base, Malawi heavily depends on donors to finance its 
state and most other public expenditure. As donor behaviour is identi-
fied as one major source of uncertainty in PFM, this dependency implies 
that the extent of uncertainty with regard to financial resources in the 
budget process is also extraordinarily high.  
— Institutional context: Formal institutions as well as laws and regulations 
are not yet consolidated and habitualised as relevant and dominant 
guidelines for administrative action. They often do not serve the purpose 
of “absorbing” uncertainty (see Section 7.1.1). To institutionalise proce-
dures and establishing routines is a long-term process that is still on-
going. 
The effects of uncertainty, ad hoc mode of planning and budgeting as well as 
informal practices in such a context are completely different from those of 
consolidated democracies with strong administrative systems. While these 
features also affect the public perception of administrative procedures nega-
tively in the context of developed countries, they do not jeopardise the system 
and the procedures as such. This is completely different in a context where 
institutions and formal rules and procedures are not yet consolidated and 
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habitualised. In such a context, there is the danger that these features of PFM 
are attributed to the system as such and therefore the formal institutions, rules 
and procedures on which the whole process should be based are de-
legitimised and undermined in the process. 
These reflections go far beyond the purely administrative system: administra-
tive action in modern democracies is democratically legitimised exclusively 
through its rule-boundedness. In the words of Luhmann: modern administra-
tions generate “legitimation through procedures” (1969). If this process of 
genuine institutionalisation and habitualisation of formal rules and procedures 
is threatened, it is not only a risk for the administrative system, but threatens 
the base of democracy in a country. This can happen, for example, through 
the prevalence of uncertainty, ad hoc behaviour and informal practices in 
PFM. It is important to keep this wider context in mind when assessing the 
features identified in PFM in Malawi. Schedler (2001) argues that institu-
tional uncertainty is a constitutive element of the transition process towards 
democracy. Therefore, uncertainty of the observed form in Malawi’s PFM 
can also be interpreted as a central feature of the much wider phenomenon of 
democratic transition in sub-Saharan Africa. 
7.4 Conclusions: Consequences of uncertainty in 
Malawi’s PFM 
What are the consequences that result from these findings regarding PFM in 
Malawi? Among the most important consequences of uncertainty, ad hoc 
behaviour and informal practices at the different government levels of PFM 
are the following: 
— The effectiveness of the PFM system is limited; therefore, the imple-
mentation of strategic policies (e.g. PRS) through this system is 
unlikely. 
— Enforcing accountability is extremely difficult in a PFM system such as 
Malawi’s. 
— The relevance of formal rules and procedures for PFM in Malawi is 
limited and is being undermined in the process.  
Particularly in a context of political transition, decentralisation tends to fur-
ther complicate the PFM system and procedures, thereby increasing the like-
liness that the problems identified in this study are exacerbated to a consider-
able extent. 
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8 Recommendations 
Establishment of an operational link between PRSP and local planning and 
budgeting procedures  
Currently, there is no operational mechanism linking local planning and 
budgeting procedures to priorities set at the national level. Although some 
stakeholders doubt the need for such a link, if devolution is taken forward, in 
particular in the sectors covered most prominently in the PRSP (health and 
education), such a link is indispensable. Particularly so when at the same time 
a meaningful PRSP approach is to be pursued.  
Such a link could be established either at the planning stage, e.g. by means of 
binding guidelines derived from the PRSP for the formulation of district 
development plans; or in the execution phase, e.g. via protected sector trans-
fers or conditional grants to the local level, which can ensure allocation of 
local expenditures according to national PRSP priorities.  
Obviously, there is a clear trade-off between full-fledged political, adminis-
trative and fiscal decentralisation of sector responsibility and the PRSP ap-
proach. Therefore, a clear recommendation as to what exactly such a link 
should look like in order to not undermine the decentralisation process while 
at the same time ensuring the effective implementation of the Malawi PRSP 
will require careful research and extensive discussion of all stakeholders 
involved (including local government level). To strike the right balance be-
tween the two strategies is one of the numerous difficult tasks  the Govern-
ment of Malawi needs to tackle over the next years. 
Improved donor coordination  
The government should take the lead in donor coordination. The responsibil-
ity of coordination, however, should not be left to the Malawian side alone. 
Donors should encourage, support and actively empower the GoM to take its 
lead in donor coordination by coordinating their activities as well as by har-
monising their modes of aid delivery and reporting  
Better alignment of donor support to Malawian PFM processes 
In order to strengthen Malawian institutions and the formal PFM processes 
and to reduce uncertainty in the system, donors should align their procedures 
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more consequently to the Malawian PFM processes. This is especially impor-
tant for the adherence to timeframes and deadlines throughout the budget 
cycle, particularly in the budget planning and execution phase. 
Binding medium-term commitments to improve the predictability of donor 
funding 
Considering the dependency of Malawi on donor funding, donors should 
make detailed, binding and long-term pledges. This will increase the credibil-
ity and relevance of the budget as cash shortfalls in approved budget votes 
can be avoided. Apart from that it enables sound medium-term planning. 
Pooling technical assistance for capacity development for PFM 
Donors play an important role in financing and organising capacity develop-
ment. However, donor-financed capacity building measures are not always 
well communicated to and coordinated with activities of the Malawian gov-
ernment. The Department of Human Resource Management and Develop-
ment (DHRMD) in the Office of the President does not have a comprehensive 
overview of ongoing training measures, as donors tend to cooperate directly 
with sector ministries or the local government level, in part deliberately cir-
cumventing the DHRMD. In order to improve coordination and align donor 
activities to Malawian priorities, donors should pool their technical assistance 
and support a comprehensive and prioritised catalogue of systematic training 
measures that are closely connected to PFM reforms and instruments. The 
pooled fund should be under the supervision of the DHRMD. For this pur-
pose, capacity building in the DHRMD might be necessary. 
New modalities to deliver capacity building for local authorities  
Donors should consider pooling resources to support capacity development of 
local authorities directly, especially for the local level, where the need for 
capacity development is even more pressing and uncoordinated donor ap-
proaches have undermined existing capacity in the past. For this purpose 
establishing a fully or partly donor financed mini-basket based on an elabo-
rated and prioritised catalogue of capacity building activities should be con-
sidered. These activities should be (i) systematically linked to PFM reforms, 
(ii) evenly distributed among districts and (iii) executed in a timely manner. 
They should include measures for both the executive and legislative branch 
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of government. At the same time there is a need to effectively address spe-
cific and sometimes very different capacity development needs of individual 
districts. While MoLGRD should assume the overall responsibility for the 
mini-basket, the management of funds and activities could be assigned to the 
NLGFC. 
Strengthened support for the National Assembly to improve budget 
 scrutiny and control 
Malawi’s National Assembly is severely underfunded. Currently very few 
donors are supporting the National Assembly, not least because in the light of 
modern development approaches such as PRSPs, budget support and other 
programme-based approaches most international donors tend to focus on the 
executive. In order to increase parliament’s relevance and its ability to con-
tribute to a sound PFM by executing its oversight functions, it is recom-
mended that more development assistance be directed towards the National 
Assembly. In order to minimize coordination needs, it is suggested that donor 
agencies pool their funds and delegate the programme implementation to one 
lead donor. This could be done in a similar fashion as DFID is currently con-
tributing funds to the CIDA-run parliamentary programme. 
Provision of equipment and financial resources for administrative  
processes 
One important capacity shortcoming in Malawi’s PFM system is insufficient 
equipment and financial resources in government institutions, especially at 
local level. Donors should continue to assist local authorities by providing 
equipment. For good reasons, maintenance of equipment is not always a 
priority for donors, who argue that in the interest of sustainability recurrent 
costs of development investments should be covered by the recipient gov-
ernment. However, it must be kept in mind that local authorities often simply 
do not have enough own resources to cover operational costs and central 
government may have few incentives to provide the necessary resources. 
Therefore, there is a role for donors to ensure that the responsibility for op-
erational costs is clearly assigned and enforced. Nonetheless, as the resource 
envelope of local government institutions is usually thin, donors should also 
consider financing recurrent costs by providing some form of budgetary sup-
port. Donors should also take into account that spare parts for special equip-
ment and technologies are not always available or affordable in Malawi. They 
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should therefore rely more on domestic procurement in order to allow local 
authorities to acquire equipment and technologies that are locally available.  
Reduced salary gap between the public sector and private entities or 
 donor organisations for middle-level staff  
High staff turnover in Malawian government and oversight institutions both 
at central and local level is an important factor that hampers the PFM process. 
This is partly due to relatively low salaries for middle-level staff. Therefore, 
it is important to reduce the salary gap between the public sector and employ-
ees working for the private sector or donor organisations in order to attract 
and retain qualified employees in the public sector. The GoM should continue 
to implement the Civil Service Pay and Employment Reform to render mid-
dle-level positions in public institutions more attractive for qualified person-
nel. 
Reduced payment of allowances and their transformation into a fixed 
component of civil servants´ salaries 
The payment of allowances for the attendance of workshops and meetings is 
a common way to top up salaries in Malawi’s civil service. Allowances were 
initially intended to improve the performance of civil servants, but in fact this 
system creates perverse incentives and delivers an opaque salary scheme. 
Therefore, the government should consider raising salaries by fixed sums and 
in exchange reducing allowances to a refund of the actual cost of transport 
and catering. Donors should support this policy and avoid creating adverse 
incentives by paying high allowances for workshop attendance. 
Better incentives for civil servants to work in remote areas 
The GoM faces serious difficulties to attract qualified staff for jobs in remote 
districts, where living and working conditions are poor. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to create more and better incentives for civil servants to work in these 
districts (e.g. salary top-up for remote areas or other compensatory measures) 
in order to compensate for less attractive living conditions.  
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Merit-based and transparent recruitment and promotion of civil servants  
Insufficient professional knowledge of PFM procedures and instruments is 
identified as a relevant disturbing factor for PFM in Malawi. In order to guar-
antee that adequately qualified candidates are recruited for vacancies, the 
government should ensure that recruitment und promotion of civil servants is 
transparent and strictly merit-based. Donors should pay particular attention to 
this as well and follow up on government’s commitments. 
Generating multiplier effects for sustainable capacity development  
The introduction of new PFM tools should always be accompanied by sys-
tematic, long-term and timely capacity development. It has to be ensured that 
the capacity of institutions is developed and not only the capacity of indi-
viduals. This involves establishing mechanisms to disseminate specific 
knowledge acquired by individuals to all relevant stakeholders in order to 
preserve the gained knowledge and capacity for the institution.  
Improved coordination between MoF and MEPD  
The coordination between MoF and MEPD is not always satisfactory, in 
particular with regard to ensuring the consistency of the PSIP and the capital 
budget. The government should consider establishing a mechanism that guar-
antees that the first year of the PSIP and the capital budget are consistent. 
This is a necessary precondition to increase transparency within the system, 
enforce the accountability of MoF and MEPD and to ensure that national 
investment projects are really selected according to national priorities as 
stated in the MPRSP. For this it is necessary, for example, that sector minis-
tries follow formal procedures in submitting their proposals to MEPD and not 
only to MoF. 
Better involvement of local stakeholders in the recruitment of District 
Secretariat staff to strengthen accountability between local entities 
The recruitment process for key positions is still very long, unpredictable and 
centralised, above all for the local government level. In the medium term, it 
may prove useful to increase the participation of local authorities in the selec-
tion of candidates for District Secretariats so that candidates feel more ac-
countable to the local stakeholders. This could be achieved, for example, by 
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changing the composition of the recruitment commission in the MoLGRD, 
giving more weight to local stakeholders such as the DC and representatives 
of the DEC and DA. In the long run, the GoM could take into consideration 
whether responsibilities for the recruitment of local level staff should be 
transferred to the districts in order to reduce bureaucracy and increase the 
accountability of local civil servants to local government. 
Performance based resource allocation to local assemblies  
Local assemblies that are more committed to own revenue generation should 
benefit from central government transfers, based on the “performance ma-
trix”, created by the NLGFC. This benchmark tool can be used to strengthen 
the awareness and creativity among local assemblies to become more 
autonomous in financial matters.  
Donors support for revenue generation capacity at local level 
More attention needs be paid to revenue generating abilities of the state and 
the rural districts in particular. One possible option to broaden the local reve-
nue base would be to assist districts with the costly and time-consuming 
activity of valuing and rating areas to levy property tax.   
Better alignment of donor support to DDPs 
Donors financing projects at district level must make sure not to undermine 
local structures and procedures. In particular, local planning procedures have 
to be taken serious. As a rule, only projects emerging from local District 
Development Plans should receive substantial donor support.  
Consequent support to and use of the new Local Development Fund  
Existing financing mechanisms to fund local development projects should be 
consolidated into the proposed Local Development Fund (LDF) with the 
objective to  
— support planning and management of development resources at the as-
sembly and community levels; 
— provide resources which ensure that development investment respond to 
the priority development needs; 
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— facilitate the implementation of the National Decentralisation Policy; 
and 
— enhance the accountability of local authorities to their constituents (cf. 
GFA 2005).  
All donors supporting Malawi’s decentralisation policy should support the 
establishment and implementation of the LDF and align their activities and 
procedures accordingly. 
Continued donor support to the NLGFC in order to ensure effectived  
decentralisation 
The NLGFC is an appropriate institution for supporting local government in 
financial management issues, capacity building and local development plan-
ning. Its staff is highly committed and adequately qualified. Therefore, do-
nors should support the work of NLGFC in a coordinated manner with a 
medium to long-term perspective. The most pressing need of NLGFC is addi-
tional manpower rather than technical training of existing staff. Taking a 
medium to long-term perspective in supporting NLGFC requires that regular 
evaluations are carried out to enquire whether the structure and responsibili-
ties of NLGFC are still adequate for facilitating decentralisation or whether 
they have to be adapted. At the same time, it is critical that donor’s support to 
NLGFC is evaluated regularly and, if necessary, adapted to changing needs.  
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Annex 1: Methodology 
This annex presents the research design and schedule, including methods of 
data collection and analysis this study is based on. It provides some back-
ground information on grounded theory and introduces the theoretical and 
analytical background of the study.  
The literature that exists on PRS implementation, decentralisation, and PFM 
in the development context is already vast and continues to grow. However, 
the existing literature exhibits three major shortcomings that should be ad-
dressed in this study:  
1) Most literature to date addresses the issues at hand separately rather 
than looking at them as interrelated subjects. PFM at local government 
level is particularly often left out. 
2) Most authors focus on the technical dimension of PFM and – albeit to a 
lesser extent – of decentralisation without taking into account the politi-
cal environment in which these processes are taking place.  
3) Most of this literature takes a normative and conceptual rather than an 
empirical approach.  
The research question of this study already indicates that it primarily intends 
to address the first of these three shortcomings. However, the focus is on the 
PFM process as such. The specific context in which this occurs is decentrali-
sation and the PRSP implementation. They are relevant for this study but 
cannot be analysed in more detail. The strong focus on PFM at the local gov-
ernment level is intended to offer a new perspective that is often neglected by 
analyses of PFM systems and decentralisation in developing countries.  
The way the second and the third shortcoming are addressed is closely linked 
to the analytical framework and the research approach of this study. With 
regard to the second shortcoming, this study explicitly takes the political 
dimension of PRS implementation, decentralisation and PFM reform into 
account. All these are processes to which the redistribution of power, respon-
sibilities and resources is central. In order to understand why certain organ-
isational and procedural changes work while others do not, it is essential to 
understand the context and the involved actors’ perceptions and interests. 
Therefore, analytical categories such as political commitment and incentives 
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are employed, in addition to others, such as capacity or the distribution of 
responsibilities.  
The third shortcoming is the subject of a large body of literature that lays out 
conceptual and/or normative frameworks for PRS implementation, decen-
tralisation and PFM respectively. These documents are often very sophisti-
cated but equally often fail to acknowledge the specific contextual conditions 
within a particular country and to adapt the proposed strategies to this par-
ticular situation. In order to avoid this shortcoming, this study consists of a 
detailed case study on the interrelations of PRS implementation, decentralisa-
tion, and PFM in a particular developing country (Malawi). However, general 
conclusions that apply to other developing countries going through similar 
processes are carefully drawn from this case study.  
There are two reasons for examining these shortcomings. First, the study 
seeks to contribute to the current debate in international development coop-
eration. Second, by arriving at a better understanding of the issues under 
research, it aims at informing about relevant problems for decision-makers 
from the government and donor side. 
Research design  
The case study approach is used as overall design for this study as mentioned 
in the main text. As the interrelations between PRS implementation, decen-
tralisation and PFM are very complex, the best results can be gained by 
studying a particular case in detail. Nevertheless, the overall aim of this study 
is to identify typical challenges and to arrive at careful generalisations, which 
could apply to similar processes in other developing countries as well. See 
Chapter 4 for the reasons why Malawi was selected as a case and how the 
two districts for the fieldwork were identified. The research project was di-
vided into three broad phases: the preparation of the preliminary report in 
Bonn (14 weeks), fieldwork in Malawi (11 weeks) and finalisation of the 
report in Bonn (4 weeks). The second phase in Malawi can be subdivided into 
the periods in Lilongwe, in the districts, for data analysis and again in  
Lilongwe for the presentation and discussion of preliminary findings (see 
Table A1). 
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During the first phase, relevant organisations in Malawi and Germany had 
been contacted and the first expert interviews with staff of German develop-
ment agencies were conducted (for a list of sources, including people inter-
viewed, see Annex 2). A representative of the Malawian partner organisation, 
the National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC), accompanied 
this phase in parts.  
In phases 2 to 5, fieldwork was carried out in Malawi at central government 
level (Lilongwe) and local government level (two districts). Furthermore, the 
collected data was analysed and preliminary findings presented and discussed 
with stakeholders in Malawi. The methods used for data collection as well as 
analysis are introduced below.   
Phase 6 comprises further detailed analysis of data for individual chapters as 
well as the drafting, presentation and discussion of the results.  
Methods of data collection 
— The methods used for conducting this case study are mainly qualitative 
in nature. The most important methods of data collection were the fol-
lowing:  
— semi-structured interviews (expert interviews, ethnographic interviews) 
— literature and official document review 
— non-participant observations (e.g. assembly meetings) 
— informal conversations 
The most important source of data were semi-structured interviews with vary-
ing degrees of openness. The interviews range from more open ethnographic 
to expert interviews. As the actors interviewed all come from very different 
context there were no standard interview guidelines. Based on the results 
from the preliminary report and the analytical focus of the study, teams of 
two to three people developed individual interview guidelines for every per-
son in the days before the interview. These guidelines covered the responsi-
bility each person had in the relevant fields of PFM, decentralisation and 
PRSP. There was also space for more open comments and assessments of 
interviewees. In the course of the research process, the guidelines increas-
ingly included open questions or new issues that have come up in other inter-
views. In total 141 interviews have been conducted (see annex 2). In most 
cases, the interviews were conducted in teams of two people. While one per-
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son conducted the interview, the other person took extensive notes. Based on 
these notes an electronic transcript has been produced as soon after the inter-
view as possible. For minimising mistakes the person who conducted the 
interview cross-checked the transcript and if necessary, added information. 
Official documents as well as academic, policy and ‘grey’ literature are used 
as the second source of data. These documents were reviewed and analysed. 
Non-participatory observations and informal conversations complement the 
data gained through interviews and documents. Although these methods have 
only been used to a limited extent, they provided valuable information that 
could not have been gained otherwise. Observation reports and conversation 
transcripts were produced on every event.  
Interview partners as well as the documents come from various contexts, 
among them politicians and administrative personnel at various government 
levels, staff of multi- and bilateral donor agencies, Non-Governmental Or-
ganisations (NGOs), the media, traditional authorities and ordinary citizens 
(see Annex 2 for a list of people interviewed). Research was conducted in 
close coordination with the Malawian counterpart organisation, the National 
Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC) as well as GTZ experts 
based in Germany and Malawi. Both, NLGFC and GTZ have been very sup-
portive by introducing the research team to various actors as well as arrang-
ing contacts and appointments. 
Methods of qualitative data analysis 
The data was analysed qualitatively using theoretical coding and triangulation 
techniques (see Box A1). For coding and organising the large amounts of 
data collected, the research team used the software Atlas/ti® for qualitative 
data analysis, which is based on the coding principles of grounded theory.  
Atlas/ti ® allows attaching analytical codes that have been developed accord-
ing to the phenomena that occur in the text to these text segments. The pro-
cess of coding is already the first step of the analysis. The research team 
started by coding transcripts together, then split into groups of two or three 
and later also coded transcripts individually.  
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Box A 1: Triangulation and Theoretical Coding 
Triangulation means that data are compared with each other that have been gener-
ated on the same case or issue either by different researchers (investigator triangula-
tion), by using different methods for data collection (between-method triangulation) 
or by using different kinds of data (data triangulation) (Flick 2000). Triangulation 
serves three different purposes in qualitative analysis. It helps to validate the data to 
some extent, it supports the careful generalisation based on the data and finally, it 
helps to differentiate the analytical findings.  
The process of ‘theoretical coding’ also involves the constant comparison of data 
for the purpose of analysis. ‘Coding’ refers to the analytical process of structuring 
raw data in categories of analysis by attaching codes to certain sections of text, e.g. 
transcripts. Although these codes can also be deducted from theory, an open qualita-
tive analysis usually starts with developing codes at an analytical level according to 
what phenomena can be found in the text. Three different steps of coding are usually 
distinguished in grounded theory (Strauss 1998; Böhm 2000):  
• Open coding: The researcher starts with this mode of coding. It is the proce-
dure by which preliminary categories are developed based on the constant 
comparison and examination of data. The same codes are attached to the same 
phenomena and attributes that constitute the phenomena are defined. Open 
coding is used to structure the data into categories.  
• Axial coding: The researcher continues to code but by paying particular atten-
tion to the relations between selected categories. Categories and sub-categories 
are identified and related to each. A preliminary theoretical framework begins 
to emerge from this system of categories.  
• Selective coding: The researcher identifies and concentrates on one or more 
‘core categories’ and relates all the other categories to them. This mode of cod-
ing often contains a significant refinement of the other categories. The core 
categories identified usually form the central concepts of the analysis.  
Researchers often switch from one mode of coding to another during analysis. Fur-
thermore, coding starts as early as the first data is collected, data collection and 
analysis are therefore not separate processes but connected with each other in a 
circular process. In the course of data, a network of categories develops, ‘grounded’ 
in empirical data, but forms an analysis at a more theoretical level. 
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If the process of coding is finished, it is possible to see all statements and 
comments that various stakeholders have made on a certain phenomena (that 
was analytically coded accordingly). This allows for a very systematic and 
detailed comparison of statements. The quotations for every code can be 
looked at and compared with each other. However, at the same time it is still 
possible to go back to the original transcript and see in which context the 
person concerned made this statement. In the process of looking at the quota-
tions for each code, one can develop the various dimensions as well as the 
reasons and effects of a particular phenomena that has been coded. The re-
search team decided to draw networks on the various relations it found. 
Again, it is very helpful to conduct this analysis, which already involves a 
certain degree of analytical discussion in teams. For most of the central 
codes,  the quotations were discussed by the team. By doing so, it was possi-
ble to control each other’s interpretations and analysis of data and develop a 
shared understanding of the data.  
After or even while analysing each code the team also began to draw interre-
lations between the various categories. The whole process of qualitative data 
analysis is thus an analytical bottom-up process. It starts with very concrete 
statements and by comparing, differentiating and interrelating them ends up 
at a much higher analytical level. Inductive as well as deductive elements are 
combined with each other in this process. The findings that are presented in 
this report are all based on this systematic and detailed process of qualitative 
analysis. It is important to keep in mind that the examples or concrete cases 
only illustrate the analytical findings. They do not have the function to 
‘prove’ the findings, but rather to make the reader understand the information 
easier. The analytical findings themselves are based on a detailed analysis of 
the data in its entirety.  
Analytical framework 
Before the team went to Malawi to do fieldwork there, it developed a rough 
analytical framework to guide its analysis, based on the preliminary results 
from the literature review. This framework proved to be useful. Therefore, it 
is briefly outlined here. In a first step, the tam decided that the political econ-
omy of transition should serve as the theoretical background for the analysis. 
The second step was to develop some preliminary ideas and categories that 
might be relevant for analysing the data in Malawi. 
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The political economy of transition  
Malawi is a country in transition. The first democratic multiparty elections 
only took place in 1994, after almost 30 years of authoritarian rule under 
Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda. Societies in political transition share a number of key 
features all over the world. The features are, for example, unconsolidated and 
young democratic institutions, administrative staff with little experience with 
working in democratic and legal-bureaucratic environments, high expecta-
tions of the population for material as well as legal improvements and a lack 
of ‘democratic culture’. Another key characteristic is the high dynamic of 
formal and informal bargaining for power and interests. ‘Old elites’ try to 
retain or transform their positions, while ‘new elites’ try to join or replace the 
old elites. Political conditions in transition countries are often shaped by 
rapidly changing coalitions, the sudden accumulation of power or the loss 
thereof by individuals and groups. Furthermore, in recent years academic 
work on institutions and path-dependency has made clear that new structures 
and procedures do not just replace the previous ones. As Bratton and van de 
Walle (1997) conclude in their study on transition processes in sub-Saharan 
Africa: “the institutional heritage of neopatrimonial rule has shaped regime 
transitions in much of Africa” (Bratton / van de Walle 1997, 269).  
Processes such as PRS implementation, decentralisation and the reform of 
PFM imply decisions about the redistribution of power, responsibilities and 
resources. As this study explicitly takes the political dimension of these pro-
cesses into account, the theoretical background of the political economy of 
transition is highly relevant, although it is not the main focus. 
Analytical approach and preliminary categories 
A study on the major challenges in PFM at central and local government 
level for implementing the MPRSP is a study on institutional and organisa-
tional change and on the factors that inhibit this change. Based on the theo-
retical background provided above, it seemed to be promising to focus on 
actors and institutions for analysing PFM practice and its change – or the lack 
thereof. While actors can be individuals or groups who have the ability to act 
in a coherent manner, institutions can generally be defined as structures of 
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expectation that determine what in a given society is regarded as appropriate 
social action and decision-making (Hasse / Krücken 1999, 7).49 
In order to understand and explain how actors act and how institutions enable 
and restrict them in their social action, the research team identified several 
preliminary categories as particularly promising for analysis. Before taking 
up with field work in Malawi these were following ones: capacity (human, 
technical), resources (financial, material), interests (political, material), for-
mal institutions and procedures (overlap, lack of coordination), information 
flows, political commitment, informal institutions (rules, actors, etc.). How-
ever, as the genuine development of categories from the data is a constitutive 
element of the chosen qualitative research style, these categories only pro-
vided some guidance without structuring the process of analysis too strongly. 
Most categories identified turned out to be useful for analysing the data, 
however, not always in the way initially thought of. Nevertheless, new cate-
gories were also developed, based on the data. 
                                                          
49  This definition includes organisations that have significant norm-setting power but primar-
ily focuses on formal as well as informal rules and expectations.  
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Annex 2 
Table A 2: List of Interview Partners 
Name Position Institution 
Stakeholders at Central Government Level 
Banda, Victor Charles Assistant Director ACB 
Liwonga, Arthur 
Deputy Director for Hu-
man Resource Develop-
ment 
DHRMD 
Mogra, Ismail 
Human Resource Plan-
ning Officer 
DHRMD 
Mjojo, Mr. 
Director of Finance and 
Administration 
DS 
Mtemba, Peter IT Manager DS 
Likwingi, Friday Principal Accountant 
Kamusu Central 
Hospital Lilongwe 
Vmasanda, Harod 
Senior Assistant Human 
Resource Management 
Officer 
Kamusu Central 
Hospital Lilongwe 
Mwenpin, Mr. Director LASCOM 
Chilunga, Kizito J.R. 
Research, Information 
Officer 
MALGA 
Khungwa, Blessings W.B. Training Officer MALGA 
Mughogho, Brussels PRA/IEC Officer MASAF 
Kubwalo, Hudson Wenji 
Development Communi-
cation Specialist 
MASAF 
Botolo, Ben 
Monitoring and Evalua-
tion Division 
MEPD 
Kambauwa, Charles Head Planning Division MEPD 
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Nyirongo, Clement Deputy Chief Economist MEPD 
Bonga, Mr. 
Controller of Human 
Resource Management 
MoE 
Kachingwe, Mr. Chief Accountant MoE 
Makalande, Mathew 
Deputy Director of Plan-
ning 
MoE 
Mwale, Mr. Director of Planning MoE 
Nkhoma, Mr. Director of Finance MoE 
Nthenda, Mr. Training Division Staff MoE 
Sumais, Mr. Deputy Controller MoE 
Chadimba, Mr. 
Deputy Accountant Gen-
eral 
MoF 
Chingeni, Margeret 
Controller of Human 
Resources 
MoF 
Mphande, Julie 
Director for Debt & Aid 
Management 
MoF 
Nyasulu, Alfred 
Assistant Director Dis-
bursement & Debt Servic-
ing 
MoF 
Perebamoyo, Richard Principal Budget Officer MoF 
Sitima-wina, Ted 
Director Economic Af-
fairs Division 
MoF 
N.N. Deputy Budget Director MoF 
Araru, Trish 
Health Planning Techni-
cal Officer, SWAPs Se-
cretariat 
Advisor to the MoH, 
SWAPs Secretariat 
MoH 
Kalanje, Mr. Director of Planning MoH 
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Mayesa, Mr. Director of Finance MoH 
O’Carroll, Michael Senior Technical Advisor MoH 
Watchi, Mr. Human Resource Officer MoH 
Bota, Hastings Chief M&E Officer MoLGRD 
Ligomeka, Mr. 
Director of Local Gov-
ernment Services 
MoLGRD 
Samute, Willie W. Principal Secretary MoLGRD 
Sikwese, Luckie Kanya-
mula  
Deputy Director Planning 
and Development 
MoLGRD 
Kalongonda, Mr. Auditor General NAO 
N.N. 
Auditor General Northern 
Region 
NAO 
Chimango, Louis MP National Assembly 
Kalebe, Teddy Chair BFC National Assembly 
Kapenda, Henderson M. MP Dedza West National Assembly 
Malamba, Steven 
Chair Parliamentary 
Committee on Education 
National Assembly 
Chilungo, Adil 
Finance and Administra-
tion Manager 
NLGFC 
Kadewere, Felix 
Senior Planning and 
Economic Advisor 
NLGFC 
Mbewe, Sidi District Desk Officer NLGFC 
Mfune, Mr. District Desk Officer NLGFC 
Mwamondwe, 
Syak’inongwa 
District Desk Officer NLGFC 
Chikoti, Ms. Regional Officer NSO 
Machinjili, Charles 
Commissioner of Statis-
tics 
NSO 
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Local Stakeholders Dedza 
Kalino, E.D. Chairman 
District Assembly 
Dedza 
Kamunga, Mr. 
Chair of Education Com-
mittee 
District Assembly 
Dedza 
Kanyumbu, D. R. 
Chair of Development 
Committee 
District Assembly 
Dedza 
Sosten, Peter Vice Chairman 
District Assembly 
Dedza 
Chiwayo, Peter 
Revenue Collector Ma-
yani Sub Office 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Chibwe, Joseph UNV Planning Advisor  
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Jere, Masawani District Commissioner 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Kumwanje, Samual 
Justification Assistant, 
Department of Finance 
MASAF Dedza 
District/ District 
Secretariat Dedza 
Kumwenda, Oscar Director of Public Works 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Livuza, Collins 
Technical Supervisor 
Roads 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Mhone, Charles G.P. Director of Finance 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Mumba, Patricia 
Director of Administra-
tion 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Mzamu, Felix F. Director of Planning 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Santhe, H. Internal Auditor 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
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Thole, Pamela UNV Financial Advisor 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
N.N. Market Agent Mayani 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Kachindamoto, Thereza Senior Chief in Mtakataka 
Traditional Authority 
Dedza 
Chitedze, Doris 
Acting District Education 
Manager 
District Education 
Office Dedza 
Lungama, Mike Joan Headmaster 
Elia Chimtengo 
Primary School 
Dedza District 
Kankota, Florence Sister in Charge 
Mtendere Health 
Centre Dedza Dis-
trict 
Mwakasungula, Dr. District Health Officer 
District Hospital 
Dedza 
   
Local Stakeholders Rumphi 
Chihana, Peter 
Councillor, Vice Chair of 
the District Assembly 
District Assembly 
Rumphi 
Chisi, Mr. 
Councillor (nominated- 
business) 
District Assembly 
Rumphi 
Gondwe, Dominc 
Chair of the District As-
sembly 
District Assembly 
Rumphi 
Gondwe, Patrick 
Councillor; Chair of 
Development Committee 
District Assembly 
Rumphi 
Kumuwenda, Khumbi 
Councillor, Chair of 
Finance Committee 
District Assembly 
Rumphi 
Mfune, Gofrida 
Councillor women affairs 
(nominated) 
District Assembly 
Rumphi 
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Mnthali, Simeon 
Councillor, Chair of 
Education Committee 
District Assembly 
Rumphi 
Gausi, Wezi Director of Planning 
District Secretariat 
Rumphi 
Longwe, Mr. 
Director of Administra-
tion  
District Secretariat 
Rumphi 
Lupwayi, Moses Data Entry Clerk 
District Secretariat 
Rumphi  
Mambo, James Internal Auditor 
District Secretariat 
Rumphi 
Muhango, Mr. 
Acting Director of Fi-
nance 
District Secretariat 
Rumphi 
Nyrenda, Mr. 
Market Master, Rumphi 
Boma 
District Secretariat 
Rumphi 
Phiri, Harold Director of Public Works 
District Secretariat 
Rumphi 
Simwaka, Rodney District Commissioner District Secretariat Rumphi 
Chapinduka, Themba S. 
T. A. Sub-Chief in Tcharo Area 
Traditional Authority 
Rumphi 
Chiculamayembe, 
Themba Ra Ma Themba 
Senior Chief Traditional Authority 
Rumphi 
N.N. Sub-Chief in Bolero, 
Rumphi District 
Traditional Authority 
Rumphi 
5 Committee Members Village Development 
Committee (VDC) 
VDC Chitimba, 
Rumphi District 
25 Committee Members ADC, VDC  ADC, VDC 
Zolokere, Rumphi 
District 
5 Committee Members ADC, VDC ADC, VDC Chin-
yolo & Bumba Tim-
bambika, Rumphi 
District 
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6 Committee Members VDC VDC Nkomkos & 
Kakolora  
6 Committee Members ADC, VDC ADC, VDC Mzokoto 
& Bale, Rumphi 
District 
Chirambo, Mr. District Education Man-
ager 
District Education 
Officer 
N.N. Head Teacher Zolokere Primary 
School  
Msiska, Mr. Education Division Man-
ager 
Education Division 
Office, Mzuzu 
6 Committee Members Primary School Commit-
tee 
Chitimba Primary 
School 
Chavinda, Bernard District Health Officer District Hospital 
Rumphi 
Harawa, Kalulet Accountant District Hospital 
Rumphi 
Msiska, Edwin C. Health Inspector/ Assis-
tant Environmental Health 
Officer 
Zolokere Hospital 
Sichinga, Steven S. Senior Medical Assistant Zolokere Hospital 
Mbewe, Aficki Chair Young Politicians 
Walita, Moir Principal Secretary Young Politicians 
   
Local Stakeholders Lilongwe 
Sibande, Mr. Director of Finance City Council Li-
longwe 
Msewa, Edwin Director of  Planning District Secretariat 
Local 
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Donors 
de Waal, Jan Project Manager CIDA 
Mothes, Dr. Surgeon, Central Hospital 
Zomba 
CIM 
Siegmund, Frank Technical Advisor, 
Rumphi District Secre-
tariat 
DED 
Whitworth, Alan Economist DFID 
Pons, Jerôme Head of Section, Econom-
ics and Public Affairs 
EU 
Zambezi, Feston Project Manager, Micro 
Projects 
EU 
Goertler, Wilfried Programme Coordinator GTZ 
Immink, Bodo Programme Coordinator, 
Malawi German Pro-
gramme for Democratic 
Decentralisation 
(MGPDD) 
GTZ 
Kruse, Claus Consultant GTZ 
Latim Lawrence Fiscal Decentralisation 
Advisor 
GTZ 
Pritze-Aliassime, Susanne Programme Advisor GTZ 
Scek, Aues Macroeconomic Advisor 
MEPD 
GTZ 
Joana Henseler Macroeconomic Advisor 
MEPD 
GTZ 
Mhango, Bhatupe Acting National Co-
ordinator 
Konrad-Adenauer-
Foundation e.V. 
Rustad, Asgeir Diplomat at the Norwe-
gian Embassy 
Norad 
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Chanza, Bill Programme Officer De-
centralisation 
UNCDF 
Kulemeka, Peter Assistant Resident Repre-
sentative 
UNDP 
Kimes, Christina E. Senior Operations Officer World Bank 
M’Buka, Francis Senior Agricultural Ser-
vices Specialist 
World Bank 
Nucifora, Antonio Country Economist World Bank 
   
NGOs/CSOs 
Mandere, Hetherwick Deputy Programme Man-
ager 
Concern Universal, 
Dedza Sustainable 
Livelihoods Pro-
gramme 
Kebabe, Donald Assistant Coordinator CSCQBE 
Nsapato, Limbani Coalition Partner CSCQBE 
Bamusi, Mavuto Nelson Director of Programmes MEJN 
Kampanikiza, Gelald Member of Committee MEJN, Dedza Chapter 
Kwataine, Martha Tazio-
na 
Programme Manager, 
Budget Participation 
Initiative 
MEJN 
Maida, Hope Member of Committee MEJN, Dedza Chapter 
Nyirenda, Kenneth Secretariat NGO Network Dedza 
Isaac, Sangweni District Coordinator Save the Children, 
Dedza 
Chilumpha, Sosten HIV/AIDS coordinator Self Help Interna-
tional Dedza 
Nchingama, Patrick Agricultural Development 
Officer 
Self Help Interna-
tional Dedza 
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Informal Conversations 
Soleo, Mr. House Keeper Chef’s Pride Hotel 
Rumphi 
Kalimbuka, George Police Officer Community Policing 
Project 
Kunga, Ruth Chair, Health and Devel-
opment Committee 
District Assembly 
Rumphi 
District Secretariat Staff Finance Committee 
(Revenue Collection 
Supervision, Mayani 
Market) 
District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Jere, Masawani District Commissioner District Secretariat 
Dedza 
Mangartz, Thomas Chargé d’affaires German Embassy 
Böhringer, Gabriele Country Director GTZ 
Office Malawi 
GTZ 
Nyasulu, Gloria Administrative Secretary GTZ 
Silungwe, Mr. Health Manager Health Center 
Nyrenda, Rumphi 
District 
   
Observations 
Area Development Com-
mittee (ADC) Meeting 
ADC Bolero, Rumphi 
District 
Full Assembly Meeting District Assembly Dedza District 
(29.03.2005) 
Human Resource Com-
mittee 
District Assembly Dedza District 
(11.03.2005) 
Development Committee 
Meeting 
District Assembly Rumphi District 
(16.03.2005) 
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Full Assembly Meeting  District Assembly Rumphi District 
(18.03.2005) 
Full Assembly Meeting  District Assembly Rumphi District 
(19.03.2005) 
Full Assembly Meeting  District Assembly Rumphi District 
(23.03.2005) 
   
Interview Partners in Germany 
Förster, Andreas Desk Officer Malawi BMZ 
Scholz, Anke Advisory Project „State 
and Democracy, Public 
Finance Reform“ 
GTZ 
Witt, Matthias Head Advisory Project 
„State and Democracy, 
Public Finance Reform“ 
GTZ 
Hansert, Christoph Project Manager InWEnt 
Siege, Hannes Consultant InWEnt 
Huber, Isabel Senior Project Manager KfW  
von Schwerin, Philip Project Manager Educa-
tion 
KfW  
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Annex 3: 
Sources of Local Revenue Mobilisation 
Ground Rent  
The ground rent is a flat tax on land that is leased from the government. This 
ground rent is payable on all leased land irrespective of agriculture, commer-
cial and residential use. Ground rent is mostly collected from agricultural 
estates. The Ministry of Lands administers this rent. 
Fees and Service Charges 
Local assemblies levy fees for services rendered to the local populace. These 
fees and service charges include the following: 
 
Box A 2: Local Fees and Service Charges 
- Market fees 
- Marriage certificates 
- Ferry fees 
- Slaughter fees 
- Bus depot fees 
- Motor vehicle hire charges 
- Building plan fees/ plan scru-
tiny fees 
- Certificate of ownership fees 
- Application fees (Birth certifi-
cate) 
- House rent 
- Car park fees 
- Clinic fees 
- Sale of firewood 
- Plot development fees 
- Water charges 
- Garbage collection 
- Solid waste collection 
- Sewer charge 
- Fire brigade 
Business Licences 
Business licenses are levies in form of licenses from small and medium busi-
ness, groceries, retail and wholesale shops, garages, motels, private schools 
and clinics. The Local Assemblies collect these licenses fees from Malawian 
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owned businesses. For foreign owned business the central government col-
lects the licence fees through the Ministry of Trade and Private Sector Devel-
opment. 
Commercial Undertakings 
Local Assemblies also directly participate in commercial undertakings. These 
typically include operating rest houses, bars, restaurants and taverns.  
Source: Decentralisation Secretariat (2005, 2–3) 
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Annex 4:  
Map of Malawi 
 
Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin 
 
  
 
 
 Publications of the German Development Institute 
Book Series with Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
Neubert, Susanne / Waltina Scheumann / Annette van Edig / Walter Huppert (Hrsg.): 
Integriertes Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM): Ein Konzept in die Pra-
xis überführen, p. 314 ., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1111-1 
Messner, Dirk / Imme Scholz (Hrsg.): Zukunftsfragen der Entwicklungspolitik,  
p. 410,  Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1005-0 
Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen: Armutsorientierte landwirtschaftliche und ländliche 
Entwicklung, p. 342, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-0555-3 
Liebig, Klaus: Internationale Regulierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte und Wissens-
erwerb in Entwicklungsländern: Eine ökonomische Analyse, p. 233, Nomos,   
Baden-Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-2379-2 (Entwicklungstheorie und Ent-
wicklungspolitik 1) 
[Books may be ordered through bookshops.] 
Book Series with Routledge 
Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen: Poverty Orientated Agricultural and Rural Devel-
opment, p. 342, Routledge, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-415-36853-7 (Stud-
ies in Development and Society 12) 
[Books may be ordered through bookshops.] 
Book Series with Weltforum 
[This publication series was terminated; books may be ordered directly from the 
Institute so far still available.] 
Berichte und Gutachten (Reports and Working Papers) 
[Price: 9,63 Euro; may be ordered directly from the Institute or trough bookshops. 
This publication series was terminated and superseded by the new publication 
series “studies”, starting November 2004.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 New publication series from November 2004 
Studies 
26 Chahoud, Tatjana et al.: Corporate Social and Enviromental Responsibil-
ity in India – Assessing the UN Global Compact’s Role, p. 118, Bonn 
2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-336-3 
25 Horlemann, Lena / Susanne Neubert: Virtual Water Trade: A realistic 
concept for resolving the water crisis?, p. 118, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-
88985-335-6 (German Edition: ISBN 978-3-88985-327-1 – Studie 22) 
24 Grävingholt, Jörn / Claudia Hofmann / Stephan Klingebiel: Entwicklungs-
zusammenarbeit im Umgang mit nichtstaatlichen Gewaltakteueren, p. 122, 
Bonn 2007, ISBN: 978-3-88985-333-2 
23 Wiemann, Jürgen et al.: Vietnam – the 150th WTO-Member: Implications 
for Industrial Policy and Export Promotion, p. 184., Bonn 2006, ISBN-10: 
3-88985-330-7, ISBN-13: 978-3-88985-330-1 
22 Horlemann, Lena / Susanne Neubert: Virtueller Wasserhandel – Ein realis-
tisches Konzept zur Lösung der Wasserkrise?, p. 138, Bonn 2006, ISBN-10: 
3-88985-327-7, ISBN-13: 978-3-88985-327-1 
21 Scheumann, Waltina / Susanne Neubert (eds.): Transboundary Water Man-
agement in Africa: Challenges for Development Countries, p. 322, Bonn 
2006, ISBN10: 3-88985-326-9, ISBN-13: 978-3-88985-326-4 
20 Schmidt, Petra: Budget Support in the EC’s Development Cooperation,    
p. 130, Bonn 2006, ISBN-10: 3-88985-325-0, ISBN-13: 978-3-88985-325-7 
(German Edition: ISBN-3-8885-295-5 – Studies 10) 
19 Loewe, Markus: Middle East / North Africa and the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals: Implications for German Development Cooperation, p.219, 
Bonn 2006, ISBN-10: 3-88985-322-6, ISBN-13: 978-3-88985-322-6 
(German Edition: ISBN: 3-88985-294-7 – Studies 9) 
18 Liebig, Klaus: Auswirkungen des internationalen Patentregimes auf die 
Medikamentenproduktion und den Zugang zu Medikamenten in LDCs,     
p. 85, Bonn 2006, ISBN-10: 3-88985-321-8, ISBN-13: 978-3-88985-321-9 
17 Mürle, Holger: Regeln für die golbalisierte Wirtschaft – Eine empirische 
Analyse aus der Global Governance-Perspektive, p. 157, Bonn 2006, 
ISBN-10: 3-88985-320-X, ISBN-13: 978-3-89985-320-2 
[Price: 10,00 Euro; may be ordered directly from the Institute or through bookshops.] 
 Discussion Paper 
16/2007 Schirm, Stefan A.: Die Rolle Brasiliens in der globalen Strukturpolitik, p. 27, 
Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-352-3 
15/2007 Dussel Peters, Enrique / Günther Maihold: Die Rolle Mexikos in der globa-
len Strukturpolitik, p. 54, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-351-6 
14/2007 Müller, Inga: Perspectives for Germany’s Scientific-Technological Coopera-
tion with Subsaharan Africa, p. 54, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-350-9 
13/2007 Engel, Ulf: Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Nigeria –Eine Analyse aus der 
Ankerlandperspektive, p. 60, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-349-3 
12/2007 Neubert, Susanne: Poverty Oriented Irrigation Policy in Kenya: Empirical 
Results and Suggestions for Reform, p. 54, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-
348-6 
11/2007 Mürle, Holger: Towards a Division of Labour in European Development 
Cooperation: Case Studies, p. 51, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-347-9 
10/2007 Leiderer, Stefan / Peter Wolff: Public Financial Management als Beitrag zu 
Good Financial Governance, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-346-2 
  9/2007 Berensmann, Kathrin: Insolvenzrecht für Staaten: Ein Vergleich von ausge-
wählten Vorschlägen, p. 37, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-88985-343-1 
  8/2007 Stott, Noel: Negotiating in Practice What is Non-negotiable in Principle: 
Development Policy and Armed Non-State Actors, p. 30, Bonn 2007, ISBN 
978-3-88985-342-4 
  7/2007 Klingebiel, Stephan: Wie wirksam sind neue Modalitäten der Entwick-
lungszusammenarbeit? Erste Erfahrungen mit Programme-Based Approa-
ches (PBAs), p. 23, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-88985-341-7 
  6/2007 Mürle, Holger: Towards a Division of Labour in European Development Co-
operation: operational options, p. 68, Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-88985-340-0 
  5/2007 Berensmann, Kathrin: Dept Swaps: An Appropriate Instrument for Devel-
opment Policy? The Exemple of German Dept Swaps, 49 S., Bonn 2007, 
ISBN 9878-3-88985-339-4  (German Edition: ISBN 978-3-88985-337-0 – 
Discussion Paper 3/2007) 
  4/2007 Klingebiel, Stephan (ed.): Africa Agenda for 2007: Suggustions for the Ger-
man G8 and EU Council Presidencies, 149 S., Bonn 2007, ISBN 978-3-
88985-338-7 (German Edition: ISBN 978-3-88985 
[Price: 6,00 Euro; may be ordered directly from the Institute or through bookshops.] 
 Analysen und Stellungnahmen 
1/2007 Faust, Jörg: Staatlichkeit und Governance: Herausforderungen in Latein-
amerika, p. 4, ISSN 1434-8934 
2/2007 Grävingholt, Jörn: Staatlichkeit und Governance: Herausforderungen in 
Zentralasien und im Südkaukasus, p. 4, ISSN 1434-8934 
3/2007 Klingebiel, Stephan / Sven Grimm: Staatlichkeit und Governance: Herausfor-
derungen in Subsahara-Afrika, p. 4, ISSN 1434-8934 
4/2007 Schlumberger, Oliver: Staatlichkeit und Governance: Herausforderungen in 
Nahost und Nordafrika, p. 4, ISSN 1434-8934 
5/2007 Altenburg, Tilmann / Jochen Weikert: Entwicklungspolitische Dreiecksko-
operationen mit „Neuen Gebern“, p. 4, ISSN 1434-8934 
6/2007 Loewe, Markus: Eine demographische Dividende für die Entwicklungslän-
der? Konsequenzen des weltweiten Alterungsprozesses, p. 4, ISSN 1434-
8934 
 
Briefing Paper 
1/2007 Faust, Jörg: Statehood and Governance: Challenges in Latin America, p. 4, 
ISSN 1615-5483 
2/2007 Grävingholt, Jörn: Statehood and Governance: Challenges in Central Asia 
and the Southern Caucasus, p. 4, ISSN 1615-5483 
3/2007 Klingebiel, Stephan / Sven Grimm: Statehood and Governance: Challenges in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 4, ISSN 1615-5483 
4/2007 Schlumberger, Oliver: Statehood and Governance: Challenges in the Middle 
East and North Africa, p. 4, ISSN 1615-5483 
5/2007 Altenburg, Tilman / Jochen Weikert: Trilateral Development Cooperation 
with “New Donors”, p. 4, ISSN 1615-5483 
[Analysen und Stellungnahmen and Briefing Papers free of charge available.] 
A complete list of publications available from DIE can be found at: 
http://www.die-gdi.de 
